

# PHILOSOPHY

## THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

---

VOL. XXVII. No. 103

OCTOBER 1952

---

### ART IN THE *REPUBLIC*

D. R. GREY, M.A.

#### PART I

THE general thesis which I should wish to sustain on this topic is by no means new. It is, briefly, that even in the *Republic*, where the views on art which Plato propounds are notoriously unsatisfactory to the modern mind, this unsatisfactoriness is not due to any lack of aesthetic sympathy on Plato's part, but on the contrary to what is almost an excess of it. The position as far as I can understand it is this: the true artist (at least for the period of Platonic thought of which the *Republic* marks the culmination) is the philosopher, and true artistic insight is *episteme*. The work of art *par excellence* is primarily the philosopher's own life—that is, the philosopher himself. This position leads to two consequences. If we wish to discover what Plato thinks about aesthetic truth and aesthetic vision, we must turn to what he says about the "philosopher" and about *episteme*: and, secondly, it comes about that there is an opposition between what we refer to by "aesthetic understanding" or some similar phrase, and what Plato refers to by "philosophy." Because of this, "art" in its narrow sense is relegated to a lower place precisely because this type of understanding is exalted to the highest of all. Clearly, the artist is different from the philosopher; and if we claim aesthetic understanding for the philosopher and for him alone, we must give some other and humbler account of the artist. We could put the same general point otherwise by saying that Plato's philosophy as a whole amounts to the first Greek attempt to produce a theory of aesthetics; and that Plato apart, there is no Greek aesthetic theory. This paradox is, I think, true, though its truth is very complicated. We may approach its

complications by pointing out that the reasons for the emphasis Plato gives to aesthetic insight, and the reasons why he relegates "art" to a subordinate place, fall broadly into three classes. We have (i) the theory of *eide*; (ii) Plato's view of *techne*; and (iii) the attitude he takes to what we may call the theories about art current in his day.

The first of these is too special for consideration here, although any serious attempt to understand what Plato means in the *Republic* by "philosophy" must rest in the end on one's interpretation of what the *eidos* is. The other two require some preliminary remarks, which are mainly concerned with the difficulty of terminology and of how we can try to convey in English what Plato's Greek means. And since there is hardly one important notion in common between the language in which Plato is expressing his thought and the language in which we attempt to comprehend it, it seems best to indicate as well as I may the main *setting* in terms of which Plato is thinking about the topic of art. For the terminological difficulty is a difficulty for two reasons: on the one hand, there is no clearly established technical vocabulary in English for dealing with aesthetics; on the other hand, Plato in discussing art is not talking about what we are talking about when *we* discuss art.

The first half of this difficulty we may make shift to surmount by a few arbitrary usages. I shall use "art" throughout, unless otherwise specified, in its narrow sense of "fine art." And I shall intend to distinguish it from "craft"—i.e. action toward an external end—as some modern aestheticians do (e.g. Collingwood). This I do partly because it is a well-established use, though not altogether a lucid one, and partly because it serves to distinguish ethics from aesthetics. In general, I think we do distinguish, though we would normally allow connections between the two; and it may be that in an adequate theory of beauty they would have to fuse together, as they do for Plato. But so far as possible I wish to avoid all commitment to any modern view, since I think this would be violently prejudicial to understanding Plato. Accordingly I shall use "modern aesthetic theory" and so forth in *broad* contrast to Plato, intending to imply by it all theories which make some distinction and difference between the notions of "morally good" and "beautiful." I cannot, I think, avoid a double use of "aesthetic," which corresponds to one of the primary differences between Platonic thought and our own. In a context such as "modern aesthetic theory," it will mean "primarily connected with, about, or deriving from, beauty." In a context like "Greek aesthetic theory" it will mean the nearest that the Greeks come to any discussion about "art" in the modern sense. In general, in such a context, and always in a Platonic context, it will mean "connected with beauty" where beauty is to be taken,

in accordance with the *Republic* and the *Symposium*, either as *identical* with Good, or as an aspect of Good; but in any case with an extremely close connection between them, so that the one is not to be thought of without the other. They are not quite correlative notions, like concave and convex, because this implies some opposition. Nor are they related like "square" and "quadrilateral." Perhaps we may paraphrase Plato, and say that the connection is like that between heat and light, where *both* are to be regarded as the essence of the sun.

The other half of the difficulty I shall try to meet by making what must appear as dogmatic remarks. Their justification would lie in an exposition of the theory of *eide* as it appears in the *Republic*, if that exposition were itself sustained. I will lay it down, then:

(a) That for the Greek there is no distinction between "the beautiful" and "the morally good": or better, that there is no distinction between aesthetic good and ethical good. "Ethical" is used here as a wider notion than "moral"; to cover what Plato means by *arete*. This is a very wide notion indeed: in *Rep.* 601D he speaks of the ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζώου καὶ πράξεως. The *arete* of a tree or a stone and that of a man are not different in kind, although the one is a moral creature and the others are not. Insofar as anything has *arete*, it exhibits aesthetic good *and* ethical good (you cannot have the one without the other, although they may be developed to different degrees); although the ethical connotation may vary enormously from the case where moral goodness is negligible or non-existent, as with the tree, to the maximal case where moral good is co-extensive with aesthetic good, and the two become one. There is so far as I can see no Greek word for "beautiful," at any rate by Plato's time: *kalos*, like *agathos*, is a fluid notion which is susceptible of different degrees and different kinds of emphasis. But where we have *kalos*, *agathos* or some equivalent seems always to be suggested, as it were by innuendo. It is not an accidental collocation when Plato writes ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης. The point is that "good" and "beauty" are not *separable*: the differences throughout the range of application are differences in *one* range. They are mediated and united by *arete*, with its shifting meanings according to context. Often enough, the predominant notion is that of function (as in Xenophon's wheel which is *dikaios*, and Homer's καλὰ πέδιλα, of Hermes' sandals). But we must beware of taking "function" too narrowly: the *Republic* itself is only one indication of what the word means for Plato.

(b) Similarly there is no distinction in kind between values and non-values. I will try to make sense of this obscure remark by saying this: The *harmonia*, which is basic for Pythagorean and Platonic thought, and I would maintain for Greek thought generally,

is seen indifferently (i) as aesthetic, in music or sculpture or architecture; (ii) as ethical, that is to say, teleologically, as conducive to, or as the result of, *arete*; (iii) as mathematical, as a numerically expressible ratio or *logos*; (iv) as logical, as the ground of being, the "reason why"; (v) as metaphysical (closely connected for Plato with the last), as the essential "what"; (vi) as a principle of order, that is, as what we call "the uniformity of Nature." Thus there is in principle no difference between the moral and aesthetic law (the golden mean), the law of reason, the law of Nature, the law of mathematics. They are all different ways of seeing the same thing; hence there is no break in subject-matter between them. They are all manifestations of, effects of, and ultimately the nature of, that "order" which is one-half of the fundamental Greek antithesis between chaos and cosmos, which gives us also the Platonic equation of the "intelligible" and the "real." The various meanings of *logos* all reflect this identity-in-difference: it is not by accident that Plato speaks of *καλὸς λόγος* in *Rep.* 401D, at the end of the passage where he is indicating what the true artist should do. Accordingly, the basic object of knowing is in principle indifferent as between the approach of science, logic, mathematics, ethics, and aesthetics, though each such approach individually will reveal only one aspect—partial, and therefore distorted or liable to distortion. This "basic object" is what Plato calls the *eidos*. I say "in principle," because the emphasis Plato gives to any one of these approaches differs as his thought develops, and one is apt to suppose that where one is emphasized in any given dialogue the others are to be ruled out. In the *Republic*, for example, the whole stress comes on ethical and aesthetic insight, scientific understanding drops to second place (*dianoia*), and logic is not explicitly considered at all. In the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus* the emphasis shifts to logic and to conceptual knowledge, and ethical-aesthetic insight is correspondingly neglected. But as far as I can see, Plato's main position never alters. He holds that the most important truths are those given by an insight which is sensitive at once to ethical and aesthetic good, and that it is beauty and goodness which, so to speak, give *sense* to reality. This is very much the view that we are concerned with in the *Republic*. He expresses it, there and in the *Symposium*, by the doctrine of *eros* on the one hand and on the other by the assertion that the *eidos* of Good is the source of all knowledge and of all being.

From all this, two conclusions follow which are immediately important, if we are to consider Plato's view of *techne* and his attitude to Greek aesthetic theory. They are: that there is thus no separation between "science" and "art," and that there is no separation between ethics and aesthetics. And it will also be clear, I hope, from what I have tried to indicate, that insofar as ethical-

aesthetic insight acquires importance in the *Republic* as the type of *philosophic* understanding, any rival claims on behalf of a *non-philosophic* activity will be depressed; and further that the general philosophical position of the dialogue will direct and colour what Plato has to say there about art. Thus there are two main contextual influences at work on Plato's discussion of this topic in the *Republic*: one the general philosophical position that he is there maintaining, and secondly the political and educative setting in which the topic arises. In one sense we should expect them both to operate together. We should expect that when he comes to discuss art, the *combined* influence of the two will make moral considerations primary. But in another sense the two will operate, we should expect, in *opposed* directions. For the emphasis on ethical-aesthetic insight in philosophy will tend toward the position which would explicitly assert that art *is* philosophy; but on the other hand, the political and educative function of art will not belong to the philosopher *qua* philosopher, but to the philosopher *qua* pilot or guide. Thus we should expect a *distinction* between art and philosophy; and we should expect that insofar as they are distinguished, art will have scant justice done to it in proportion as it is subordinated to philosophy. We should expect to find, then, a tension or opposition whereby on the one hand the two are identified, and on the other art is subordinated to philosophy; and we should expect this to happen in a context which stresses the moral values at the expense of the aesthetic where the second alternative predominates, but which identifies aesthetic and moral values where the first alternative predominates.

This, I suggest, is precisely what we do find. I will try to deal with it first in terms of current Greek aesthetic theory; but I should make it plain that all three classes of reasons (the *eide*, *techne*, current theories) are operating at once, modified by the two main influences of context I have mentioned. So that what we have is an extremely subtle interplay between two contradictions, which admits at any point of a six-fold analysis. For the sake of simplicity I am treating as separate what in fact is one aspect of a living unity of thought: the analysis kills, but it does, I think, help us to understand. I do not suggest, of course, that Plato is consciously multiplying complications in this way, but I do suggest that we should take them into account, if we are to grasp what he is saying about art and why he is saying it.

Of what he says the passage at 401B *seq.* is typical. True art must be like a "health-giving breeze from happy places": it must lead men "from childhood unawares, to love, resemble and be in harmony with the beauty of reason"—or however one is to translate *καλῶ λόγῳ*. True art will imitate only what is morally uplifting: accordingly Plato advocates a censorship which will ban all poetry which is

mimetic (the suggestion here being that some poetry is not), or at least ensure that only the right kind of things are imitated. Similarly with the other fine arts; and Book X reaffirms this position, with metaphysical and psychological arguments based apparently on the view that all art is mimetic. In short, unless art is *utile* as well as *dulce*, it can find no place in the ideal state.

Now Professor Webster<sup>1</sup> has pointed out that we may distinguish seven ways of thinking about art which were or had been current in Plato's time. Of these, four are important for our purpose, since they are espoused by Plato. In the *Republic*, he adopts explicitly the view that art educates and the view that it is *mimesis*. Implicitly, we find also the hedonic view of art, that it is a matter of pleasing—to which, as we shall see, he gives a special twist, and the view that the artist is divinely inspired. We may perhaps take the myth of this dialogue (as of others) as a practical example of the inspirational view, the theory of which is propounded in the *Ion* and the *Phaedrus*; but I think it is more importantly latent in what Plato considers, in the *Republic*, to be the nature of true knowledge, of the philosopher, and of the *eide* themselves. Its detailed discussion therefore belongs elsewhere.

It seems that by Plato's time the aesthetic theory most predominant was that art is *mimesis*. Certainly the *practice* of art (whatever may have been the theory about it) becomes more and more "realistic" from the late fifth century onward—the schools of illusionistic painting, the proverbial hare of Polygnotus—and we can trace the change from the time of Euripides as it persists through the Hellenistic period and beyond, whether in comedy or sculpture, in Theocritus or Herondas or in the curious and exquisite production of Longus. The aim and effect of this type of art is exemplified in the genre of epigrams whose sole purpose is to say how "life-like" a work of art may be. It is then not surprising that Plato, with an eye on contemporary practice, should adopt the mimetic theory. But in adopting the educative theory as well, he provides us with a *tour de force*. For the natural emphasis of the mimetic theory is on "realism" and on the technique of producing illusions. Art is thus a *pseudos*, a deliberate deceit, a dodge, a trick: the work of art is a copy, known to be a copy, which gets its effect by deceiving us into thinking, for a moment, that it is the real thing. The connection between this and the major epistemological distinction in the *Republic* is obvious. As long as we hold this view of art, there can be no question of experiencing the "real thing"—the work of art is a matter of *doxa*, of "outward show" or semblance, and the shifting "opinion" based on this alone. And worse, it is a semblance whose very being is to seem *real*; it is an instance of that inversion or

<sup>1</sup> In the *Classical Quarterly*, XXXIII (1939), p. 166.

perversion of being and knowledge which Plato calls in another context the "lie in the soul." Metaphysically, the work of art is "at three removes from reality."

In saying this much, Plato is adopting the aesthetic theory of his own day, with all the implications which his system gives to it. But there is nothing in this view which can allow it to be linked *naturally* with an educative view of art. Quite the contrary. For on this kind of view, what "realist" art must do is to imitate successfully: this is the only criterion one can apply, apart from aesthetic criteria proper—i.e. is the work beautiful? And the more successfully it imitates, the more egregious the deceit. This is no example for the youth of Plato's state. Further, "realism" in art requires representation not of this or that particular aspect of a thing, but of any and every aspect; it means representing not only the "good," but also the "bad." Providing it imitates successfully, *what* it imitates is beside the point. This kind of aesthetic theory, then, leaves no room for morality, except incidentally and insofar as the subject imitated may happen to exhibit moral characteristics. It is not our purpose here to consider the theory as a manifestation or result of the political and moral dissolution which disturbs Thucydides (nor yet to inquire how far it is the beginning of the separatism and syncretism of the Hellenistic period). But the point did not escape Plato. It is indeed obvious that he was much exercised and concerned by the course which contemporary art was pursuing; and it is equally obvious that the average educated Athenian would connect art and politics (since they were different, or identical, expressions of the same thing, the *polis*) and that we can transfer bodily to art what Plato says in the 7th Letter about the contemporary political scene.

These, then, are the natural implications of the mimetic theory. It is at odds with the educative view, that the function of art is to improve. Yet Plato adopts it—although he specifically connects art with morals; not merely by the implications of his philosophical position, and the close relation between Beauty and Good, but by what he says or supposes about the function of art. And what is more, he makes this connection in terms of the very theory of art which is least adapted to sustain it. Art must imitate what *ought* to be, he says: that is, it should be both mimetic *and* educative. Hence the immediate shift in 377 *seq.* to the question of what is *worth* imitating in literature. This gives not merely the ethical complexion which Athenian art so strongly exhibited when the educative theory was in its heyday, but an explicitly *moral* tone. In terms of Greek aesthetic theory, what Plato seems to be doing in adopting the educative theory as well as the mimetic is to advocate a return to the artistic *practice* (but idealized) of the previous century, while accepting the *theory* behind that of his own. Mimesis *needn't* lead,

he virtually insists, to the decadence and neuroticism into which art has in fact lapsed. That comes about if you imitate the wrong sort of things. Let us have mimetic art by all means, but let it imitate what is noble. It is as if one should advocate the "realism" of Jane Austen rather than that of Hemingway. The mimetic theory does not indeed lead naturally to this sort of art, but it is not entirely incompatible with it.

But it so happens that the practice which accompanied the educative theory of art was not mimetic, but hortative; as we would say, the art of Pindar and Sophocles and the rest is not "realist," but "ideal" or "typical." Part of Plato's difficulty is that there is no adequate aesthetic theory which explains the practice he has in mind: art either educates or imitates. There is as yet no theory of what art *is*, only theories about what it does or should do. And art can improve precisely because it does *not* imitate, but on the contrary transcends, our ordinary experiences. Plato is in fact struggling after a theory of aesthetics which does not find full expression before Hegel. But it is a theory which cannot be held until we have isolated that kind of activity we call art. And the Greeks could not do this: they have no word for art, and hence no specific isolation of it in thought. They have only *techne*, which means something quite different. Plato has to conduct his discussion in terms of the four theories we have noticed; and none of them is really what he wants. This is one reason why he commits himself to the contradictory position which demands on the one hand that the artist should have philosophic vision, and denies on the other that he can.

The junction Plato makes between the mimetic and the educative theory may be expressed by saying that he urges that art should imitate only the ideal, that is, the thing in its aspect of complete *arete*. But this leads directly to the requirement that the artist should have true knowledge, as the philosopher has. Otherwise, how *can* he produce this imitation? Even the carpenter in the *Cratylus* works with the *eidos* in his mind's eye. *A fortiori*, so will the poet. And if this is so, what becomes of the mimetic view proper, and the "third remove" view of the work of art? Thus Plato solves one difficulty only to raise another. Indeed we can discern three incompatibilities in his joint adoption of the mimetic and the educative view: (i) the fact that they are not naturally allied; (ii) the fact that the mimetic view, taken strictly, conflicts with the theory of art as God-inspired;<sup>1</sup> (iii) the fact that the mimetic view

<sup>1</sup> Space forbids a detailed discussion of this theory. But what holds for the educative theory, as against the mimetic theory, holds for the inspirational theory also. It is not *naturally* allied with the mimetic view; what inspiration or Divine gift of frenzy is needed, if all the artist does is to produce accurate copies? It is only if art is to be prophetic, or to "inspire" in the sense of

would naturally lead to some dissociation of the aesthetically good from the ethically good. A complicated interplay of these three underlies what is said both in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*.

We cannot study this interplay in detail here; but we may note that whereas the prevailing and explicit view adopted in the *Republic* is that art is the imitation of imitations, based not upon true insight but upon fallible "opinion," there are indications which if taken seriously lead us straight to the view that the artist copies the *eide* and exercises *episteme* or philosophical insight in the process. Thus in 401B, where Plato has been stating what art should do, we find the significant remark that the Guardians will not be properly trained or educated (*παιδευτέον*)—sc. by art, among other things—until they can recognize the *eide* of "temperance, courage, liberality, and all other kindred qualities";<sup>1</sup> that these must be apprehended both in their own right and in image, as they are in things; and that we are to realize that both the *eide* and their images belong to the same *τέχνη καὶ μελέτη* (402 c.). But unless the artist recognizes the *eide*, how can he make images of them? Again, the point of 595 seq. is that the artist has not, in fact, the knowledge that he ought to have if he is to be "good." "Some people tell us," says Plato, "that the *good* poet must have knowledge of that about which he writes; otherwise he could not write *καλῶς*" (598E). But most artists deceive, producing images which are not the result of knowledge, "which is an easy thing to do without knowing the truth." We may recall *Soph.* 267B, where art comes under the craft of producing copies; but there are those who *know* what they imitate, and those who don't; the majority of artists are ignorant of *δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῆς* and imitate their "vague notion" of it—*δοξάζοντες δέ πη*. If we take seriously the point about knowing what one copies, we are led to the full doctrine exemplified by the Line and the Cave. Again, there is the frequent simile whereby the philosopher is likened to the painter (whose art is otherwise taken as the *ne plus ultra* of semblance), as in 472D, 484C, 500–501B.

revealing triumphs of perfection to be aimed at, that this kind of view has any point. And in that case it is virtually equivalent to the educative view; it is merely being more explicit about whence the artist derives his authority and information, and the purpose of art remains the same. The doctrine of the *Republic* must mean that if the artist is inspired, this inspiration comes ultimately from the *eidos* of Good: that is, by philosophical vision. Hence insofar as Plato may be thought to have the inspirational theory in mind, in this dialogue, he will have similar difficulties with it.

<sup>1</sup> I cannot agree with Adam that there is no technical reference here, when it is apparent from 476A that the theory of *eide* is already known to at least one of the participants. Whether the *eide* are "immanent" or "transcendant" is beside the point, when one realizes what the *eide* are in this dialogue: for they will be both.

Indeed the question in 472D 4, epitomizes the theory of art Plato would like to hold, but which he cannot hold unless he allows art to coalesce with philosophy—"And do you think a man would be any the worse painter, if he should produce an exemplar of the ideal man (ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος), but couldn't show that this ideal could actually be realized?"

This kind of emphasis by itself must lead, I think, to the requirement that the true artist should have *episteme*; just as the mimetic view will lead to the same requirement if we hold, as Plato does, that art should imitate not what is but what ought to be. For that is tantamount to saying it must copy the *eide*. On the other hand, it is counterbalanced by the assertion, for which Book X gives metaphysical and psychological reasons, that the artist does not and cannot have such knowledge. Does not, granted: but why cannot? Simply because *qua* artist, he is *not* a philosopher. Plato uses the mimetic theory here *in malam partem*—or rather, with its *natural* implication, to insist that the artist is at the lowest level of the Line, and that his art is organized deceit. This is the explicit doctrine of the *Republic*, and where Plato is asserting it, he sacrifices aesthetic values to moral values—as in 387C, 387B, 390A, 398A: the ἡδύ, the ποιητικώτερον, must give way to the ὠφέλιμον.

We may wonder why, if they are to introduce this tension or opposition, Plato should adopt both the mimetic and the educative theory of art. Why, for example, should he not have dropped the mimetic view, and held to the educative—which would have served his ends quite easily on its own? Or why should he not have taken the mimetic view alone, and used the word as he does elsewhere, of the particular "imitating" the *eidos*? Then the educative view would automatically disappear into the mimetic theory, because of the teleological sense of mimesis, and we should have a straightforward parallel of the ἔρως doctrine of the *Symposium*—besides which, there would be a gain in simplicity, since the same notion would be operating equally in art, in metaphysics, and in psychology. Indeed this position is virtually implied by the admission that art is vital to education, that education is crowned by philosophy, and that philosophy involves the "kingly art" which is in the end (since sin is ignorance) identical with the art of living. The question why he should not adopt either of these alternatives is in part easy and obvious to answer, in part complex and obscure.

The easy part of the answer is given by pointing out that he could hardly do other than adopt *both* views. For the educative view is not so much a consciously advanced *theory* about what art does, as a flat historical statement about what it actually was doing in the Athenian polity. The facts were there; Plato could scarcely repudiate them. He could, and did, wish that art were doing better in this

task; but he could not pretend it was not doing it at all. Indeed we can almost deduce the theory from the word for "poet," with its double sense of making or creating (What? Clearly not the originals; obviously, *copies*) and of making somebody something, better or worse. It is latent in language, as well as patent in fact. As for the mimetic view, Plato was clearly influenced by the artistic practice of his day, whether or not we are to say that the appropriate theory was consciously propounded by those who practised it. Admittedly, he can give it a twist which serves his ends, but there is no need for him to give it that particular twist. In any case, the general testimony of Greek literature goes to show that in the psychological discussion of Book X, for example, Plato is doing no more than to make explicit the normal feelings of the normal Greek confronted with poetry and music.

The other part of the answer is not so easily come by. To give it thoroughly, we have to take up the same question successively from three different points of view, considering it in terms of the *eide*, of *techne*, and of aesthetic theory as such. So far, I have tried to discuss the last of these—at some length, yet more briefly than it requires. This discussion itself, I think, provides the answer, or rather that part of it. In the next section I will attempt it from the point of view of *techne*; but it may be well to summarize the position so far.

The interplay between the mimetic and the educative theories of art in the *Republic* may be seen:

(a) As the outcome of an opposition between two incompatible doctrines. The one is that art is "philosophy" in a different guise (in Plato's special sense of philosophy); the other is that art is different from philosophy and subordinate to it. The influence *tout pur* of the *eide* and the epistemological doctrines exemplified by the Line and the Cave lead to the first position; and the educative theory of art is consonant with this provided we grant the artist knowledge of the *eide*. On the other hand, the mimetic theory taken in its natural form leads to the "third remove" position and to the subordination of art to philosophy, with the consequent sacrifice of aesthetic values proper to moral values. But this happens only because art must be "useful," in the widest and best sense. And so once more we are back at the *impasse*: for only philosophy can tell us of utility in *this* sense. Neither theory will give Plato what he wants, and no amount of juggling with the two will really solve his dilemma.

(b) The dilemma may be considered in another way. What Plato is anxious to maintain is "idealist" practice in art, and a view of art which enables it to transcend human experience by hinting at the perfection of what "really" is, i.e. what ought to be. But he cannot adopt such a theory without identifying art and philosophy,

## PHILOSOPHY

unless he is to break the mould of his Greek thought and achieve a post-Renaissance insistence on art as the special activity of the beautiful as distinct from the ethically good. In fact, he has to work with the thought of his period and a language which articulates that thought in a certain way. Thus he embraces two incompatible theories. The educative (or equally the inspirational) view would lead to an identification of philosophy and art; the mimetic view, taken strictly, to the entire banishment of art from the ideal state. He fuses the two; by distinguishing aesthetic from moral issues he contrives to suppress some art (considered as mimesis) while retaining that which is mimetic of the good (considered as educative art). And by insisting judiciously on mimesis *tout pur* he can sustain the "third remove" position and subordinate art, so distinguished, to philosophy. Thus he constantly shifts his emphasis to maintain an equilibrium; but the equilibrium is unstable, because it is an equilibrium of incompatibles.

This I suggest is a *description* of what, in these terms, is going on in the *Republic*. If we ask *why* it should go on—why Plato should put himself in this dilemma at all, the real answer comes from a consideration of what the *eide* mean for this dialogue. And it is that Plato is so convinced of the paramount importance of quasi-aesthetic insight (of which they are the objects) that art as such is swallowed up in his view of philosophy. There is, properly, *no* place for art in the *Republic*, because the whole philosophical, political, and metaphysical conception is aesthetic from beginning to end.

## PART II

WE come now to the second part of the answer to the question I have raised—viz. why Plato should adopt two theories of art in the *Republic* which are incompatible with one another, the mimetic theory and the educative theory. We are to deal with it in terms of *techne*; and once more we may best approach it by considering something of the general character of the thought involved.

Where Plato's treatment of art seems offensive or unsatisfactory to the modern mind, it is because he refuses to allow that the activity of art is independent as well as autonomous. Modern writers, for example, may regard art as a type of "expression" which is its own justification; they may be inclined to hold that art is a way of reaching truth, just as "science" and "religion" are ways of reaching truth, and that the aesthetic aspect of truth so attained is at least co-ordinate with "religious" or "ethical" truth and with "scientific" truth. Hence art may stand on its own feet: it is its own cause, its own justification, its own end. Whatever we may think about this

way of viewing art; it is certainly not Plato's. And the reason why he thinks differently, or the main reason why, is that for him τὸ καλόν and τὸ ἀγαθόν form a unity, and hence the ethical cannot be kept out of art. It follows that art is not an independent activity; like all other kinds of activity, it must minister to, and be justified by, the realizing of the Good whether in the community as a whole or the individual as a whole. Otherwise put, art is a species of *techné*.

Thus, if we say, as I have done, that the entire conception of the *Republic* is through and through aesthetic, we must be careful to use this word with a Greek and not with a modern connotation. In adopting these theories about "art," Plato is not working out a theory of art in the sense in which he is working out a theory of philosophy—what it is, and what its place is in human activity. For what he is concerned with is a species of *techné*; and that makes all the difference, although it is almost impossible to find English words which can explain what the difference is. He is indeed working out a theory of *something*, but what that something is is not "art" in its modern sense: it is what he calls elsewhere a sub-branch of ἡ εἰδωλοποικὴ τέχνη (*Soph.* 266D). The very same factors, which enable him to achieve almost an organic unity and consistency in the philosophical doctrine of the *Republic*, preclude him from throwing the activity of what *we* call "art" into sharp relief and contrasting it with other activities. The chief reason for this is the fusion of beauty with ethical and moral good, which gives as *one* of its by-products (and not the only one, as some think) an emphasis which emerges in one of its guises in the *Republic* as the political setting in which art is to be exercised and discussed. But the important point is that insofar as the Good-Beautiful is the object of *philosophic* knowledge, "art" is as it were robbed in advance of its most essential characteristic; so that when it is contrasted with philosophy, it is already a shadow of itself. Thus art is really not in contrast *with* philosophy, but a pale reflection *of* it; and this very fact produces a constant tendency for art to subside into philosophy and be identified with it. The difficulty is further complicated because Plato is an artist, in his philosophizing, in a way in which he is not, for example, a mathematician: this doubtless accounts also in part for the aesthetic-ethical emphasis of the *Republic*. Hence it comes about that some modern aestheticians proper, dealing with art as separate from morals or politics or science, can make the same sort of statements about art as Plato makes about philosophy—sometimes without even recognizing the connection.

But in the *Republic*, art is no more clear-cut—in fact, less so—than "science" is. And despite the illustrations of the Line and the Cave, the position of science, or at any rate mathematical science, remains equivocal. On the one hand, it is distinguished from philo-

sophic insight and subordinated to it (in the upward movement of the dialectic, and the passage out of the Cave); on the other, by the downward movement of the dialectic, it is absorbed *into* philosophy. And if mathematics, we may inquire, why not art? Why should Plato disallow those glimpses of the ideal, or the light that never shone on land or sea, which art can give? Why should he allow, in the *Symposium*, that beauty in its various forms is a stepping-stone to ultimate truth, and yet in the *Republic* so largely deny that art is, while insisting that it should be? I have given the answer I cannot here defend: it is because philosophy is the supreme form of art, and so art cannot serve as a stepping-stone in the way that mathematics does. Beauty can do it in the *Symposium*, because there we are not dealing (except by implication) with Good. But when we look twice, it becomes plain that the expositions of the Line and the Cave and the dialectic of the *Republic* are simply the *Symposium* doctrine put into a more elaborate and reticulated form, with the ethical innuendo of *kallos* now made explicit. Thus aesthetic-ethical insight, knowledge of the *eidos* of Good, is the archetype of all knowledge, and all other knowledge derives from it.

Underlying this whole position, and in part explaining it, is the Platonic view of *techne*. *Techne* once more is a notion of wide and variable range: comprised in it is any activity by which the mind orders, after a rational fashion (this phrase is tautological for "orders" in Greek thought) its immediate environment, the self, and its less immediate environment, the "external world," including its own body. Thus it is neither "art" nor "craft" nor "science," but all three; and it follows that there is no clear thought of "art" in its narrow sense in Greek, any more than there is in Latin. Because of this meaning, Plato is able to treat morality (*dikaiosyne*) as an art; and what is too often termed the "analogy between justice and other arts" is the basis of the entire discussion and definition, from 332C to the end of the *Republic*. But in truth it is more than an analogy: it is the same principle of form (and hence, for Plato, of being) exemplified in different instances. Morality is a *techne* because the basic notion of *techne* is that of putting order into chaos, in accordance with some purpose, and after some determinate pattern. There is thus a direct connection between the definition of morality as τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν and the "analogical" argument with Thrasy-machus (cf. especially 349E and 352D, E *seq.*): or again with *Lysis* 210B—"where we know what is what, we are in our own proper province, and we act with benefit"—and the whole assertion, in all its ramifications, that goodness is a matter of knowledge. This brief indication may serve to show that the conception of *techne* is always at work in the *Republic*; and we must turn to its immediate consequences for the discussion of art.

## ART IN THE REPUBLIC

(a) In the first place, *technē* applies indiscriminately to the whole range of human activity, insofar as that activity is implicitly orderly or rational. The differences between one *technē* and another, marked by the adjectives in phrases like "the war-like art," "the mathematical art," and so on, appear to be not so much differences in a type of *activity* as such, as differences of the order, purpose and pattern by which the activity regulates itself. Thus *technē* is derived with a rather pointed joke from *ἐξω νοῦ*, "active state of insight," in *Crat.* 414B, and *Soph.* 219A hints at it as a kind of *dynamis*. It comes about, then, that in principle the "artist" is in the same category as the politician, the shoemaker, the mining engineer, the philosopher.

(b) There is no notion quite corresponding to "means and end" in terms of which art might be distinguished from craft: since the means and end concepts involved operate in a context which conflates or confounds art *with* craft. We might wish, for example, to adopt Collingwood's distinction, in terms of which the "end" of art is one with its "means," while the "end" and the "means" of a craft (e.g. food production) are not thus unified. But in fact this kind of distinction turns in Plato's hands into that between "insight bare of practice" and "insight organically fused with practice" (*Pol.* 258D); and once more art in its narrow sense is grouped with the manual crafts, or with those combining "theory" with "practice." In fact, the "end" of any *technē* is conceived as lying outside the activity itself; the proper "work" or product of a *technē* (its *ergon*, cf. *Rep.* 363 seq.) is always useful for some other *technē*. And the "end" is always the Good (cf. *Gorg.* 468). Again, "art" is thus assimilated to "craft," and the effect is that "art" has inevitably attached to it an end or purpose which lies outside the aesthetic creativity itself. In short, art is educative. Thus the educative theory is implied in the concept of *technē* itself.

(c) This same principle imports a hierarchical order into the arts. And in terms of the three most concerned in the *Republic*, it means that "art" is subsidiary to education, which in turn is subsidiary to philosophy, which in its turn is (though sometimes doubtfully) subsidiary to the "art of living." (Politics at times serves education, and at times is served by it.) Thus we are reminded in *Rep.* 352D and in 608B that the dialogue is concerned "with no casual topic, but with the question of what is the right way to live"; and in 353 we are told that the *ergon* of the soul is to live, and its *arete* is to live morally. We have therefore the same effect as before, brought about by the hierarchical relations of one *technē* to another as well as by the notion of the activity of *technē* taken on its own. Again, art is educative.

(d) Such *technai* are distinguished according to the ends they

serve, the *ergon* they produce and the type of order they are concerned with, we have the *product* of "art" thrown into relief in separation from the activity which produces it. The artist's product is clearly not the original: what can it be but a likeness, an image, a copy, which is the result of an imitative ordering? And no incompatibility is felt between the "creativity" of art and its imitativeness. For the sense in which the work of art is "original" is subsumed into the inspirational theory maintained explicitly by Plato elsewhere (or dismissed rather uneasily as *ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύ*, as in 398A); and the sense in which "art" is creative is swamped in the creative or productive activity which belongs to *any technē*. So that the emphasis is free to fall on the product of "art," the copy. And thus we find the mimetic theory operative.

(e) For Plato the hedonic theory of art—that it is a matter of giving pleasure to gods or men—seems to disappear into the *parergon* or "accidental concomitant" of a *technē*. Thus the pleasure which the right kind of art will give will indeed be the *accompaniment* of the identification of the audience or spectator with the ethical ideal portrayed, but it will not be the "end" (*τὸ οὐ ἐνεκά*) of art, nor even its proper *ergon*. (We may perhaps compare the remark of Plotinus in *Enn.* 6, vii, 25, that if we associate pleasure with the Good as an *essential* aspect of it, we are thinking not of *the* Good but of *our* good.) I think Plato would argue that if we make the aesthetic pleasure given by art of primary importance, we are perverting the true notion of art. Thus an hedonic view which stresses aesthetic pleasure is a view of art which substitutes for its proper end what is merely a *parergon*; just as "the cosmetic art" is a perversion of the art of medicine, produced by substituting for the true end of medicine, good health, the *parergon* of it, and then creating a perverted art to produce this perversion as its *ergon*.

Thus the attitude which Plato takes in the *Republic* and which causes him to sacrifice aesthetic values proper to moral values is parallel to, and indeed is a partial expression of, his cardinal doctrine of the perversion to which *technē* is subject,<sup>1</sup> and which is found in his treatment of sophistry. The connection is very close, since "art" appears in the *Sophist* as explicitly conjoined with "thinking," of which sophistry is a perversion. The *Republic* is not quite so explicit; but it is clear enough that where Plato dismisses the aesthetic proper, he does so very largely in the belief that otherwise "art" will become perverted and get out of hand—or rather, that it has become so already by reason of the indiscriminate and vicious imitation of contemporary artists. It is this conviction which underlies the "third remove" position, and which is illustrated psychologically in Book X. The illustration, in fact, gives another example of this

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Plato's Theory of Man*, John Wild, Harvard University Press, 1948.

## ART IN THE *REPUBLIC*

same perversion. It is not merely that indiscriminate imitation is the cause and the effect of perversion in "art"; it encourages a psychological perversion (i.e. of the *ergon* and hence the *arete* of the soul). Thus there is an added force to the operation of the mimetic theory, and an added reason why Plato should adopt it. And in operating in this way, the mimetic theory helps to support what is incompatible with it—the educative theory—in the interests of which Plato dismisses where necessary that kind of art which is not entirely consonant with his ideal.

For all of these reasons, then, I suggest that the discussion and treatment of art in the *Republic* is affected by the notion of *technē*. But I can do no more than allude to them, because the notion operates in another way which also demands attention. I have pointed out what seems to me a constant tension between the claims of "art" and those of "philosophy"; and this too may be considered in terms of *technē*. In some respects the distinction between "theory" and "practice," with its affinities with "knowing how" and "knowing that," cuts across the activity of *technē*. We have noticed already that in the *Politicus* (258 seq.) Plato makes a division between *technai* which are concerned with insight alone, and those in which theory and practice are organically one—thereby depriving himself of a possible differentia for "art" in its modern sense. This whole question has repercussions on the relative position of art and philosophy in the *Republic*.

For the sake of simplicity, let us take only one instance, as an example of what is going on. In 601D Plato epitomizes the conflation which is *technē*, with the remark that there are three *technai* concerned with any object: that of using it, of making it, and of imitating it. It looks as if we have as clear a distinction as one could wish between art and philosophy, with no question of their conflict. For philosophy, we know, is theoretical; the pilot of 487E seq. gazes at the stars; in 486A the philosopher "contemplates all time and all existence," and the whole emphasis of the Line and the Cave, with the upward movement of the dialectic, tells the same story. And if this were the whole story, we should indeed have the clearest possible distinction between "art" and philosophy. For "art" would be a *technē*, and philosophy would not. And that would allow art to be as educative as Plato liked; he could even openly insist that art should properly involve *epistēmē*, and that what the artist imitates are the *eide*. As long as the philosopher is a "spectator," we can distinguish him from the "doer," the artificer (*technites*); and we could assert explicitly that the only true artist is the philosopher—not indeed *qua* philosopher, but quite simply *qua* artist.

The argument seems odd: and it is—so odd that Plato cannot adopt it. It is impossible for two reasons. In the first place, by

definition *techne* must include philosophy; and in the second place, any *techne* must involve both theory and practice, though the sense of "practice" will not be identical in each case. Plato is using an equivocation, when he makes his bold division in the *Politicus*. But in the *Republic* he allows *techne* to have its natural implication; and philosophy is *not* purely contemplative. In fact, by the paradox that the philosopher is the "best doer," because he alone *knows*, and by the downward movement of the dialectic and the Cave. Plato makes in the *Republic* the assertion that philosophy is *par excellence* the *χρωμένη τέχνη*. (cf. Adam's note on 601D, 27). But if "the art of using a thing" turns into philosophy, the apparent distinction between that and "the art of imitating it" really collapses. For as we have seen, the sense of "imitate" which Plato really wants to use—the effect of which he contrives by adopting the educative theory—is such as to lead to the identification of art with philosophy.

*Techne* is here operating in a complex fashion, and what we have is the same tangle of notions which leads Aristotle to divide "theoretical science" from *techne*, and Plotinus to his paradoxical argument that all action exists for the sake of contemplation, and that practice is a *parergon* of theory (*Enn.* 3, viii, 3; 8). Could Plato adopt this position, art could be subsumed into the *practical* aspect of philosophy (as mathematics is by the downward movement of the dialectic) while remaining distinct from philosophy *qua* contemplative, even though the type of insight employed by both be identical. The position of art would then be parallel to that of mathematical science; in the upward movement, it would be subsidiary, providing a stepping-stone to apprehension of the *eidos* of Good; and in the downward movement it could be included in philosophy. This is in fact what is implied by the teaching of the *Symposium*, where contemplation predominates. But it is not the teaching of the *Republic*. Mathematics has its separate objects of apprehension; but "art" has not, for the very good reason that the *eide* themselves are conceived in this dialogue as the objects of an insight virtually indistinguishable from that of art.

Thus although it is only the concept of *techne* which enables Plato to put art in ostensible contrast with "the art of making" and "the art of using" a thing, this same concept implies a partial identity between art and philosophy (each of them is at once something more and something less than what we mean by "art"). And he cannot employ the practical-theoretical distinction to separate them, because *techne* itself cuts across this distinction. Further, the mimetic theory collapses, since the true artist must "imitate" not what is, but what ought to be—and only the philosopher can apprehend that. Both Proclus and Plotinus reject Plato's delicate balance, and explicitly assert that art portrays the *eide* themselves.

## ART IN THE *REPUBLIC*

The division of *Rep.* 601D reappears in a slightly different form in the *Sophist* (266D seq.). There productive *technai* are divided into "the art of making a thing" (ἀντουργική) and that which produces "copies" of them (εἰδωλοποιική). And under the latter fall both the activity of "art" and the activity of thinking, and hence of philosophy. εἰδωλοποιική is divided in turn into the arts producing a true copy (*eikon*) and those producing a mere "image" (*eidolon*) which amounts in the vocabulary of the *Republic* to the distinction between *doxa*, or properly *eikasia*, and *episteme*. Here again is the *Republic's* difference between good and bad art; and here the "third remove" implication of the mimetic theory is apparent, together with the whole question of perversion in an art (as the rest of the dialogue makes plain). And we can see the close connection of art and philosophy. Again, too, the implication is that the true artist must copy the *eide*. But the art of the man who apprehends the *eide* is, we know, either philosophy or the art of living—according to whether or not we are to identify the two. And then what is to become of the distinction between good and bad "art"? For if it is the nature of art to be "good art," i.e. to produce an *eikon*, then bad art is not "art" at all—it must be something else. Or if it is the nature of art to produce the *eidolon*, as the *Republic* insists when Plato is stressing the mimetic theory, then "good art" is not "art" at all, but something else, namely philosophy. The distinction of the *Sophist* is interesting because Plato is not there considering the ethical-aesthetic aspect of philosophic insight, and so he can develop his division without embarrassment. But if we interpret it in terms of the *Republic*, the dilemma becomes apparent. Either we have the mimetic theory and *eikasia*, or we have the educative theory and *episteme*. And in the second case "art" tends to coalesce with philosophy.

In general, it would seem that if Plato is to hold, as he does in the *Republic*, that "truths of reason" (roughly corresponding to the scope of *dianoia* in the Line and the Cave) and "truths of value" (roughly corresponding to the objects of *noesis*) both derive from the same source, namely, the *eidos* of Good, and are properly intelligible and corrigible only in terms of it, then he is bound to get into difficulties with "art" in its modern sense. For art involves awareness, and true art knowledge, of values; and it is involved in such awareness. But knowledge of this kind is attainable only by the philosopher. Further, all discursive "scientific" knowledge, in its true significance, is attainable only by the philosopher (cf. 511B). It follows that the philosopher is the only true *technites*; and within this conclusion, that he is the only true artist, just as he is the only true educator. On the other hand, his art is not that of the "artist" in the narrow sense. The product or *ergon* of philosophy is the good life; that is, the good man. At least, that must be our conclusion if

## PHILOSOPHY

we leave aside the contemplative-practical distinction, which if pursued will lead to a different conclusion, namely the neo-Platonic view that the philosopher lives to contemplate rather than contemplates in order to live. And if we add to all this the aesthetic-ethical emphasis in philosophy which is maintained in the *Republic*, it becomes clear why there should be the tension which alternately subordinates "art" to philosophy, and conflates them on equal terms.

What Plato wishes to hold is that whereas the philosopher lives the good life, the artist portrays it. But the artist, exercising as he does a *techné* which is not philosophy, cannot exercise that knowledge which differentiates the supreme *techné* from all others. Yet Plato sees that he ought to, if he is to educate rightly. Hence the interplay between the mimetic and educative theories of art. Again, under the wide range comprehended in *techné*, we have the art of living at the top, requiring *epistémé*, and at the bottom crafts like shoemaking, which do not require it. But in these terms the notion of an artist who educates is really self-contradictory, since it implies a *techné* which is not the art of living, but which nevertheless requires *epistémé*. Plato gets out of the contradiction as well as he can, by saying on the one hand that some art *cannot* be educative in the required sense, and by implying on the other that all art *would* be educative, if only the artist had the philosopher's knowledge.

I have deliberately exaggerated throughout, in an attempt to present in contrast various strands of thought in the *Republic*. It seems to me that in the discussion of art there, there are two main influences at work, and inside these two, two others. The two main ones are the philosophic position in terms of which Plato carries out the discussion—namely, the primacy of the *eidos* of Good as the source of all knowledge and being, and the type of insight which is thus made fundamental to all knowledge—and secondly, the political, social, and ethical context of a dialogue whose question is "What is morality?" Inside these, and influenced by them, we have the background of previous and contemporary aesthetic theory as one of the subsidiary factors, and the Platonic view of *techné* as the other. But the interplay between them all is not clear-cut, because *techné* is at the bottom of the philosophical position also: it dictates what Plato has to say about philosophy relative to education and to the art of statesmanship, and it is vital to the distinctions and assertions of the Line and the Cave, and all that they imply. The details of the shifting emphasis between two different conceptions of "art" are due, I think, to the interplay of these four factors. But the fact that the emphasis shifts at all is due to something else: it is due to an aesthetic sympathy which some people would doubtless condemn as excessive in a philosopher.

*University of Otago, N.Z.*

# THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

PHILIPPA FOOT, M.A.

## I

PHILOSOPHERS are often asked whether they can provide a defence against hostile theories which are said to be "undermining the foundations of morality," and they often try to do so. But before anything of this kind is attempted we should surely ask whether morality could be threatened in this way. If what people have in mind is simply that the spread of certain doctrines leads to the growth of indifference about right and wrong there is no philosophical problem involved. So long as we treat the matter as a case of cause and effect it will belong rather to the psychologist than the philosopher, and we have no reason for questioning that correlations of this kind may exist. But this is not the assumption, or not the only one, for people undoubtedly do think that if certain doctrines could be proved then moral judgment would have been shown to be "nonsensical," "meaningless," or "invalid," so that thereafter it would be not merely difficult but positively irrational to formulate and attempt to follow moral principles. It would be simple enough if the attack was supposed to be against some particular moral code, for there are recognized ways of arguing that a thing is not right but wrong. But when it is morality in general which is to be disproved or discredited it is difficult to see what this means or how it could be done. What would have to be shown is not that this or that is not right, but that nothing is—or not in the old sense—so that attacking moral judgment is not like attacking a theory but more like attacking theorizing itself, which shows where the difficulty lies. If something is stated it can be denied or disproved, but a moral judgment does not contain statements except about what in particular is right or wrong. Yet many people, though they would probably reject a request for a justification of morality in the form of some argument as to why we should do our duty, feel that morality would be in a positive sense *unjustifiable* if certain supporting truths were knocked away from the structure. This may indeed be so, but we are unable to show that it is, or to explain the matter by appealing to "presuppositions" of morality, which besides being far too vague would too easily include much that was linked merely psychologically to the recognition of obligation. I propose, therefore, to look at some specific arguments which are supposed by those who resist them to constitute a threat to morality, and to ask whether this supposition is justified.

First of all I shall take the current battle between objectivist and

subjectivist moral philosophers, for the question of how morality could be attacked, or defended, is particularly relevant here. What, after all, is an objectivist moral philosopher? What is common to all these positions which we call "objectivist" in ethics? We may be told that an objectivist is a man who believes in moral intuition, or in moral qualities, or who thinks that there are ethical facts, propositions, and truths, but these positions are obscure in themselves (what exactly is involved, for instance, in the question of whether there are ethical facts?), and the relation between them does not become clear until one sees that they are all being set up as defences against the subjectivist, who is thought to be attacking moral judgment. It is as if one saw a series of battles and wondered at first why particular positions were defended with such determination, the whole thing only becoming clear when the citadel was located. If the citadel was to be defended at all costs, and the front line positions were thought suitable to its defence, the common factor in these positions would be their relation to the citadel, and when one position fell another would be taken up which was supposed to serve the same purpose. Fundamentally the objectivist is out to defend morality, and he assumes that *some* doctrine such as that of moral properties, moral intuition or the truth and falsity of ethical statements is essential to this defence. Sometimes this is admitted (as by Professor Paton in his paper published in the *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, Volume XXII) but usually it is kept in the background, probably because the protagonist would agree with Hume that "there is no method of reasoning . . . more blameable, than in philosophical debates to endeavour to refute any hypothesis by a pretext of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality" (*Treatise*, Book II, Part III, Section II). But it is one thing to use such an argument and another to enquire whether a theory can have dangerous consequences, or rather (since this is the only thing with which we are concerned) dangerous implications. The philosopher who hurries to defend morality without looking into the philosophical problems raised by such an assumption is surely making a mistake.

The subjectivist may hold either that moral judgments express propositions about what the speaker feels, that is, that they refer to subjective properties such as being approved of or liked, or else that they do not refer to properties at all. I shall not discuss the first view because it has many times been refuted by those who point out that disagreement on what is right or wrong is not disagreement about whether the speaker really feels what he says he feels. It is not from this quarter that the subjectivist attack is at present feared.

The argument for the more radical position (the denial of moral properties) might start from Moore's "refutation of naturalism" (*Principia Ethica*, Chapters I and II) though Moore himself stopped

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

after a single application of his own method and so remained an objectivist with a theory of goodness as a simple non-natural quality<sup>1</sup>). What Moore did was to distinguish the two questions "Is such and such the meaning of the word 'good'?" and "Are such and such the things which are good?" pointing out that the denial of a generalization such as that made by Bentham involved no contradiction, and that a man could agree with the generalization without saying anything about the meaning of the ethical term. But if we apply the distinction more generally we shall see that Moore's own theory of goodness as a quality, and his comparison of goodness with yellowness, begins to seem more doubtful. For if no application of the word "good" in a moral judgment can be *linguistically* incorrect, which is what is involved in distinguishing the meaning of the word and the things to which it is applied, then it is difficult to see what is left of the theory of moral properties. Certainly the comparison of goodness with yellowness breaks down, for here the meaning of the word is determined by the things to which it is applied, and it would not make sense to say that people who called entirely different things yellow yet used the word with the same meaning. Someone once suggested the following example to make the contrast clear: it would make some sense to say that we had discovered a people who reversed all our moral judgments, thinking good all the things we thought bad and vice versa, but it would not make sense to report that some other race thought our blue things yellow and our yellow things blue.

It may be said that this is wrong, because we generally do know when a man says "a good action" what kind of thing he is talking about, so that the application of the term gives its meaning, and we should explain differences in moral codes as differences of meaning. But the answer is that our inference from the use of the moral term to the kind of action to which it was applied may be based on induction; knowing when a man uses a word is not *necessarily* knowing what he means by it. For we may have a different kind of connection here (e.g. a factual conjunction) and not one guaranteed by a verbal convention. The sign that we have a verbal convention is that consistency is accepted under the general agreement not to mislead which is the basis of language. (Compare with a case of the misuse of language that of a man who misleads us by the clothes he has put on; he knows perfectly well that we will draw the wrong conclusions, but unless he has accepted some special convention he may do as he pleases about this. The general language convention does not apply here.) The point is that we need not assume that when a man's moral judgments are fairly stable he automatically gives moral

<sup>1</sup> Of course Moore is not, historically speaking, the forerunner of the emotivist views. But Stevenson has recognized the connection between the two. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, p. 272.

## PHILOSOPHY

terms the meaning which this application could supply. He might do so, but where he found himself out of step with his community, or wanting to make a change in his own basic standards, he would then be obliged to notify his change of meaning, and it is obvious that on the whole people do not do this, and that no one accuses them of misusing language.

In any case, if ethical terms were tied down in some way to particular moral codes this would mean that the moral philosopher should invent his own terms, for he is not concerned with any one set of values, but with moral valuation in general, and it is extremely inconvenient to have to talk about part of the function of an existing word. It is easy for us to see that we could invent terms here, because the word "moral" already singles out for us the judgments in which these terms would appear, and because "good" and "right" always can be used without being restricted by meaning to particular actions. If no such terms were available we would have to undertake the laborious task of giving the situation in which our new words would rightly be used, but anyone who understands our present use of "moral" and so would know roughly what to look for in deciding whether another race made moral judgments, knows the kind of thing which would have to be said. For instance, within the general situation which we call "valuing" (and this again could be explained) we require that moral terms should be applied to things directly or indirectly within the agent's powers. We also require that he should be serious, that moral considerations should have a certain precedence, and so on. Naturally there could be cases where no clear decision was possible, and all sorts of interesting questions arise. For instance, what place should repentance be given in the concept of morality? If a man neither made any move towards doing an action nor seemed in any way troubled by this fact, and if this happened not once but continually, we might wonder whether "I ought" was the correct translation for the words which he had used. And yet when Nietzsche boasts that he has never felt a prick of conscience, saying "once it was done I should hate to leave an action of mine in the lurch" (*Ecce Homo*. Complete Works. Ed. O. Levy. Vol. XVII, p. 28) we hardly feel that this counteracts the strong impression that he speaks as a moralist.

What matters to us is that there are some obvious signs by which a moral judgment can be recognized however much its *content* differs from our own, and this is shown by the fact that we do understand a man who is making moral judgments diametrically opposed to our own; we understand what he says, though in another sense we do not understand him. Things would be very difficult for the moral reformer if terms like "right" and "good" were entirely appropriated by the majority for the things of which they approved, for he would have to

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

convince other people of his intention in some roundabout way. In fact we certainly can shed the reference to some particular code, and I shall hereafter follow this rule. If anyone objects, let him invent new terms in the manner described above, and substitute them for "good" and "right" in what follows.

It will be remembered that we embarked on this discussion in order to set out the arguments which the subjectivist might bring forward to support his denial of moral properties. He does not always give these arguments, and more often simply asserts that his opponent's appeal to moral intuition, moral facts, and special non-natural qualities is unintelligible, and proceeds to put forward an account of ethical sentences which avoids these difficulties.<sup>1</sup> He is therefore accused by the objectivist of having failed to argue his case, but I think that he could do so, and that the considerations set out here show that there really are difficulties in the moral property theory. The doctrine which we have called "the denial of moral properties" is a theory of meaning which contrasts statements such as "this is right" with statements such as "this is yellow." Now it is characteristic of the latter type of statement that there is always a way of reconciling opinions. Either there are tests which could be applied or else the designation is "ultimate," in which case there is an appeal to authority. It does not make sense to say "everyone else thinks this yellow, but it isn't really" unless one has in mind some test, or else an appeal to a more acceptable authority such as what "everyone" will say on most other occasions. Property words are to be applied according to the usage of the majority (or better the "authority") in the following ways. (1) It does not make sense to question all the examples on which we were taught the words. (2) If we find, once a word is learnt, that our classification does not in some particular instance conform to that of others, we say "It seemed (looked to me) such and such, but it isn't really." The fact that *in the last resort* it is right to label a dissident "abnormal" and shout him down is not as shocking as it sounds. It is a simple consequence of the purpose for which descriptive words are used, i.e. for representation, so that we can, for instance, indicate to someone the kind of thing that he is to expect.

The contrast with words such as "right" and "good" is obvious. There is nothing logically wrong with the idea of questioning all the moral judgments of those who taught one the use of moral terms, or indeed of everyone else in the world. But of course it is only because we have separated the application, i.e. the acts to which the terms were attached in moral judgment, from that part of the situation which determined the meaning of the terms, that this point can be

<sup>1</sup> See for instance C. L. Stevenson in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (Ed. P. A. Schilpp), p. 89.

## PHILOSOPHY

made. It would not be right to say that we could go back on the *examples* on which we were taught the use of moral terms if this were taken to mean that we used them in completely different situations, for instance without any reference to approval, or for some trivial expression of preference.<sup>1</sup> The case of particular divergencies of application show the same contrast with property words; for if we find ourselves out of step with other people and have exhausted the possibility of testing, we do not say "I thought it right (it seemed right) but it isn't really." All this follows once we have granted the possibility of the radical moral reformer, that is, the man who could make the particular kind of judgment which we call "moral" and yet question the fundamental assumptions of his age. (Compare with this the suggestion that someone might be a colour reformer, turning upside down our preconceived ideas about the things which are respectively blue and yellow.) The discovery of other races with moral codes opposed to our own serves the purpose of helping to make this conclusion clear to us, and this is the relevance of the argument known as the argument from ethical relativity. It is a contingent fact that other people do disagree with us, but it helps us to see what is in any case true, that moral judgment is distinguished not by the actions to which ethical terms are applied but by other features of the situation.

The conclusion must be that there is no way of guaranteeing that we will be able to reach agreement on questions of right and wrong, and this is naturally enough disturbing to us, given the methods by which we are trained in childhood and our consequent tendency to think in terms of an authority. But since an appeal to authority is not so to speak "built in" to the meaning of our ethical terms, this means that any expectation that other people will agree with us is a psychological accompaniment and not logically connected with our judgment, so that there is no obvious reason why their disagreement should be held to affect its validity. (Here we must gain on the swings what we lose on the roundabouts.) This is a case where we should distinguish the things which may result from the propounding of a thesis, and the implications of this thesis. If the beliefs which accompany our moral judgments are shattered anything may *happen*, but that is not to say that moral judgment has been in some way "invalidated" or that moral values are in need of vindication. Is it not in any case those standards of behaviour which would most easily disappear, given the realization that everyone does not or need not uphold them, that we call "conventional morality"? And must we

<sup>1</sup> A comparison with "I resolve" may help to make this clear. We could make quite different resolutions from everyone else, but we could not make resolutions in a completely different way.

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

not be careful to distinguish the effect of the denial of moral properties from the effect of this plus the belief that the foundations of morality have somehow been undermined?

The philosopher may say that his beliefs cannot be treated as "accompaniments" in this way, for they are beliefs about the nature of moral judgment, and if there are no such things as moral properties there is no such thing as moral judgment as he conceives it. Yet moral philosophy starts from something whose existence cannot be doubted, for a moral judgment is recognized by the general circumstances under which it is made and not by the application of a philosophical term. Any philosopher who said that he could no longer make moral judgments because his theories had been disproved might consider the following analogy. Suppose that a man who read Lewis Carroll's *What the Tortoise said to Achilles* (*Mind*, 1895), and was shocked to find that he had been mistaken in thinking that all the principles used in a deduction could be set out as premises, ceased to make deductions on this account. Would we really say that Carroll had disproved, or otherwise invalidated deduction?

I propose to call the thesis so far considered "the logical thesis", that is, the doctrine that ethical terms are not property words and that there is therefore no way of guaranteeing agreement on moral matters. The use of the word "property" is not meant to extend the doctrine in any way beyond that explicitly set out, and the phrase "the logical thesis" is used simply for convenience and to remind us that it is a theory of meaning. It is important to insist that nothing shall be slipped in under cover of these terms.

Now the objectivist probably feels that if we accept this thesis we allow morality to be discredited, because it follows that morality is *subjective* or *relative*, and that moral judgments can be neither true or false. But here we begin to feel confused, and must ask what would be meant by such expressions.

I take it that they are not meant merely to express the logical thesis, because if they were they could not be used to show that this has dangerous implications for morality. (We must insist on this; either they do not advance us a jot, or else we must be told how they do advance us and must be allowed to make a separate decision about their correctness.) It is supposed I think that they do go beyond the logical thesis, but that they are implied by it, and in their turn commit us to a certain choice of attitudes such as that expressed in the words "It would be silly to make a lot of fuss about what one thinks right and wrong." But surely this is a mistake. The phrases which we are considering can be used both to express the logical thesis and to mark the choice of such an attitude, but this does not connect the two as the objectivist thinks it does. One does not commit oneself to one in committing oneself to the other, and it is highly confusing to

use phrases which suggest that one does. The objectivist argues for instance that moral judgments can be true or false primarily because he means to defend a certain seriousness and deliberation in matters of right and wrong, but he feels that this depends on establishing a doctrine such as that of moral intuition or moral properties. This shifts the argument to the ground most favourable to the subjectivist who can, moreover, insist that he is not in the least intending to attack morality, and so combine the appearance of daring with the assurance of respectability.

Perhaps it will be agreed that the case against the subjectivist is not easily made by maintaining that moral judgments are true or false or that morality is objective, but other things will be said to show the implications of the subjectivist position. Does it not follow from the possibility of ultimate disagreement in morals, and the lack of an authority by which such questions can be decided, that "one man's judgment is as good as another's" and that it is impossible for anyone to say "I am right and you are wrong"? Here again it is easy to suppose that this does follow, because on one interpretation phrases such as "one man's judgment is as good as another's" simply restate the logical thesis, drawing attention to the fact that we cannot find some superior position from which any judgment could be criticized. But on this interpretation it will not contain any justification for changing our present attitudes with regard to morality. It is only because the same phrase can express an attitude of indifference to distinctions of right and wrong (as if we would say "I think  $x$  wrong, but it doesn't in the least matter; I will adopt another point of view if you like") that the moralist has reason to reject it. What matters is that he should not suppose that because two different interpretations could be placed on a single phrase the two are therefore connected in some irrevocable way. Very much the same point could be made about the possibility of saying that one's own moral judgment is right and the other person's wrong. This would be, in a way, a pointless remark if the possibilities of arguing the matter had been exhausted. And yet to say that a man cannot hold that he is right and someone else wrong where there is ultimate disagreement between them can also suggest something quite different. For it might be taken to recommend the kind of neutrality which is inconsistent with actually making a moral judgment. And it is of course this suggestion which the objectivist refuses to countenance, but which seems less of a menace when we realize that it is merely a recommendation, which cannot be supported by anything which the subjectivist has managed to prove.

So far we have been considering the formulation of the subjectivist case made by his opponent. What are we to say about his own account of his theory? Take for instance the comparisons involved in a theory

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

of moral judgments as expressions of feeling, or again as exhortations. "This is good" is compared with a whole range of expressions, either with "this is nice," "how nice!" etc., or with the words we use to try to persuade people round to our own preferences for practically anything. If all that was meant was that there is *a* point of comparison, since in all these cases there is no reference to a quality as there is in the statement that something is yellow, then this would contain nothing to suggest that the speaker himself had no more respect for distinctions of right and wrong than for the choices which we normally regard as unimportant, and subordinate to consideration of politeness or convenience. But if a man makes a comparison it may be supposed to hold generally except where he says that it does not, and so a phrase such as "moral judgments are expressions of feeling" may be taken to contain an attack on morality. But the right way to deal with such an attack would be to challenge it directly. Anyone who likes can suggest that we should drop moral judgments and substitute expressions of preference, but in this case he should say so explicitly.<sup>1</sup> If the subjectivist wants to make such an attack (and I do not think that he does) he should admit that he cannot support it with his logical doctrine. As it is the objectivist's position is rather like that of someone who heard another say "the king is just an ordinary man; he eats and sleeps as we do," and resenting these words tried to show that the king ate more, slept less, or was richer than anyone else. For thus the loyal subject might be for ever defending indefensible positions, because he thought his loyalty was at stake. And we could not say that he was wholly wrong, for someone who says that the king is just an ordinary man may be taken not only to state facts but also to refuse his allegiance. Yet the man who accepts the facts need not withhold allegiance, unless he decides that the two are to be connected in this way; and the other choice is open to him. That the choice is open is all that we can say. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the philosopher can produce a charm against the mood of indifference in which someone asks why he should care about what is right and wrong. But if our argument is correct it is wrong to suppose that there is anything in the way recent philosophical discussions have gone which could justify such a mood.

### II

This discussion of current philosophical disputes has not given us an answer to our question, for it has not shown us how morality can

<sup>1</sup> This would be a somewhat insipid point of view, and as such particularly opposed to morality. Is it not the fire, as well as the seriousness of Nietzsche's work which makes us want to say that in spite of everything he is a moralist?

be held to have "foundations" which could be undermined by some theory or other. The only sort of attack on morality which we could discover in the doctrine of subjectivist moral philosophers was a concealed, and perhaps unintentional, but none the less *direct* attack. We saw that it is easy to suggest or recommend a change in our attitude to distinctions of right and wrong, and to do this under cover of a logical doctrine, but we did not see any way in which the change could be supported by the doctrine. Of course if "morality" stands for our present attitudes and practices (including, for instance, the amount of trouble which we are prepared to take to discover our duty, and the relation between what we ought to do and what we want to do) it is possible to attack morality by suggesting that these attitudes should be abandoned; but that is not to say that it is possible to show reasons why they should go. We have not yet found the kind of thing which people have in mind when they assume that moral judgment might somehow be discredited if the right discoveries were made, but we have not yet exhausted the field of search. Psychology remains to be considered, for some people think that there could be a kind of inconsistency between the statements of the psychologist and the moralist, so that if certain things were proved in psychology it might no longer make sense to make moral judgments, even though the psychologist himself might insist that it would be better if we did. This supposition we must now examine.<sup>1</sup>

Psychology meets ethics at a number of different points, and we shall have to look into the relevance of several different kinds of psychological statements. Where it can be shown that some psychological statement is relevant to the validity of a particular moral judgment we shall still have to ask whether this relevance could be extended to moral judgment in general. It is obvious that if the *invalidity* of one judgment involves a contrast with others which are *valid*, no general attack could be developed along these lines. But if there is some other way in which a particular moral judgment can be called in question, then we shall have to ask whether this could be generalized or not.

There is one kind of psychological statement which is directly relevant to discussions of what is right and wrong. If we are told by the psychologist that a certain action will have consequences of a particular kind, and if these consequences seem to us to be bad, then we may use his statement as an argument against the rightness of the action. Here we will follow the ordinary pattern for arguing about the rightness and wrongness of what we do, and we may be led

<sup>1</sup> No attempt is being made to give a picture of the actual views of contemporary psychologists. I have used some of Freud's statements where they were exactly relevant to the argument. But in general I have spoken hypothetically, and invented my own examples.

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

to a radical revision of our former moral judgments. Freud has maintained that the psycho-analyst "can demonstrate with ease that what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth" (*Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 362) and if this is true then Freudian psychology will give us reason to revise the code. But of course the demonstration will depend not only on the establishment of the facts but also on our acceptance of Freud's basic valuations. It may not be as easy as he supposes to decide how much it is worth sacrificing for a particular practice or institution. But in any case this is not the kind of thing which we were looking for, which was a *general* attack on morality. Of course the effect of attacking the prevailing moral code might be to produce a state of confusion and scepticism in which people found it very difficult to make any moral judgments, but we would not say that it had been shown that nothing was right or wrong. A sudden change in historical or scientific beliefs might have a similar effect in their own sphere, so that the cry would go up that "nothing is true any more," but we would not say that this conclusion followed from the new doctrines.

Someone might ask at this point whether we are not setting out on a wild goose chase. What could it mean to say that moral judgment might be ruled out in some way, so that the impossibility of saying that one thing was right and another wrong followed from something that had been proved? The reason why we should not simply dismiss this as nonsense may become clear if we consider next the specific suggestion that we would have to stop making moral judgments where the psychologist convinced us that these were ineffective and did not bring about the kind of actions which were enjoined. To see whether this would be so we might usefully look at the relation between the effectiveness of a certain form of speech in bringing about a particular result and the possibility of using it correctly.

Take for instance the case of a magical formula, where it is clear that if the words are to be classified as magical they can only properly be used when there is some hope of influencing the future. (This is a very crude formulation and ignores the fact that there may be no sharp dividing line between magic and other ritual, but the fact remains that the words would have to have a different meaning if they were to be used in circumstances in which the speaker acknowledged their ineffectiveness.) Thus someone who convinced everyone else that the future could not be influenced in this way could make this mode of speech inoperative, either for a particular case, or in general. We could not say that this was merely a case of cause and effect, the effect of the new beliefs being to make people give up using this kind of spell; they could not have gone on using the words with their old meaning—that meaning which made us classify them

as magical—although they could of course have found new uses for the same marks or sounds. It is easy to misunderstand this point. It is not that the “validity” of a spell depended on its achieving its effect and that the facts proved such formulae “invalid,” but that a belief in the power of the spell is one of the characteristic conditions for that kind of speech, so that the discovery of certain facts could make them inapplicable because occasions on which they could correctly be applied would no longer arise.

The reasons which a man has for saying something may be more or less closely connected with the form of words in which he says it. In some cases it may make sense to say that he could have said the *same* thing even when he had had to abandon his former purpose, but in other cases where that particular purpose is, so to speak, “built in” to the words we would not know what meaning to attach to them under the new conditions. For instance if we were to become convinced that nothing which we said in the way of wishes and commands ever altered other peoples’ behaviour we could not go on using commands, which are only rightly used where we think there is some possibility of getting obedience. But we could go on expressing wishes, even if it were the case that we had previously given as our reason for doing this the fact that other people would try to satisfy them. This shows that we should be careful not to assume that it would be a fatal objection to moral judgment if it were shown that by making moral judgments we do not influence conduct. We might find other reasons for making moral judgments, or indeed consider that none were needed. It would only be if belief in a certain effect were one of the conditions for a moral judgment that a proof of ineffectiveness would have the sort of relevance which we are considering. But if it did have this sort of relevance then moral judgment in our present sense could be ruled out, and if the belief had been important among the distinguishing marks of this kind of speech we would say that we could no longer make moral judgments at all. Anyone who thinks that moral judgments are exhortations addressed to oneself or to other people should apply this pattern and say that words like “ought” and “right” cannot properly be used where we know that they will not affect our actions. But this analysis ignores the element of admission in a moral judgment, and the fact that we may not be trying to change anyone’s conduct but rather taking other people as witnesses and giving them the right to blame us in a special way if we do what we have admitted to be wrong. In fact we could say that something was right although we knew that this would not make it any more likely than before that the action would be performed. It would only be if we had to say that the action *could* not be carried out that the moral terms would be incorrectly applied, and we would not necessarily say this because moralizing

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

failed in this or similar cases. It may be that the psychologist will eventually be held to have shown that we could never have done what we did not do, and therefore since it does not make sense to say "I ought to have done such and such but I could not have done it" we will have to give up making moral judgments. But this will depend on the sense of "can" in the corresponding dictum "ought implies can." There will always be *some* sense in which actions can be distinguished as "in my power" "not in my power,"<sup>1</sup> and the difficulty is to see the principle on which it could be decided whether this is or is not the sense relevant to moral judgment. It is for this reason hard to see how the discovery of psychological causes could make it impossible to carry on with moral judgments, for this will only be the case if we do insist on an interpretation of "I could have," "I can," etc., which is inconsistent with such explanations of our actions.

The conclusion of this section is that it would be possible for an entire mode of speech, such as moral judgment, to be required to give way in the face of factual discoveries, though we have not seen how moral judgment is actually being threatened in this way. What is important is that we now have a model of the kind of thing which is being opposed to a relation of cause and effect between a belief and the abandonment of a certain practice. If we came to believe that our commands never had the slightest effect on other peoples' actions we could no longer *correctly* say "do this," "do that," because it would have become logically impossible to use the words with their old meaning, and we cannot express this in terms of cause and effect.

Let us now consider another type of statement made by the psychologist, turning to the discoveries which he may make about the subjective conditions under which a man makes moral judgments. It is probably this kind of statement which most worries the moralist, but on consideration it is not easy to see the justification for his anxiety. When we say that something is right or wrong we do not seem to be making any assertion about our own state of mind, or the connection which the action concerned has with the things which we hope and fear, and it is therefore not obvious how the psychologists can be saying anything which is inconsistent with our moral judgment. In general we would surely say that a psychological explanation of the conditions under which a judgment is made cannot affect the validity of what is asserted. No one has put this point more forcibly than Frege, who insisted that we must never take "a description of the origin of an idea for a definition, or an account of the mental and physical conditions on which we become conscious of a proposition for a proof of it." (*Foundations of Arithmetic*, tr. Austin, p. 6.) If a

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, A. J. Ayer's discussion of constraint in *Polemic* 5 (1946), p. 41.

psychological account cannot give a proof then neither can it give a disproof, and unless we can show some kind of inconsistency between the psychological proposition and the moral judgment we shall not be able to say that there is a reason why the two should not be affirmed together. It may be that the case of moral judgment is quite different from that which Frege was considering (the propositions of arithmetic) but the fact remains that if there is to be *argument* from a psychological proposition to the invalidity of a moral judgment it will have to be shown how one can be relevant to the other.

We do sometimes think that the conditions under which a judgment was made can be argued against the judgment, for the following reason. We notice that in certain states we tend to make judgments which we later condemn, and we take the presence of certain things, such as strong emotion, as signs that this kind of judgment may be expected. Here we have an inductive argument, which is valid as far as it goes. Now suppose that the psychologist were to tell us that this condition was in fact always present whenever we made moral judgments—that for instance our emotions were involved; would it not follow that we had reason to suspect that our judgments were always mistaken? Clearly this argument is invalid. The induction depended on the correlation of *special* conditions with judgments which we later came to reject. If the conditions were general the correlation would not hold, unless we already knew in the cases so far examined the only thing that could be proved by an argument of this kind, that is that people always came to reject their own moral judgments in the end. Certainly the psychologist can give us reason to suspect a certain conclusion about what is right or wrong by showing that we took the decision under conditions which have been found to go with unreliable conclusions, but we cannot go further than this.

What we must now consider is a different type of psychological statement, those which claim to give an explanation of the phenomenon of moral judgment. Freud's account of the way in which the super-ego and ego-ideal are developed might be taken as an example, and it will not matter from our point of view if this doctrine turns out to be mistaken, for there could be many other explanations which were of the same general tenor. Consider the following statements:

"... now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man: 'very true,' we can say, 'and here we have that higher nature in this ego-ideal or super-ego, the representative of our relation to our parents. When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves'." (*The Ego and the Id*, p. 47.)

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

"Religion, morality, and a social sense . . . were originally one and the same thing. According to the hypothesis which I have put forward in *Totem und Tabu* they were acquired phylogenetically out of the father complex: religion and moral restraint by the actual process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social feeling from the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that then remained between the members of the younger generation." (*Ibid*, p. 49.)

We must distinguish two different elements in the explanation of the phenomenon of morality. First of all there are statements about the general mechanism by which conscience (here identified by Freud with the ego-ideal as well as the super-ego) is developed, and how it comes to take on the "compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of a categorical imperative" (*Ibid*, p. 45). And secondly there are statements about the way in which particular moral principles come to be adopted by the super-ego, that is, explanations of the content of moral judgment. Freud is saying, first of all, that conscience is not inborn, but is produced by the conditions under which children are brought up, and some people feel that this destroys the authority which conscience would have if it were shown to be "natural." But this is to take the word "natural" in a sense which it cannot have in this context, and which already implies approval. If we are really talking merely about origins it is hard to see how this could be relevant to that acceptance of duties which we call "recognizing the authority of conscience." Vanity may suffer from the explanation given by Freud, but can we really say more than this? (It would of course be quite another matter if we were to find that the making of moral distinctions depended on conditions which were (a) within our control and (b) condemned by moral standards. There could theoretically be a situation in which we thought it impossible to achieve a balance of good by training children in morality.) It is hard to see why conscience should be required to conform to our preferences in the matter of origins, or else give up its place, and it is also hard to see why we should demand that nothing fantastic or evil should be able to appear under the guise of conscience. If this last point is sound then we should not accept the psychologist's observations on the manifestations of "conscience" found for instance in melancholia as affecting the status of moral judgment. Freud says when discussing this disease: "It is a very remarkable experience to observe morality, which was ostensibly conferred on us by God and planted deep in our hearts, functioning as a periodical phenomenon. For after a certain number of months the whole moral fuss is at an end, the critical voice of the super-ego is silent, the ego is reinstated, and enjoys once more all the rights of man until the next attack." (*New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 83). That conscience may be a periodical phenomenon

seems to give us no reason for altering our concern with moral distinctions; the same could be said of intellectual activity, and we do not hold it discredited on this account. And the fact that morality can take evil forms was known to religious thinkers long before Freud studied pathological conditions.

Turning to the explanation of the content of moral judgment, we might consider the following possibility. A makes a number of moral judgments, singling out particular things as his duties. He is then told that the reason why he thinks these things right is that he wants to stand in well with B who wants these things done. In other words his principle of choice is said to be "what pleases B." A notices with surprise that all his "duties" do come into this category, and he admits to a desire to please B; is he to conclude that his moral judgments are somehow invalid and must be abandoned? It is important to notice that no such question will arise if A can accept the common factor discovered in all the things he thinks right as something relevant to his judgment. Bentham sometimes treats the principle of utility as just such a generalization, and the fact that we already have a motive for doing the things which come under this principle is urged in support of his theory and not as an objection to it. If A could answer the original assertion with the words "Yes. Now I see that that is what makes them right" he would merely have gained a generalization; it is when he cannot incorporate the discovery in his moral judgments that the situation becomes puzzling. If he regarded B's attitude as a factor making neither for the rightness nor for the wrongness of the actions concerned, i.e. as something irrelevant from the moral point of view, then he would be left asserting that as a matter of fact all these things which were right were viewed favourably by the other person, but that this was not why they were right. When asked why they were right he would give a set of principles which he thought applicable to the actions in question.

If the psychologist was to assert that he had given a causal explanation of A's choices, he must say that where the cause would operate in a different direction from the application of the principles, it would be the latter which would be over-ruled. This he can only say on the basis of experience of cases in which the two were seen to him to diverge, and in which the subject did fail to apply to his own principles. There are two possibilities here: (a) that the principles are abandoned and (b) that the person concerned simply fails to notice that he has not applied them. The first possibility belongs to a case which will be considered later, and it is the second which concerns us at the moment. A man may easily fail to notice that he is "faking" a moral argument, and that his conclusion is not really consistent with the principles which he professes, and this is partly due to the

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S DEFENCE OF MORALITY

fact that moral principles are often not universal statements to the effect that *all* actions of a certain kind are good or bad, but rather assertions that certain things *tend* in this direction.<sup>1</sup> We cannot be sure that a man who says " $\alpha$  actions are wrong," " $x$  is an  $\alpha$  action," and " $x$  is not wrong," is failing to apply his own principles: there may have been some other factor which more than balanced the presence of  $\alpha$  in the action. This does not mean that we cannot see that a man is not applying his own principles, but only that it is more difficult to pin down a case of this kind. We might compare it with a case in which someone said that certain symptoms would show that a man was about to die; but was unable, in a situation where this would bring him grief, to draw the right conclusion from the symptom, and brought up considerations which he would at other times have regarded as negligible.

We cannot doubt that a man may fail to apply his own principles in arguing about what is right and wrong, and the psychologist, who has his own reasons for observing this fact, may convince us that we should consider this possibility more often than we do. But it is because the judgment is seen to be inconsistent with the principles that we have reason to reject it, and not because of anything which was said about psychological causes. We have not yet seen any reason why we should make such a move if no inconsistency could be shown.

It was only because we assumed that the cause and the principles were independent of each other that we could suppose that in certain cases they might diverge, and that the inconsistency might be observed. The same possibility would not arise if the psychologist was giving an explanation which related to the adoption of the principles by which a man decides what is right and wrong. At some point argument must break down, and the most basic principles can only be affirmed, and not referred to other principles. What are we to say if the psychologist steps in at this point, and shows us the connection with some factor in our background?

This is a much more realistic assumption. The psychologist often stresses the importance of moral principles in a man's life, and it is the adoption of these principles rather than individual decisions which he claims to explain. Are we now to say that there is a kind of inconsistency between the psychological statement and the moral judgment, or should someone be prepared to admit that the cause of his thinking a certain thing wrong was, for instance, that this type of action held terrifying possibilities in his childhood, and yet go on to say that it was wrong? It does not seem possible to set an opposition here—either caused in this way *or* wrong—and therefore we

<sup>1</sup> Compare the discussion of *prima facie* rightness in W. D. Ross's *The Right and the Good*, Chap. II.

## PHILOSOPHY

may ask "why not both?" This is, I think, as far as we can go. Once again we have reached a point at which it does not seem to make sense to talk of what *should* be done. But this may be worth pointing out, for it is easy to confuse the different ways in which psychology may be relevant to ethics, and people may not always realize how many decisions they must take for themselves.

*University of Oxford.*

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

ALAN R. WHITE, B.A.

MR. T. H. MCPHERSON has given, in a recent article in *PHILOSOPHY* (Vols. XXIII, 1948, and XXIV, 1949), various reasons for supposing that there was a development in Butler's ethics from the *Sermons* to the *Analogy*. He argues that Butler was in the *Sermons* a "rational egoist" or "Ethical Eudaemonist," and in the *Analogy* an Intuitionist. By "Ethical Eudaemonism" he seems<sup>1</sup> to mean that "the ground or criterion of rightness is conduciveness to the agent's interest" (XXIII, pp. 327, 330, 331; XXIV, p. 18, etc.) or that "it is the happiness-producing character of acts that makes them right" (XXIII, p. 327). I shall use the phrase "McPherson's view" to denote the theory that this was Butler's view in the *Sermons*.

This view is, to some extent, supported by Sidgwick (e.g. *Methods of Ethics*, Ed. 7, pp. 7, 39, 200, 366, 378; and *History of Ethics*, pp. 196-7) and is opposed, as McPherson points out, to the usual modern view, as held by C. D. Broad (*Five Types of Ethical Theory*) and A. E. Taylor (*Some Features of Butler's Ethics*, in *Philosophical Studies*, reprinted from *Mind*, 1926). The "Broad-Taylor" view is also held by Seth (*English Philosophers*), Spooner (*Bishop Butler*, 1901), Bernard (*Works of Bishop Butler*, 1901), Mossner (*Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason*), and recently by D. D. Raphael (*PHILOSOPHY*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 235-8).

Mr. McPherson has given much more detailed evidence for his view than anyone has given for the "Broad-Taylor" view, but in my opinion McPherson's view is wrong and theirs is right.

McPherson rests his case on (a) a general review of Butler's *Sermons* (including the *Preface*) which purports to show that McPherson's view is the usual one all through these *Sermons*; and on (b) the famous "cool hour" passage (II, 173)<sup>2</sup> which seems to clinch the case by stating "when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." The "Broad-Taylor" view on the other hand denies McPherson's point (a) and says that some sort of intuitionist view which makes

<sup>1</sup> I think that McPherson has not clearly distinguished in Butler the following views: (a) rational men act only in their own interest, (b) they *ought* to act so, (c) right acts produce happiness for the agent. I shall argue that (a) is often but not always, (b) never and (c) always Butler's view.

<sup>2</sup> All quotations, unless otherwise stated, are from Gladstone's 1897 edition—Bernard's edition is better since he collates the two editions of the *Sermons*, but Gladstone's seems better known.

the dictates of conscience the ground of rightness is most common in Butler. But it admits that point (b) certainly supports McPherson's view. Its reply then is that this passage is "unguarded" (Spooner, p. 111) or "does not fairly represent his true position" (Mossner, p. 119) or "is making a hypothetical concession to an imaginary opponent" (Broad, p. 80) or is "a sarcastic concession" (Taylor, p. 323, compare "an obiter dictum," p. 324, "temporary concession to prejudice of audience," p. 324).

I agree with McPherson (pp. 15-17) that this type of answer to the "cool hour" passage is insufficient. It is, as Matthews (*Fifteen Sermons*, p. xxv) says, "a deliberate and carefully expressed statement." But I do not think that it supports McPherson's view nor opposes the "Broad-Taylor" view because I do not think that it means what it is usually taken to mean, viz. that self-love ought to be the judge of moral conduct. Hence my purpose in this article is (i) to support with full quotations the "Broad-Taylor" view of the *Sermons*, and (ii) to give evidence for an alternative interpretation of the "cool hour" passage which does not contradict that view.

There are many passages in both the *Sermons* and the *Preface* where Butler makes it quite clear that Conscience is the arbiter of virtue prior to any other consideration.<sup>1</sup> "But there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which . . . pronounces determinately some actions to be *in themselves* just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which *without being consulted, without being advised with*, magisterially exerts itself. . . ." (II, 51, my italics.) The directness and immediateness of this pronouncement is several times emphasized, e.g. "Yet in these cases there is a right and wrong . . . which surely is our duty" (II, 149), especially in the *Preface*, "an inward perception" (II, 6), "an approbation of what was good" which men undoubtedly have (II, 14) and which is accounted for by the fact that men are "born to virtue" (II, 5, 8). Indeed in the *Sermons* Butler hints that the more we deliberate about the act the less likely we are to be right. "In all common ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view, what is our duty, what is the honest part. This is the ground of the observation, that the first thought is often the best. In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself dishonesty" (II, 112; cp. 150).

Butler explicitly deals with rival claims, especially that of interest. He says in the *Preface* (published 1729), "The goodness or badness of actions does not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or disinterested may be applied to them . . . nor from their being attended with present or future pleasure or pain; but from their being what they are; namely, what becomes such creatures as we are, what the

<sup>1</sup> D. D. Raphael (*op. cit.*, pp. 235-6) has listed most of these.

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

state of the case requires, or the contrary." (II, 21; cp. 14, 23, and "we may judge and determine that an action is morally good or evil, before we so much as consider, whether it be interested or disinterested," 22, and "virtue is to be pursued as an end, eligible in and for itself," 24.) Since the *Preface* was published later than the first edition of the *Sermons* (1726) it could be claimed<sup>1</sup> that Butler took this opportunity to change his doctrine. To me there seem three objections to this: firstly that these passages only make explicit the priority of conscience, mentioned in the passages previously quoted. Secondly, they are explicitly supported by a passage from the *Sermons*, which, though a footnote and therefore presumably later than the actual delivery of the *Sermons*, does occur in the first edition and so is contemporary with their first writing for publication. If this passage is taken (as by McPherson, XXIV, p. 15) as a foreshadowing of the *Analogy*, then the foreshadowing was as early as the first publication of the alleged original views, and is quite in keeping with them. The passage (in part) is "For there are certain dispositions of mind, and certain actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness or the misery of the world; approved or disapproved by reflection, by that principle within, which is the guide of life, the judge of right and wrong. . . . Fidelity, honour, strict justice, are themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from consideration of their tendency. . . ." (II, 190-1.) Thirdly, frequent references in the *Sermons* themselves, though not as explicit as these, show clearly, I think, that Butler has considered the claims of both interest and conscience, and has adjudged conscience prior. As he says in Sermon II, "It is by this faculty (i.e. conscience) natural to man, that he is a moral agent" (II, 51) and he frequently (e.g. II, 37, 47, 50, 55, 60, 65, 110, 115, 181-2, 185, 188, 225,<sup>2</sup> etc.) mentions the opposition of both interest and passion to the dictates of conscience. "And how often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it for supposed<sup>3</sup> interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration to the *natural right* and *office* of conscience" (II, 55-6).

In Sermon I Butler had considered a similar claim made by religion to be the prior obligation to virtue and had given a similar answer, "It cannot indeed possibly be denied that our being God's creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior

<sup>1</sup> As McPherson (p. 12) and Raphael (p. 235) point out.

<sup>2</sup> Most of these passages are treated more fully in the course of this article.

<sup>3</sup> The alleged difficulties about the word "supposed" are treated later in this article. Here there is a clear distinction between "passion" and "interest."

obligations to piety and virtue, than the consideration that God sent his Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from the peculiar relation of Christians, as members one of another under Christ our head. However, though all this be allowed, as it expressly is by the inspired writers; yet it is manifest that Christians at the time of the revelation, and immediately after, could not but insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind" (II, 29). I think this passage is important not only for upholding the prior obligation of virtue *per se*, but also because the type of concession it makes is similar, as we shall see later, to that in the "cool hour" passage.

I hope I have established that Butler explicitly upheld the claims of conscience against all rivals, especially interest. There is no change, only clarification. But perhaps the alleged importance of interest or self-love can be considered by asking (i) whether self-love is ever, for Butler, an arbiter of conduct in this way, and (ii) whether it is ever an arbiter superior or prior to conscience. As regards (i) Butler does say that "self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion . . . so that if we will act conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern" (II, 53). But he immediately adds "Thus, *without particular consideration of conscience*, we may have a clear conception of the superior nature of one inward principle to another" (II, 53, my italics); and he goes on to consider "the natural superiority" of conscience, which he has expressly said a few pages before is "a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all others" (II, 51), i.e. over "every bias, instinct, propension within" (II, 58). Surely this means that conscience is the supreme principle, and not that self-love, though it is superior to the various passions in man, is thus on the same level as conscience (*pace* McPherson, p. 327).

Elsewhere (II, 64-5) Butler says, "Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be suitable to his nature, though all other principles be violated, but becomes unsuitable if either of these are." This passage, which Broad (p. 80) considered "simply an inconsistency," is taken by McPherson (p. 329) to drive home his point of the "practical identity of conscience and self-love." It seems to me, as it did to Gladstone (*ad loc.*), that it shows that conscience and self-love are alike in their superiority to other principles and affections, and that any situation where there is a conflict between these other affections and either of these principles is "unnatural"; but not that self-love is equal to conscience. Remember that here Butler takes it for granted, as he often did, that the dictates of conscience and self-love coincide, but when he considers which is the real arbiter of virtue, he then, as we have shown above, always comes down on the side of conscience. I think it is clear that he is here

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

summing up the two cases that he has considered throughout these early Sermons; that is when we consider human nature as made up only of various passions and cool self-love (e.g. "man in his single capacity"; II, 43, 78, etc.), and the truer situation, where we remember that man has conscience as well (cp. II, 53, and 13, quoted above).

The "Shaftesbury passage" (in the *Preface*) says that "interest, one's own happiness, is a manifest obligation" (II, 13) but Butler is "explicitly . . . leaving out the authority of reflex approbation or disapprobation" (*ibid*). By itself "self-love in its due degree is as just and morally good as any affection whatever" (II, 22) but it is not the arbiter of its own goodness.

In answer to (ii) McPherson replies (p. 327) that Butler "maintains elsewhere that it is the happiness-producing character of acts that makes them right." The only passage which he quotes in this connection, and the only one which I can find to make this answer plausible, is the "cool hour" passage which I will consider in detail later.

I conclude then that the superior position of conscience is never doubted by Butler.

To understand the position assigned to self-love, we must consider a distinction which runs all through Butler's work, and which is present as early as 1717, that is long before the publication or even the delivery of the *Sermons*. This is the distinction between reflection and action, between judging what is right and doing it. I suggest that this distinction avoids much of the difficulty about the relative merits of self-love and conscience, and resolves the alleged inconsistencies in his ethics without any recourse to a hypothesis about an earlier and a later view. This important passage (II, 359) occurs in a letter to Clarke, dated 1717, "A disposition in our nature to be influenced by right motives is as absolutely necessary to render us moral agents as a capacity to discover right motives is. These two are, I think, quite distinct perceptions, the *former* proceeding from a desire inseparable from a Conscious Being of its own happiness, the *latter* being only our understanding or Faculty of seeing Truth. Since a disposition to be influenced by right motives is a *sine qua non* to Virtuous Actions, an Indifferency to right motives must incapacitate us for Virtuous Actions. . . ."

Butler says here that moral actions need a disposition in man to be influenced by good motives. He seems to feel that such a disposition depends on man's desire of happiness. I think he is suggesting that men will only follow right if they feel it is directly connected with their own happiness. And this seems to be the cause of the emphasis all through the *Sermons* on the coincidence of virtue and interest. Men will only act virtuously if they "are convinced that it will be for

our happiness, or at least not contrary to it" (II, 173). This is quite distinct from our "capacity to discover right motives." Their rightness does not depend on our interest. But Clarke answers (Bernard, I, 334) that "a disposition in our nature . . . to be influenced by right motives . . . in men is that which we call Rationality, or the faculty of reason . . .," and only "perverseness of will" could let a man be influenced by any other motive. Men's inclinations are strictly non-moral; "vice consists in pursuing the inclination towards any object in certain circumstances, notwithstanding reason, or the natural disposition to be influenced by right motives declares to the man's conscience at the same time (or would do, if he attended to it) that the object ought not to be pursued in those circumstances" (Gladstone, II, 360)<sup>1</sup>. Butler professes (II, 361) to be partly satisfied by this answer, and it may be the origin of his important distinctions in the *Sermons* regarding the relations between the various passions on the one hand and both reasonable self-love and conscience on the other. Indeed he almost quotes Clarke in Sermon XII (II, 180): "our inward structure is not simple or uniform but a composition of various passions, appetities, affections, together with rationality; including in the last both the discernment of what is right, and a disposition to regulate ourselves by it." And again in Sermon III (II, 59) "he hath the rule of right within; what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it."

I suggest then that this letter, of a very early date, shows Butler already struggling with the problem of an *incentive* to moral action; that it shows he had, even then, no doubt that the rightness of an act was something intuitively and immediately seen; and that he considered the happiness of the agent relevant to the question of a motive for action and not to the rightness of the act. He was himself inclined to the view that only self-love could be a sufficient "disposition," but was appreciative of Clarke's insistence on the "reason of the thing and the right of the case."

These two views appear in his *Sermons*. He does often support the view, already expressed in this letter—"no Rational creature is strictly speaking indifferent to Right Motives" (II, 359)—that "a general abhorrence of what is base, and liking of what is fair and just, takes its turn amongst the other motives of action" (II, 11). "Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be considered

<sup>1</sup> This answer is quite in keeping with Clarke's usual view "originally and in reality it is as natural and (morally speaking) necessary that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing and the right of the case, as it is natural and (absolutely speaking) necessary that the understanding should submit to a demonstrated truth." (Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, Vol. II, p. 13).

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

as an appeal to each particular person's heart and natural conscience" (II, 45); and in the *Preface* (II, 16) "Goodness is a fixed, steady, immovable principle of action" (cp. "Your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature," II, 60). Of course in a "creature perfect according to his created nature . . . goodness must be the single actuating principle within him" (II, 198; cp. 214); but even among imperfect men "there have been persons in all ages, who have professed that they found satisfaction . . . in the pursuit of what is just and right and good . . ." (II, 168). Sometimes Butler is prepared to stress the incentive power of conscience even more, "but the reflection that it is his proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to do; this added to the affection becomes a much more settled principle, and carries him on through more labours and difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from that affection alone, if he thought it and the course of action it led to, either indifferent or criminal" (II, 36). Indeed, "in the familiar and daily intercourse amongst mankind," to "get our heart and temper formed to a love and liking of what is good is absolutely necessary in order to our behaving rightly . . ." (II, 180).

But Butler seems to have felt, and certainly knew that his audience felt, that "to be convinced that any temper of mind, and course of behaviour, is our duty, and the contrary vicious, hath but a distant influence upon our temper and actions . . ." (II, 136). He realized the force of the objection that, although "it may indeed be absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection;<sup>1</sup> nay, without regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call conscience . . ." yet "interest and passion do come in; and are often too strong for and prevail over reflection and conscience" (II, 47; cp. II, 36, "for men often approve of the actions of others which they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not"). Since then we realize that "Reason alone,<sup>2</sup> whatever anyone may wish, is not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as man" we sometimes must have recourse to "this reason joined with those affections that God has impressed upon his (i.e. man's) heart" (II, 83; cp. 85, "the imperfection of the higher principles of reason<sup>3</sup> and religion in man, the little influence they have upon our practice, and the strength and prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these affections to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to

<sup>1</sup> "For reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent" (II, 188).

<sup>2</sup> I.e. Conscience as a purely rational principle.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. fragment 13 (*apud* Bernard) "as all my passions and affections to my reason such as it is, so in consideration of the fallibility and infinite deficiencies of this my reason, I would subject it to God, that he may guide and succour it."

the deficiencies of the former"). And on at least one occasion (II, 125), Butler gives as an example a specific affection, i.e. fear of resentment: "Men are plainly restrained from injuring their fellow creatures by fear of their resentment; and it is very happy that they are so, when they would not be restrained by a principle of virtue."

But in Butler's usual view there is a motive to action even more powerful than any affection, namely, the general and rational principle of self-love or a desire for our own happiness. He had mentioned this as early as 1717 in the letter quoted above ("a disposition in our natures to be influenced by right motives . . . proceeding from a desire inseparable from a Conscious Being of its own happiness") and he often repeats the view in the *Sermons*, e.g. "The nature of man considered in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world" (II, 43), and "from the very constitution of our nature, we cannot but have a greater sensibility to, and be more deeply interested in, what concerns ourselves" (II, 120; cp. II, 189, 204, 42, etc.). This emphasis on the motive force of self-love is common in Butler, though he realized that it had the weakness common to all rational principles, including conscience. Even "the private interest of the individual would not be sufficiently provided for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; therefore the appetites and passions are placed within as a guard and further security, without which it would not be taken due care of" (II, 87).

Now, I think, we are prepared to see the real meaning of his appeal to self-love. The course dictated by conscience is the right one but the power of conscience to move happiness-loving men to virtuous action is weak, so let us call in self-love and common sense. "Therefore morality and religion must be somewhat plain and easy to be understood; it must appeal to what we call plain common sense, as distinguished from superior capacity, and improvement; because it appeals to mankind" (II, 90). "Man is not so constituted as to desire things and be uneasy in the want of them, in proportion to their known value; many other considerations come in to determine the degree of desire" (II, 206). And in the *Preface* (II, 14), Butler tries to clinch the argument against Shaftesbury's supposed case "and how little influence soever this obligation (i.e. that from conscience) alone can be expected to have in fact upon mankind, yet one may appeal even to interest and self-love." In a passage (II, 173) immediately preceding the "cool hour" passage, Butler admits that religion should, as it does, "address itself to that very principle (i.e. self-love)" since "there can no access be had to the understanding, but by convincing men, that the course of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest." And immediately after the

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

"cool hour" passage occurs (II, 174) the same prudential reason repeated, "but, so far as the interests of virtue depend upon the theory of it being secured from open scorn, so far its very being in the world depends upon its *appearing* to have no contrariety to private interest and self-love" (my italics). I agree with Bernard (note at I, 151) that Butler's remarks here about self-love are strictly parallel to those of Shaftesbury, "For though the habit of selfishness and the multiplicity of interested views are of little improvement to real merit or virtue; yet there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue, that it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment" (Characteristics II, 67).

Surely then, in the light of these quotations, the meaning of the "cool hour" passage is clear. "Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such; yet that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it" (II, 173). This does *not* mean that the ground of rightness is conduciveness to happiness, it does not even mean that the motive of self-love is a good motive—the good motive is "affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such"—it simply means that as a motive to action, self-love is more influential than the dictates of conscience. The word "justify" in this passage is not, in my opinion, being used in an ethical sense, but means that happiness-loving men can see no reason to do action A, that is, cannot "justify" to themselves their choice of action A, unless it plainly appears to be productive of their happiness. The fact that the action is right is not for them sufficient justification or reason to pursue it. A happiness-loving creature such as man is rarely swayed by things "according to their known value" but by their productiveness of happiness; and only the latter will, in general, urge him to any pursuit. Though Butler has already pointed out that many men have other spurs to action, for example either passion or the voice of conscience.

I hope then that I have shown that this passage is "a deliberate and carefully expressed statement," that it is not "unguarded" nor an "obiter dictum" nor a "sarcastic concession." But neither does it have the meaning that "it is the happiness-producing character of acts that makes them right" (McPherson, p. 327). Rather we might say that it is this happiness-producing character of acts that makes men do them. Broad, Taylor, etc., consider this passage as an *ethical* concession, that is that Butler is conceding a point in ethics to an opponent of his system; otherwise they would not be forced to admit that the passage was inconsistent with the rest of Butler's ethics, and that it constituted a difficult problem for the usual interpretation of his views. I would admit it as a concession only on a

psychological point, and not in any way inconsistent with the rest of Butler's views. It is merely an explicit statement of his reiterated point that to know right is not necessarily to do it, that the immediate awareness of right and wrong—an awareness given by conscience—usually “hath but a distant influence upon our temper and actions.” In short, it is a concession not to an opposing ethical system but to the weak nature of man.<sup>1</sup> Similarly Butler was willing to admit (II, 29) that although our being born to virtue was a prior obligation to virtue than any religious motives, yet “Christians at the time of the revelation could not but insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind.” And at all times, the belief that “we are one body in Christ” is “an additional motive over and above moral considerations” to the discharge of Christian duties (II, 28; cp. 174). Indeed, Butler several times (e.g. II, 97, 135) makes a clear distinction between “is” and “ought,” saying on one occasion (II, 135) in reference to self-love, “that men should be affected in this manner and act accordingly, is to be accounted for like other vices; but to *assume* that it *ought*, and *must* be true, is self-partiality possessed of the very understanding” (Butler's italics). And the distinction is very familiar in his frequent opposition between “natural” (or “authoritative”) and “strong.”

I suggest that Butler never doubted that conscience was the only arbiter of virtue. His doubts did not concern moral theory but moral practice. Sometimes he accepted Clarke's views on this latter, sometimes those of Shaftesbury. But the appeal to self-love to make the virtuous course the chosen one did not affect the ethical importance of conscience. Observable coincidence of interest and virtue had nothing to do with the worth of moral obligations. “Though a man should doubt of everything else, yet that he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue; an obligation implied in the very idea of virtue, in the very idea of reflex approbation” (II, 14). Men will still be “under the strictest moral obligations, whatever their opinion be concerning the happiness of virtue” (*ibid.*).

There are indications that Butler felt, after further consideration, that an appeal to the advice of self-love was not strictly necessary. He could use the fact that the desire for happiness is man's chief motive to action, to show that there were practical grounds, that is grounds of interest, for following the dictates of conscience rather than the advice of self-love, even when the former seemed to conflict with the latter. Butler was able to show the reasonableness of this

<sup>1</sup> I had already reached this conclusion when I found Bernard's comment on the “cool hour” passage (I, 59). “It is a concession which is made in the interests of moral practice not of moral theory.” This excellently summarizes my view.

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

view by drawing attention to the nature of man. Consider conscience and self-love. It is they who advise us to pursue course A, either because, in the case of conscience, it is our duty, or because, in the case of self-love, it is our interest. Butler rarely, if ever,<sup>1</sup> admits that the dictates of conscience can be in error; that is, the course it advises is always our real duty. But he seems to suggest that we may get bad advice about our interest, either from our ignorance or from what we may call "supposed" self-love. As regards the former, he says, "If the make and constitution, the circumstances he is placed in, or the reason of things affords the least hint or intimation, that virtue is the law he is born under; scepticism itself should lead him to the most strict and inviolable practice of it" (II, 225). And he had frequently given arguments to show that man is "born to virtue." "Darkness, ignorance and blindness are no manner of security" (*ibid.*), and man is certainly ignorant. "We are much less competent judges of the very small part which comes under our notice in this world, than we are apt to imagine" (II, 221, and frequently in Sermon XV), and "there are numberless cases in which, notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent judges, whether a particular action will upon the whole do good or harm" (II, 188). On the other hand "the natural authority of the principle of reflection is an obligation the most near and intimate, the *most certain and known*; whereas the contrary obligation can at the utmost appear no more than probable." (II, 13-14, my italics.)

But we may also be mistaken because the advice is that of "supposed" self-love. McPherson seizes on this point and suggests that if Butler ever seems to allow a conflict between conscience and self-love, or appears to censure or degrade in any way the value of the latter, then of course the latter is not self-love at all, but only "supposed" self-love; and therefore we need not admit any conflict between conscience and real self-love, these being practically the same.

I admit that a useful distinction can be made between "real" and "supposed" self-love, and I admit that Butler says that ultimately there is no conflict between the advice of real self-love and the dictates of conscience; that is, that "real" interest and virtue coincide. Butler says, "Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future, and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things." (II, 65; cp. "Self-love . . . does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course of life. . . ." 64; cp.

<sup>1</sup> In I, 46, there is a hint that the signs of conscience, e.g. a feeling of shame, may be misleading. I can find no other support for this doubt.

"... seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is called interest; it is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty and what is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness and satisfaction" 63-4; cp. II, 30, 33, 38, 79, etc.) Butler is here saying that there may be a conflict between duty and "supposed" interest, that there *may* be a conflict between duty and "real" interest if we count only this world,<sup>1</sup> but that there is no conflict between duty and "real" interest if we take in the whole scheme of things. But it is most important to decide what "real" and "supposed" mean in this context. As my argument here is somewhat detailed, I will summarize it briefly. McPherson says that "real" self-love means "cool" self-love, and that "real" self-love does not conflict with conscience. I argue that since Butler (i) often says that real self-love and conscience do *not* conflict, and yet (ii) when he is considering together self-love and the other principles of action in men, certainly equates "cool" and "real," but often admits that "cool" self-love may conflict with conscience, then either Butler is inconsistent on the question of the coincidence of "real" self-love and conscience, or "real" is being used in a different sense in (i) from what it is in (ii). I think this latter suggestion is the correct one and I give what I consider to be the criterion of "real" in sense (i).

When Butler says, as above, that "real" self-love and conscience do not conflict, I suggest that the criteria of "real" are (i) whether or not the advice of self-love agrees with the dictates of conscience<sup>2</sup> (ii) whether its results are real interest or not. If these are the criteria then it is tautological to say that "real" self-love and conscience cannot conflict, or that the advice of "real" self-love is never against our real interest.

Butler believed, on theological grounds not mentioned in the *Sermons*, that virtuous behaviour brings the greatest happiness in the end; "it is implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things" (II, 65). Self-love which would bring such happiness would be called "real," hence the advice of "real" self-love must coincide with that of conscience. And therefore we could only know whether A is "real" self-love by seeing whether its advice agrees with that of conscience or brings the greatest happiness. There is nothing in the advice of self-love *per se* to show whether it is "real" or "supposed."

On the other hand Butler himself often explicitly distinguishes between what McPherson calls "real" and "supposed" self-love when he is considering the various impulses to action in man. And in these

<sup>1</sup> In fragment 9 (according to Bernard), Butler says, "Good men surely are not treated in this world as they deserve."

<sup>2</sup> McPherson seems to make this point on p. 13, without noticing its implications.

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

places his criterion is, as McPherson (p. 323) rightly points out, whether the self-love in question is "cool" or "passionate," whether rational or irrational. This distinction is very frequent (e.g. II, 34, "passions distinct from self-love"; cp. 35 *passim*, 41, 43, 87, 139, 189; and "self-love is a superior principle to passion" II, 53, etc.), perhaps the clearest definition being in the *Preface* (II, 19), "the first may be called cool or settled selfishness, and the other passionate or sensual selfishness. But the most natural way of speaking plainly is, to call the first only, self-love. . . ." The subject is treated in greater detail in Sermon XI, where self-love is called "the principle of an action proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage" (II, 158).

Usually, in Butler, if it is "cool" or "reasonable" self-love, then it is called "self-love," if it is "passionate," it is "supposed self-love." But if this is the distinction, then I suggest that he often says (e.g. II, 37, 47, 50, 55, 60, 65, 110, 155, 185, 188, etc.), that the advice of self-love and conscience can conflict, and especially in the "Shaftesbury" (II, 13) and "cool-hour" (II, 173) passages. And though the advice of self-love may triumph it ought never to do so, even if it were only for the reason that the dictates of conscience will always result in real interest, whereas the advice of self-love may not. We can never be sure that rational advice about our happiness is infallible, "regards to private interest . . . lead us (though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray" (II, 50), and "private interest is far from being likely to be promoted to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other principles" (II, 161). We can never be sure that self-love, even "cool" self-love, is "real" self-love in the sense that it secures our real interest.

The point I wish to make is that considered *a priori* as a piece of advice, the cool and reflective judgment that course A will secure our happiness is called by Butler the advice of self-love. To regard this advice is to follow self-love whose "primary intention and design is the security and good of the individual" (II, 34; cp. 87, 157, 158, 170, 184, 189). But whether we are following "real" or "supposed" self-love (as defined by my criteria) cannot, *ex hypothesi*, depend on whether it is "cool" or "passionate" (since we are only considering here the "cool" self-love) but must depend on whether it does secure our happiness. Indeed Butler condemns "false selfishness, whether cool or passionate" (II, 146), and often when he speaks of "self-partiality" he seems to use the phrase to cover cool as well as passionate self-love (e.g. II, 16, 60, 136-8, 141, 143-4, 153). "If we understand our true happiness," then certainly "conscience and self-love, always lead us the same way" (II, 65); but unfortunately we do not always understand our true happiness; we think that course A is our real interest but it is only our supposed interest.

Self-love is not as good a guide in these matters as conscience. "Thus they who have been so nice in their generation as to regard their own supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find that he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his own interest and happiness" (*ibid.*).<sup>1</sup>

Certainly, "if the generality of mankind were to cultivate within themselves the principle of self-love; if they were to accustom themselves often to sit down and consider, what was the greatest happiness they were capable of attaining for themselves in this life, and if self-love were so strong and prevalent, as that they could uniformly pursue this their supposed chief temporal good, without being diverted from it by any particular passion it would manifestly prevent numberless follies and vices" (II, 23). And yet "it is by no means the religious or even moral institution of life" (*ibid.*; cp. II, 9-10, 13, 14, 62, 181-2); Butler deals at length in Sermons VII and X with cases where people act wickedly "upon the cool motives of interest and advantage" (II, 109; cp. 107, 149). "Men will and can be wicked with calmness and thought; we see they are" (II, 113; cp. 112, 16, 69, 146-7). And he goes so far as to suggest that reflection—almost what a modern writer would call "rationalization"—is often only an excuse to dodge an obvious duty. "In all common ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view what is our duty, what is the honest part. . . . In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself dishonesty. . . . That which is called considering what is our duty in a particular case, is very often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away" (II, 112; cp. 113, 61, 179, 110, "conscience may be laid asleep"). The more difficult the case the easier it is to persuade ourselves that we are not forsaking our duty when we follow a course because it seems to be our interest (cp. II, 148-9). These actions are not to our real interest, but the motive and principle of them is self-love, cool and reflective, though not "real" self-love. It is "a deep and calm source of delusion . . . and corrupts conscience, which is the guide of life" (II, 155).

I hope that I have fairly proved my point that McPherson's distinction<sup>2</sup> of "real" and "supposed" self-love is not such as to enable him to avoid the objections that I have offered to his view of Butler. McPherson emphasizes it in relation to two passages of the *Sermons*: (a) the "Shaftesbury" passage in the *Preface*, and (b) Sermon XI, *passim*.

The debated sentence in (a) is "would not the obligation from

<sup>1</sup> Cp. II, 55-6; quoted above p. 331 and referred to in note on that page.

<sup>2</sup> Raphael (*op. cit.*, p. 236 footnote) considers it well made.

## CONSCIENCE AND SELF-LOVE IN BUTLER'S SERMONS

supposed interest on the side of vice remain?"<sup>1</sup> There is no reason to say, as McPherson does, that the authority of conscience here is not exercised "over cool self-love." Butler expressly says here that men "are under the strictest moral obligations, whatever their opinion be concerning the happiness of virtue," and there is no hint in the passage that he is talking about passionate or unreflective self-love. And if "real" self-love means "cool" self-love as McPherson says it does, then Butler is certainly saying that conscience is exercised and ought to be exercised over real self-love.

(b) It seems obvious to me that Butler is in Sermon XI mainly treating of cool self-love. He says very frequently, even at the beginning of the Sermon, that self-love means "a *general* (my italics) desire of his own happiness" (II, 157), "the pursuit of private interest" (*ibid.*); and one of the main purposes of the Sermon is to distinguish self-love ("the principle of an action proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage" II, 158) from the various passions aimed at *particular* objects. Throughout this Sermon many of the very damaging blows dealt to self-love seem clearly aimed at cool and reflective self-love. And in Sermon XII it assumes a position in the ethical hierarchy not only below conscience but even below benevolence<sup>2</sup> (e.g. II, 177, 179, 181-2, 190, 191; cp. 131). On the other hand I admit the justice of McPherson's plea that "favourite passion" is a strange expression for Butler to apply to cool self-love. The answer may lie either in the fact that both cool self-love and the various "interested" passions (wrongly, as Butler says, called self-love) are treated in this Sermon, this expression therefore being applied to the latter, or in the carelessness of Butler as regards his use of words like "passion," "affection," "principle."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> McPherson admits (p. 13) this passage "may not appear to be very favourable" to his view and he seems to concede his whole case in saying, e.g., "Conscience, which has authority over the other principles in human nature, should correct him and show him that he will be really happier if he follows virtue." "We may have doubts about the ultimate coincidence of virtue and interest, but that is because we do not properly understand what is our interest." He continues, "There may be here a slight suggestion of the doctrine that Butler was later to develop in the Analogy. One might interpret the passage as a movement away from his emphasis on the reflective side of conscience, which is so marked in the *Sermons*, to the view in the later work that conscience makes 'immediate judgments.'" I hope that I have proved that the immediacy of conscience is the recurrent view in the *Sermons*; though this is entirely compatible with its being "reflective" in the sense of this term usual in Butler's day.

<sup>2</sup> I think McPherson is wrong to explain (p. 330) Butler's utilitarian passages as due to enlightened egoism.

<sup>3</sup> A good example of this is seen in his various discussions of benevolence. Benevolence is often used either as a "particular affection" or as a "rational principle" (II, 31-3, 166, 173; 33-4, 35, 88, 188, 169).

But even if the sentence in which self-love is called a "favourite passion" does not refer to cool self-love, there is no evidence at all that many of the other passages in this Sermon XI do not. Indeed, many of them expressly do.

Though McPherson suggests (e.g. pp. 16, 324, etc.) that his distinction of "supposed" and "real" self-love will nullify many of the interpretations of his opponents, he expressly considers only, I think, the two passages just mentioned. And I hope to have shown that his distinction is here not sufficient to support his argument. My object has been to show the relation of conscience and self-love in Butler's *Sermons*, and to argue that for Butler the position is that "virtuous acts are, as a matter of fact, such as always tend to our own interest" (McPherson, p. 327; cp. Butler "virtue is naturally the interest or happiness, and vice the misery, of such a creature as man" II, 13; cp. "happy tendency of virtue"), but *never* that "it is the happiness-producing character of acts that makes them right" (McPherson, *ibid.*). "Virtue is demonstrably the happiness of man," but "it consists in good actions, proceeding from a good principle, temper or heart" (II, 230). Since self-love is the strongest and most usual spur to action in reasonable men, virtue and religion will always appeal to it for help. And this appeal is made by showing that the pursuit of virtue is in general not at variance with their supposed self-interest, and never, in the final estimation of things, with their real self-interest. McPherson (p. 6; cp. 18), in summarizing the argument of the *Analogy*, says, "God, who seeks the happiness of all his creatures, prescribes our duty for us. If we follow this, we shall attain happiness. God speaks through our consciences. We know the deliverances of conscience intuitively." This I would submit is also the argument of the *Sermons*.<sup>1</sup> Butler has not dealt in any detail, in the *Sermons*, with the question of conscience as the voice of God; as a faculty, "which if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own" (II, 51), for the good reason that "this part of the office of conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider" (*ibid.*).<sup>2</sup>

*University College, Hull.*

<sup>1</sup> Therefore I consider his development thesis unnecessary.

<sup>2</sup> Though the subject is mentioned in, e.g., II, 59, 61, 98, 109, 150, 175.

# WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

PROFESSOR H. D. LEWIS.

## I

FEW people, I imagine, would be disconcerted to learn that it is not very easy to provide a philosophical account of their activities; and this holds no less when these activities are of an intellectual nature. Historians and mathematicians and scientists do not wait in that fashion upon the deliberations of philosophers; and a good thing it is for them, too. For their patience might otherwise be rather severely tried, since disagreement and dispute appear to be the life-blood of philosophy. Nonetheless philosophical questions about these and other activities are not irrelevant to practice. The historian can benefit by what the philosopher has to tell him, and no one could desire a better example of this than the wise observations with which a recent reviewer opened his discussion of Professor David Williams's recent *History of Wales*. The reviewer observes, for example, that it is not the business of the historian to hold the balance between conflicting evidence but to find what is true, possibly rejecting outright one view for which there may be much evidence, the strongest evidence pointing in the other direction. So also, the same writer notes, we should not deliberately cultivate or nurse a prejudice just because it is difficult to be altogether without prejudice or bias. Considerations of this sort are really part of a philosophy of history, and if they do nothing else they at any rate have the negative function of saving us from foolish philosophies, such as the far too prevalent belief that, since some people write history from a Marxist point of view we should counter them by writing it from a Christian point of view. No doubt, as Christians, some things will impress us which would not impress the Communist with his very different scheme of values, and the story which the one tells may be very different from the story which the other tells. Nonetheless the facts must not be distorted to fit into any preconceived mould, nor must facts be suppressed if they fail to support our particular views. It is the truth that we are after, and if our limitations prevent us from giving the whole truth we should try to give as adequate an impression of it as we can, we should deplore rather than exult in our partialities.

No doubt there are matters here which would need further qualification if a full account were to be given, and sooner or later we would run up against the vexed question of values. But my paper is not exactly about history, although history will come into it again later. I mention these matters here as an example of the sort of bearing which a philosophical enquiry can have on other studies.

# PHILOSOPHY

## II

Perhaps the hardest question of this sort which philosophers have to ask, or at least the most disconcerting, is the question what is philosophy itself. For even if we say that the historian and the scientist can get on well enough without a philosophical definition of their aims, it seems rather odd that the very study which attaches importance to definitions of this sort should find itself peculiarly puzzled by itself. If it cannot set its own house in order how can it lend a hand elsewhere? Now there is not anything radically disconcerting here, if the matter be rightly understood. We can get on with many philosophical projects without starting with the question what is philosophy about; and that is very fortunate, for we might otherwise never get to those problems. At the same time we are never very far from the question what exactly is it that we are trying to do, and at times the question assumes decisive importance. Books like Professor Barnes's recent *The Philosophical Predicament* are almost entirely concerned with this question, and it can often be shown that misleading answers have been given just because the wrong questions were asked. At a simpler level we may remind ourselves what trouble Plato seemed to take with beginners, if the dialogues are any clue, to give them a sound impression of what sort of study philosophy is.

It is perhaps in everyday encounters that the philosopher feels most at a loss. For almost anything he says about his subject to those not acquainted with it is bound to be much more misleading than rough definitions of history or science. We cannot, for this reason, fall back on some stock definition such as "the study of reality as a whole." For in addition to begging one of the main issues in philosophy itself (and also seeming—to the layman—rather pretentious) this definition will almost certainly convey the impression that philosophy is some kind of super-science which gathers up the findings of all the other sciences into some more comprehensive view. And that would certainly not be true. But we are not much better off if we say that philosophy is "analysis"; for apart from begging the main question again, the sort of analysis which will suggest itself will be very different from that which the philosopher actually attempts; and if we were to say that the aim of philosophy is to get us to think clearly about things in general, apart from being far too modest (for as Professor Price reminds us "Clarity is not enough"), the impression may well be left that the philosopher provides us with a set of rules which we can forthwith apply as we go about our business in other studies; and that at any rate is not what it does.

I remember one occasion when the predicament in question became

## WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

a very acute one for me. I was staying at the house of a friend. There was also in the house at that time a very old lady who had been accustomed to visit us many years before. I had not seen her since I was a small boy, but I was asked to go and speak to her. She was very spry, alert, and in full possession of her faculties. She talked a little about some boyish pranks of mine, and then came the ominous enquiry, "And what do you do now?" "I lecture at the University," I said. "Oh, yes" she answered, "and what do you lecture on?" "Philosophy," I replied, rightly fearing the worst. And of course the inevitable happened—"Well, what is philosophy?" Now I do not know how my colleagues cope with that sort of situation. But I thought I managed rather well at the time—at least to begin with. "Oh well," I said, "it studies 'free will' and 'right and wrong' and the 'existence of God' and that sort of question." "I see," she said, "*Theology*."

I let it pass at the time, but the story has a moral which enables me to come to closer grips with my subject. For after all theology does ask these questions, and sometimes goes so far as to claim a monopoly of them. They are certainly very central to it; and there have been some periods when the philosophical treatment of such issues could not be distinguished from that of the theologian. Where then does theology end and philosophy begin (or the other way about if you prefer it)? We know very little in fact of one another's work nowadays; theologians and philosophers get on quite nicely without much help from one another, and yet, very oddly, they seem to be dealing with the very same matters. Now this would be less perplexing if we were asking very different sorts of questions about this common material. The psychologist, for example, and the moral philosopher deal with matters of conduct. But they deal with them in respects which are normally quite distinguishable. The work of the one may be very helpful to that of the other, but they ask very different questions about conduct. In much the same way the physicist and the chemist deal with material objects. But they deal with them in different aspects. The desk before me would be of interest to the chemist, the physicist, the student of optics, the historian, the connoisseur of art, the psychologist and hosts of others; for they ask different things about it. But what appears odd about theology is that it seems to raise the same sort of question, in part at least, as the philosopher raises, and to give very different answers—different not only in the sense in which one philosophy differs from another, but often, and quite radically, in its conception of what the answers should be. In other words, even if theologians set out, as philosophers do, to answer the sort of questions instanced above, the former would not regard themselves as being a species of philosopher, or claim to be propounding a philosophical answer to rival that

normally given by other philosophers. They claim to be doing something different. They are theologians and we are philosophers; and the assumption is that both are engaged on very different activities, an assumption much supported by our colossal ignorance of one another's work.

Of the curious situation which arises in consequence of this in respect to ethical questions something has been said by me on other occasions. I have pointed out how often and how flagrantly moral philosophers and theologians appear to contradict one another. They almost literally talk a different language. "Sin," "guilt," "disobedience," "purification," "reconciliation," "new birth," "conversion," "redemption," "atonement," these hardly ever figure in the ethical philosopher's vocabulary. You will be hard put to it to find them in the best recent books on ethics. And yet in some way they have all to do with conduct. Now part of this may be due to the fact that religion, while including ethics, goes beyond it. It brings new terms into the problem of the way we should deal with one another and into kindred ethical questions, much as membership of a family brings with it new duties and complications of old ones. To know that we stand in a certain relation to God may well be expected, not only to set before us new duties and values, but to modify other duties at every point. I will not enquire now whether this is so. For even if it is, that does not seem to be an adequate account of the differences between the way conduct is described normally by moral philosophers and by theologians. For it is not the content of duty and goodness that are altered and amplified in the theological account, but the very conception of them. And for this situation, I am very certain, no solution is possible by rejecting ethics or theology outright, much though some theologians at present would like to make an end of all ethics. But if we are to allow the moral philosopher his job, and also to allow, as at any rate we have to do in practice, that he need learn nothing expressly from the theologian for his immediate purpose, if in fact he can get on without asking religious questions at all, it seems that there is a very real problem of the nature of the statements about morality which the theologian also makes. If he is making the same sort of statement as the moralist, then one or other must give way. We cannot have two contradictory answers to the same question, and where the answers are not contradictory (and it is not moralists of my own persuasion alone that find theological statements altogether opposed to much that they say) the one discipline or the other appears to be superfluous. This suggests that perhaps theologians and philosophers are not really attempting the same sort of task when they deal with ethics, and if theology deals with matters which are more peculiarly its own, namely questions about God, in ways which are also, at the very least, different from

## WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

the way philosophers deal with these questions, if even in this field they know little of one another's work, and get on moderately at any rate in spite of that, the impression is deepened, not that they treat of fundamentally different matters, but that the tasks they set out to accomplish are very different. And if we can discover in what ways they are different we may be able, not only to facilitate ways of co-operation between them and a better understanding of the aims and principles on which each proceeds, but also to eliminate a great deal of lamentable confusion engendered in men's minds when they find themselves confronted with these apparently contradictory assertions put forward in the name of two highly respected disciplines. This may eventually redound to the considerable advantage and credit of both theology and philosophy, and it may help to restore the former, and to restore its basic conceptions, to the respect which I fear they have lost almost entirely in the popular mind.

Now I do not propose at this point to embark on a detailed analysis of the nature of philosophy, for I do not require for my present purpose to add anything that is not tolerably familiar to students of philosophy. My aim will be to confront the theologian as squarely as I can with the question whose fellow has so often disconcerted me—"Just what is theology, what does it do?" And in the light of the answer which I hope in due course to suggest we shall have at any rate what seems to me the main clue for our understanding of the relations of philosophy and theology, although much will remain to be said which cannot be brought within the scope of this paper.

### III

Now within certain limits the answer to our question is quite straightforward, or at least as straightforward as such questions ever can be. We know quite well in some respects what theologians do. They undertake very much the same sort of task as scholars set themselves in other fields. They study the text of Scriptures with a view to ascertaining how and when they were written. They seek to determine the authorship of various books; were these books written by one or more persons, were they composed all at once or in stages, do they represent developments in the author's mind, how far is the text before us reliable, through what stages did it pass to reach the form in which we have it, what are the significant shifts of meaning and nuances of important words, to what extent do the common translations of these words represent the real meaning of the author, how are historical allusions in the text to be understood and what were the most important historical events and influences which need to be taken into account by the reader to-day? Now these are difficult questions and they require in those who would tackle them a

combination of many scholarly accomplishments. But they do not seem to be radically different from or more complicated than the similar questions confronting scholars in other secular fields, the historian or the classical scholar for example. The latter tries to determine for us when, for instance, the *Iliad* was written—was it composed by one man or many, were there additions to it at later stages, was it built up out of more primitive traditions, what actual historical occurrences does it reflect? The classicist may again turn to the work of Plato and Aristotle, he helps us to date the dialogues of Plato so that we can understand better (among other things) the development which took place in the mind of the author, we are told of subtle differences between the meanings of Greek words and their nearest English equivalent; and in much the same way the English scholar sets to work on the poetry of Chaucer or Shakespeare. The great Biblical controversies have their parallels in other fields. Is there anything then peculiar to Biblical scholarship which has no equivalent in other fields of enquiry? Is one historian or skilful scholar as well equipped as any other to cope with textual and historical questions about the Bible? Is the fact that it is Holy Scriptures that we deal with relevant here? On the face of it, it is not. There seems to be no reason why the opinion of an unbeliever should not be as reliable as that of any other when the question how many authors the book of Isaiah has is concerned. Some sympathetic interest or insight into meaning is of course presupposed. But this is true also of Platonic or Shakespearean scholarship. There must plainly be some questions of scholarship where the difference between sacred and secular texts is irrelevant, and perhaps this goes for most questions of Biblical scholarship. And yet there may be cases where points of scholarship turn on nuances of meaning which can only be properly appreciated by those capable of grasping some peculiarly religious import of the text in question. It is here that difficulties arise. What is it that is peculiar about religious truth, in what ways is religious knowledge different from any other, how far does it presuppose aptitudes and conditions not required in principle elsewhere, and how far, finally, does this affect questions of Biblical scholarship? I leave it to the Biblical experts to answer. But in so far as they do claim, as they seem bound in some measure to do, to be engaged in work for which the appropriate scholarly equipment is not enough, the question "What is theology?" takes on an altogether different proportion.

Turn again to another important branch of theological study—Church History and the History of doctrine. Here again the procedures of the scholar follow much the same course as those of the secular historian. The same sort of skills are often displayed by both. Inscriptions must be deciphered, scrolls and documents examined,

## WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

linguistic questions settled. But here again there lurks more than a suspicion that even purely historical questions, so far as they concern religion, may prove unamenable to treatment by the purely secular historian, and that for some reason more fundamental than that which urges us to commission lovers of freedom to write the history of democracy and scholars of leftist sympathy to study the history of socialism. To what extent does this apply? I should much like to have the views of the experts. But even if it applies in only a small measure we are again confronted with an intriguing and difficult question—just what is this peculiarity of religious studies which sets them apart from all others.

But the point at which this problem becomes most insistent is when we consider the work of theology *par excellence*, namely the formulation and exposition of doctrine. What is the logical status of the statements which the theologian makes in this connection? Are they scientific generalizations or are they some species of philosophical assertions; and, if the latter alternative be selected, why is it difficult to iron out the seeming inconsistencies between theological statements and the philosophical assertions which deal with kindred matters; what is the rationale of theology over and above that of a fairly exhaustive philosophy of religion?

### IV

The answer to these questions will depend on the view we take of religious truth. For example, the idealist thinkers who dominated European and American thought at the turn of the century would not find it easy to draw a very rigid distinction between philosophy and theology, and both these in turn would have close points of affinity for them with science. The universe for the idealist of the Neo-Hegelian type which we know best in this country, thinkers like Green, Caird, Pringle-Pattison, and the early A. E. Taylor, would be a completely rational system. The divine is for them in principle the same as the human, it is the completion and fulfilment of the powers we ourselves already exercise. And therefore if we could think out completely what is involved in human perfection, indeed if we could see all that is implicit in the "flower in the crannied wall" we would know all that could be known about God also, we would have fathomed the mystery of his nature. Even now this is, in principle, open to us, for its principle is our reason. Reason is the essence of God and it is in terms of this rational identity that idealist thinkers of the type I have mentioned would proceed to understand the love of God for his creatures. God draws us to himself as the perfect whole takes up the parts into itself. The universe is "homeward bound" because everything is really already taking its place in the divine

plan. We can be at peace in the assurance which it was the business of the Gospel especially to deepen that all is subject to this over-riding rational providence.

Now it is not necessary for me here, and time would hardly allow it, to show in much detail how far we have travelled to-day from this position. Shattering experiences of two wars have helped to widen the little rift which was already evident in the idealist lute at the beginning of this century. It is not easy for us to-day to adopt the complacent confidence of our nineteenth-century prototypes in the universal dominion of reason. And there is more than one way in which this has come about. Undoubtedly we all deplore the growth of irrationalism in politics and morals. But it is plain now that we shall not provide the adequate answer to the distressing irrationalism of our time unless we acquire in the first instance as clear a conception as we can of the limits of reason. That there are such limits has been forced upon us not only by a better grasp of the process of scientific enquiry itself and by the importance ascribed to intuition or some equivalent for it which others may devise in ethics, nor merely by the stock indictment of idealism on the ground of its failure to account for human freedom and rebellion and for the reality of evil in many forms, but also, and most important of all, by a much clearer conception of the way in which we must think of God. Nothing short of a transcendent God will content us to-day, and for this we seem to be equally indebted to the more traditionalist Catholic thinker and to the more violent and explosive Protestant who, however we may wish to condemn him on other grounds, earns our considerable gratitude for the vivid prophetic character of his re-affirmation of the unfathomable mystery of the Being whom we can again properly regard as the transcendent source of all other reality, our creator and sustainer.

But once this matter is reaffirmed and appreciated the problem of our knowledge of God acquires a peculiar severity, so much so that many thinkers have regarded it as almost blasphemous to claim that knowledge of God is possible; and such thinkers include, not only agnostics of the type of Herbert Spencer but deeply religious people. Many oriental mystics would say that we can never know anything of God and that to think of him having this form or that is absurd. In quite recent times we have, among very devout people like Buber and Heim, the view that the claim to have knowledge of God at once questions his transcendence and essential mystery. They substitute for such knowledge a "pure relation," but as I have argued in another paper<sup>1</sup> it is not very easy to ascribe any meaning to this notion of a "pure relation." Furthermore, religious people normally claim much more, they claim to have explicit messages from God and

<sup>1</sup> *Morals and Revelation*, chapter viii.

## WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

to rely on his guidance. Their revelations have a very rich content. But one nonetheless sympathizes with Buber and Heim; for how can statements about God be made at all without presuming to solve a mystery which it is essential that it should be beyond our power to solve?

I do not think the notion of analogy will help us here, and in any case we usually wish to go much further than the attenuated and usually negative assertions to which sponsors of this approach very understandably confine themselves. But if we are not to think of God in the image of man how can we think of him at all?

Now if we were thinking of the problem of the existence of God the answer would, in my view, be that we have an "intuition" of his existence, although I fight rather shy of this notoriously ambiguous word. I mean that we can see the necessity for God's existence in the contemplation of all other reality. It would take me too long to discuss this adequately here. I certainly do not mean that we can infer the existence of God from the existence of finite things in the same way as we infer the existence of a planet from the existence of other planets or of atoms and electrons from the behaviour of observable phenomena. The most that we could get along these lines would be a finite God. But a "finite God" is a contradiction in terms, and in any case the attempt to establish the existence of some such super-being lamentably breaks down. The considerations which might support our case have, on reflection, to be qualified to vanishing point. But if we forswear this rationalistic "idealistic" approach, we shall, I think, find in the very limitations of all finite thought whatever a compulsion upon us also to believe in that which is complete and perfect as finite beings cannot be.

The sharper the more fundamental limitations of finite thought are brought home to us, as in the well-known difficulties about space and time, the plainer will be the compulsion or necessity to which I referred. Vague designations of it are "Ultimate Source," "First Cause or Ground," "Necessary Being," but all these terms really mean the same, and as we can give no specific meaning from finite experience to "ground" or "cause" as used in this context, designations such as those instanced only serve to refer to what they cannot effectively specify. They all stand in the same way for that which we cannot put into any really adequate formula, but which can be elicited in ways which such terms suggest, namely the quite peculiar conviction of the being of God to which I have alluded.

It is the peculiarity of this conviction which precludes us from using it as a source from which to educe further statements about God; and the recent Neo-Thomist thinkers who have guided our thought very helpfully in these matters seem to me to have erred very seriously in seeking to extract from the alleged intuition of the

## PHILOSOPHY

Being of God at least *some* more specific matter. For in spite of their estimable caution they have done serious injustice to the very insight for which we are especially indebted to them.

At the same time religion must somehow supply itself with more information about God than that he exists. It claims in fact to know a great deal about him; individual religious people claim to direct their lives under the continuous guidance of God and to enjoy his presence. God speaks to them, and often in no unambiguous terms. How is this possible, how can we know what is from God, and what is not, if God is so much beyond and "other than" ourselves?

This brings us closer to our special problem, but it will be well at this point to interpolate a word of warning to those philosophers who have participated in the spate of interesting discussions of the logic of religious statements recently in philosophical periodicals. It is this. Problems concerning the existence of God differ in some respects markedly from the problems of the status and validity of other assertions we make about God. Little account has in fact been taken of this distinction and I cannot now show in detail how unfortunate that has been. I should agree that we cannot argue from particular facts to the existence of God, since what we find is that the existence of God is evident in the existence of any fact whatsoever; in this way no particular event has more significance than any other where the existence of God is concerned. On the other hand, it seems inevitable that the more specific assertions we make about God must be based in some way on the particular content of our experiences. This is what gives some superficial plausibility to the more empirical and positivist approach to our problem. I do not think that a purely empirical approach can be successful, but the problem of the nature of the knowledge into which empirical elements enter obviously wears a very different epistemological aspect from that which involves no explicit reference to the varied content of experience.

### V

To return to our main question, little time need be taken up at this stage to insist that mere speculations or fabrications of our own will not give us the specific knowledge of God we want. Nor is such a suggestion at all in accord with religious experience. Recent religious thought in particular has stressed the invasion or possession of man in his religious life by forces from without himself. Its externality is part of the authenticity of the religious communication, it is found in an "encounter" with a "Living God." But many theologians, even those who have stressed most the transcendence of God and the "givenness" of the "Word" man receives in his encounter with God, have fallen into the error of presenting truths about God in the form

## WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

of purely rational systems which we apprehend in the same way as any other rational statements—for example those we find in philosophical arguments. Recourse to the transcendent nature of the object described in those systems is made, in the cases in question, only when the system fails. The paradoxes and inconsistencies of the system are excused on the ground that we are not after all dealing with matters which can be exhaustively rationalized. But this is not unlike the much denounced procedure of those scientists who used to bring in God to fill the gaps in their scientific explanations. The truth seems to be, however, that the transcendent nature of the object of religious experience must make itself felt, not here and there in the experience, not at this point or that in processes which have otherwise nothing to distinguish them from others, but at all points. The rational and the supra-rational in religion have not their water-tight compartments. Whatever the relation between them it is not that. But unfortunately this is what most theologians appear to overlook. By doing so of course their task is simplified, for they can proceed, in neglect of the harder creative problems, to present us with purely intellectual considerations exempt from the rigour and consistency which should attend on intellectual operations as such.

I repeat, then, that account of the transcendent nature of God must be taken at *all* points in considerations of religious truth, a matter which needs to be emphasized all the more strongly when even the more "existentialist" theologian is found to present us with little of substance in the last resort besides those very abstract formal reflections which he denounces in others. The conclusion to which this points, in my view, is that religious truth must not be sought in some isolated sphere of its own but blended with other truths or embodied in them. And it seems thus that we must regard certain experiences as being informed by a meaning other than their ordinary or more superficial meaning, and one which we come to recognize as God's communication to us. This happens especially in moral experience, and the transmutation of moral experience into religious truth is one of the higher reaches of religious life. Morality plays a distinctive part in religion also by helping to induce in us the attitude of expectancy and disregard of self which facilitates the quickening of normal processes into the vital religious experience. Of the further problems attending our recognition of the religious significance which is thus infused into other modes of awareness there is hardly space to say more here. I will only venture to refer you to what I have maintained elsewhere<sup>1</sup> about the suggestive parallel which we find in the case of art, where the overt meaning is also taken up as an element in a completer experience in which canons of truth that apply to the former at its own level no longer hold. One consequence of this which

<sup>1</sup> *Morals and Revelation*, chapter ix.

## PHILOSOPHY

I also stressed in my previous discussion is that we no longer require to suspend or abrogate the standards we normally apply to intellectual operations, considered as such or at their own level, when these figure in religious experience. Thinking must be honest and consistent in religion as much as anywhere else. But as it figures in a religious experience it will be more than itself or part of what is meaningful in another way. In a somewhat similar fashion the integrity of the moral life, and of our thought about it, is preserved, while regarding religion as also something informing the moral life and more than it. On this basis the way will be open for us to view what is said about ethics in a religious context as needing to be understood in a different sense from the statements we make about ethics when reflecting on it in itself. One may thus accord, in a special religious context, the greatest importance to theological statements which, taken in a literal sense, are quite opposed to ordinary ethical principles. We must not, however, forget, as theologians are only too prone to do, the qualification "in a special religious context." But this will perhaps be plainer when I present more boldly the suggestion about the nature of theology for which I have been trying to prepare the way.

## VI

Much that goes by the name of theology seems to me to be a matter of abstracting the more formal and rational elements in religious experience and seeking to develop them on their own account and apart from the distinctive symbolic significance which belongs to them in the life of religion. This leads to the arid wastes in which theology has too often wilted or become a dilettante game with bodiless fictions. And of that nothing more need be said now. But if the theologian sets himself to the task of guiding us back from the more persistent abstract formulations of religious truth which we have to the original experience in the symbolic totality of which they played an indispensable part, then he will be discharging a function than which few can be more important at present. For I need hardly stress, for any who are seriously interested in our subject, how crucially important it is for us to redouble our efforts to counter the irreligious forces in our age and hasten the revival of true religion. And this is not a task to be accomplished in the abstract or in isolation from the continuous life of religion in the past, least of all for Christians whose faith depends on a historic revelation. But if we are to recover the experiences of the past by which our own religious life may be enlivened and on which so much in the work and significance of the Church depends, few things will help us more than the skilful and sympathetic reconstruction of the vital religious experi-

## WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

ences and reactions in which the mind of God became known to men in the past. This is not a process of analysis, nor is it any kind of philosophical construction, it is a process of carrying out an operation upon religious experience which is itself a distinctive form of religious activity and upon which no one can enter in any mood other than a deeply religious one. But at this point I think we can have the help of a very instructive analogy.

The analogy I wish to commend to you is that of art criticism. Part of the work of such a critic will consist of scholarly investigations not radically different from those of the historian or the pure linguist. He will need to tell us, for example, when a certain work of art was produced, what were the circumstances and artistic conventions of the time, what influences had most effect on the artist and what are the features of the work of art to which we ought especially to attend. All this will be largely a matter of applying scholarly techniques, but it may prove singularly enlightening, especially when the artistic conventions of another age are displayed before us. But even so it is little more than journeyman's work compared to the more distinctive function of the critic, namely evaluation and appraisal. At the same time this work of appraisal does not consist at all of applying certain preconceived standards to the estimation of a work of art. It may include some element of that at certain levels, or where unfavourable criticism is concerned, although I have my doubts. But the inducement of artistic appreciation *par excellence* must take another form of which the best indication is given by comparison with the work which the actor or the singer or reciter performs upon a work of art already complete in itself, namely to render it. In doing so they really impose one new artistic activity upon another to the enrichment of the latter. Art criticism is itself a kind of art, a parasitic one which is no less valuable on that account.

And without developing these matters in detail, I wish to suggest that the work of theology *par excellence* is to "render" the religious experiences of the past by performing upon them as a whole, and with all the help which careful scholarship can provide, an operation not dissimilar to that performed in the complete symbolism of the original experience upon the elements of more overt meaning within it. For such work there can be no rigid rules. It is creative work and must be inspired. In addition it will require a lively sensibility to contemporary events and culture. For the life of religion is always moving, and we cannot re-create what is vital in the past except in terms of situations which confront us to-day in our most realistic apprehension of them and in our own idiom.

From this it follows, in the first place, that the work which the theologian has to do is supremely difficult, and requires a com-

## PHILOSOPHY

bination of attainments which may well be unique. The creative theologian cannot live in the past but he must have a peculiarly lively sense of the past; and his scholarly equipment must be of the finest. But above all he has himself to live a profoundly religious life. Only in the fires, often very fierce ones, of deep and continuous religious experiences can he forge the new truths which every age needs for the support of its spiritual life, and indeed of all life. The theologian merges into the prophet, as evidenced strikingly in recent examples. But he is a prophet with a difference, for he has a particular task to perform especially upon those deposits of truth which have settled more permanently in our religious traditions and which, if I may vary my metaphor, it is his business to stir into life. As he goes about his work he will learn from the philosopher, especially as the latter investigates the logic of various disciplines and raises the question of truth and the variety of its modes. He will learn not to confuse himself and others by seeming to adopt the role of the philosopher, and he will remember that the statements he makes must be taken in a very different and more distinctively symbolic sense than those of the philosopher. He will realize also that he is dealing with elusive symbols which must not be allowed to carry him away on the wings of alluring incidental associations. He must discipline and restrain himself as the artist does while also maintaining the fire of inspiration alive in his heart. And for this he will need above all the humility and passion for truth which only come fully to those who have learnt to walk always with God.

The ideal is a daunting one. But there has never been a time in the whole history of the world when the need for committed creative theologians of the sort suggested was more evident. For the rapid advance of contemporary science and culture have made it all the more urgent for us to discover in the full life of the present, and without repudiation of our attainments, the truths which only a living tradition can bring to the redeeming of the present from what is dead and past in the life of the individual and society, and thereby ensure our continuous initiation into newness of religious life. The field is white to the harvest. What of the reapers?

*University College of North Wales, Bangor.*

## DISCUSSION

### MR. BAIER ON DOING ONE'S DUTY

1. Baier, in his article "Doing One's Duty" (*Philosophy*, July, 1951) attacks the distinction which is drawn by Ross and Prichard between subjective and objective duty, claiming that it does not solve the difficulties it was meant to solve, and that, in addition, it creates paradoxes that can be avoided by the simple expedient of returning to ordinary usage. I should like briefly to examine Baier's attack and the claims that he makes in the course of launching it.

2. He begins by drawing attention to a point that he assures us is obvious, but which, he informs us, both Ross and Prichard failed to notice. The point is indeed obvious; what is less obvious is that Ross and Prichard failed to notice it. Baier maintains that the question, "Which of the two acts, the subjectively or the objectively right act, is the one which I ought to do?" cannot be asked, for the agent cannot distinguish between "the act which he, perhaps erroneously, thinks right and the act which is really right." This, of course, is true. (Since, on Ross's view, the subjectively right act may also be the objectively right act, it is difficult to understand how Mr. Baier came to think that Ross held that the agent could distinguish two acts, one the subjectively and the other the objectively right act.) But it is also beside the point that Ross wishes to make, for what Ross wishes to maintain does not require him to hold that it is feasible for the agent to set himself this question. Let me consider something that the agent might very well say to himself. "I think it would be right for me to tell John what his brother has been doing. But I might be wrong; it might not be right for me to tell him. So can I be sure it's my duty to tell him?" In such a case the agent is not distinguishing two actions, the act that is his objective duty and the act that is his subjective duty; what happens is that, prompted by doubt as to the rightness of a certain course of action, he turns over in his mind the possibility of an alternative course of action being his objective duty. That the agent can do this is sufficient for Ross's purposes; for surely, in such circumstances, there is plenty of point in his declaring to himself, "My duty is to do what I think right, i.e., my subjective duty." If we do not accept this conclusion we must allow the possibility of a man's failing to do his duty because he did not know what his duty was. But this, since we regard it as culpable not to do one's duty, forces us to say that a man can be blamed for not doing something that he did not know that he had a duty to do—surely an intolerable conclusion.

3. I shall now consider the paradoxes which follow, in Baier's view, from Ross's conclusions. The first of these is that if we agree with Ross we are forced to say that an act which was thought right but which is wrong can be someone's duty. This, I think, is true. But surely there are occasions when we should want to say precisely this. Thus, if an anaesthetist gave a patient nitrous oxide instead of oxygen, the nitrous oxide cylinder having been mistakenly labelled "Oxygen" by the manufacturer, surely we should say that the anaesthetist did his duty, but that, nevertheless, what he did was wrong.

Baier's second paradox is that if we accept Ross's view we are prevented from saying such things as, "I thought it was my duty to lock the gate but I was wrong." On this I have two comments to make. First, the word "duty" is ambiguous. In the sense of the word "duty" which is illustrated by the

## PHILOSOPHY

sentence, "His duties included the emptying of the village post-box every evening," one could still say, "I thought it was my duty to lock the gate but I was wrong." The sentence would then mean, "I thought my orders included the locking of the gate but in fact they didn't." A duty in this sense is a task which I have been detailed to perform regularly by someone who has, or assumes, authority over me. Clearly, this is not strictly an ethical sense of the word "duty," although it is in the interest of those in authority to encourage the confusion which leads one to suppose that it is. Furthermore, even if this sense were ethical, "duty" could only be used in this way at the cost of once more confusing what one is obliged to do with what Ross called our *prima facie* obligations. Secondly, although Ross's conclusion prevents us from saying, "I thought it was my duty to lock the gate but I was wrong," where "duty" is used in its genuinely ethical sense, it does not prevent us from saying, "I thought it right to lock the gate but I was wrong." Hence there is no need to say (as Baier suggests), "I had a duty to lock the gate and now I don't have one." Surely it is obvious that some ordinary usages have to be jettisoned in the interests of accuracy?

H. J. N. HORSBURGH.

*University of Oxford.*

# PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

## GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

To return to reality, to return to concrete experience, to return to facts would seem to be more necessary than ever at the present time. This is especially relevant to the discussion of philosophical problems. The problem of personal identity, for instance, which Hume found insoluble on his assumptions, can hardly be fruitfully discussed without a knowledge of the relevant psychological facts. For this reason C. G. Jung's *Aion* (Rascher, Zürich) may be recommended to all serious students of this problem. It summarizes his most interesting and provocative theory of the Self which is noteworthy because it arose out of psychological and psychopathological experience. Jung discusses the problem on the levels of (1) the "I" as the focal point of our conscious acts, (2) the "shadow-self" (*animus-anima*) of the Unconscious, and (3) the Self. The Unconscious and the Conscious compensate each other, the conscious male by a female *anima*, and the conscious female by a male *animus*. But they may be in conflict, and the Self, arising in the Unconscious, represents the tendency to combine both in a psychological whole. Moreover, the religious philosopher will find in the book a most provocative attempt to interpret Christ as a symbol of the Self, whose shadow-self is Satan or the Antichrist.—To return to a first-hand observation of primitive mentality is the *leit-motiv* of Richard Thurnwald's *Des Menschegeistes Erwachen, Wachsen und Irren* (Duncker and Humblot, Berlin). It represents a refutation of the alleged prelogical character of primitive mentality; discusses, in a sober and competent manner, the methods of non-analytic, sense-bound (*sinnengebunden*) primitive thought; and is rich in observations, e.g. on *Mittelpunktgefühl* and on the primitive attitude to lying and stealing.—To return to the concrete experience of real philosophizing is the guiding principle of Jaspers' philosophy. His starting point was psychology which became transformed in his hands into a clarification of existence (*Existenzerhellung*). In his newest book *Rechenschaft und Ausblick* (Piper, München), which is in fact a most welcome collection of scattered papers and addresses, the autobiographical ones are the most interesting. Jaspers believed that there were no real philosophers in the Universities, and that therefore even a weak man, unable to produce a philosophy of his own, had a right to say what philosophy had been and what it could be. He is certainly right in saying that the individual in isolation cannot become man, and that as a philosopher he ought to live in communication with the great philosophers of the past.

Existentialism is still a chief topic of discussion in West Germany. Aloys Wenzl calls the term *existentiell* the most frequently used foreign word of contemporary German language. He does so in his book on Immortality which he discusses from a Catholic point of view (*Unsterblichkeit*, Francke, Bern). Indeed, the post-war mood was favourable to existentialism and provided an opportunity for the publication of several books. Marcel Reding's *Die Existenzphilosophie* (Schwann, Düsseldorf) is a simple account of the philosophies of Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, and Jaspers, concentrating on some problems deemed to be common to them. Franz Sawicki's *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Schöningh, Paderborn) reproduces on its cover the photos of three existentialists, including Sartre, a surprising fact in a Catholic publication, seeing that Sartre is on the Index. The book itself is a comprehensive, though a trifle pedestrian account of contemporary German philosophy from a Thomist

point of view. H. H. Holz takes rightly *Jean Paul Sartre* (Westkulturverlag) as representing consciousness in the stage of alienation, but wrongly interprets this fact, from the Marxian standpoint, as "self-unmasking of bourgeois mentality." He quite forgets that the same alienation is operative in Marx's thought. F. J. von Rintelen's *Philosophie der Endlichkeit als Spiegel der Gegenwart* (Westkulturverlag) is a painstaking and most elaborate attempt to refute Heidegger and Jaspers. His central thesis, that contemporary philosophy is essentially a philosophy of finiteness, is hardly correct but interesting because it reveals Heidegger's overwhelming influence on contemporary German thought. That a philosopher should transcend the arbitrary limits of finiteness would not be denied by either Jaspers or Heidegger.

Catholic philosophers are again very active. George Siegmund presents us with three books, an enormous volume on *Naturordnung als Quelle der Gotteserkenntnis* (Herder, Freiburg), a typescript *Der Mensch in seinem Dasein*, and a small booklet, *Das Zeichen des Widerspruchs* (Fuldaer Verlag). The first attempts a reformulation of the teleological proof of the existence of God; the second is the first part of a Philosophical Anthropology; and the third an anti-critique of the protest against God, against Christ, and against the Church. Siegmund has resigned from the editorship of the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* which, under the auspices of a committee, has started the publication of special issues of *Kosmologie* and *Philosophie des Lebens*, the latter, referring to biology and philosophy of nature, being especially interesting.

To return to an analysis of the moral life and to start with our early experience of moral behaviour is Hans Reiner's intention in *Pflicht und Neigung* (Westkulturverlag). His book is a serious discussion of the foundations of ethics, with specific reference to Kant and Schiller. As a pupil of Heidegger he gives a well-informed and penetrating criticism of Heidegger's mostly unpublished moral teaching. In *Recht und Rechtsordnung* (Westkulturverlag) W. R. Beyer interprets law as being in a continuous flux and the order of law as an order of norms, dependent on the order of society. R. Schottländer attacks the phenomenological basis of Scheler's and Hartmann's ethics, and tries to substitute for it the notion of *Heil* (*salus*) in *Der Philosophische Heilsbegriff* (Westkulturverlag). H. Wein rejects relativism as leading to moral defeatism (*Das Problem des Relativismus*, de Gruyter).

The contributions to the history of philosophy are numerous. First place would appear to belong to Paul Wilpert's *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften* (Habel, Regensburg). I drew attention to his work in *Philosophy*, 1949, p. 264, but so far we have not received the book for review. Joseph Zürcher tries to prove that Aristotle's works in their present form are not written by him but by Theophrastus, and that they do not contain more than 20-30 per cent of Aristotelian substance. He has produced an enormous book of 456 pages on this topic, *Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* (Schöningh, Paderborn), a welcome bone of contention for the specialist. Jan van der Meulen's *Aristoteles, Die Mitte in seinem Denken* (Westkulturverlag) recommends a return to Aristotle, especially to his theory of *μεσότης* which he claims as the common source of his logic, physics, psychology, and ethics, apparently overrating the term *Mitte*.—I should like to draw the attention of students of Greek philosophy and classical scholars to the *Bibliothek der Alten Welt* (Artemis Verlag, Zürich). We have received three handsome and most enjoyable small volumes, *Epikur, Von der Überwindung der Furcht*, translated and introduced by Olof Gigon, *Stoa und Stoiker, Die Gründer, Panaitios, Poseidonios*, introduced and translated by Max Pohlenz, and *Plutarch, Von der Ruhe des Gemütes und andere philosophische Schriften*, introduced and translated by Bruno Snell. Anyone who knows how difficult it is to collect this material and to present it in a form

## PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

amenable to the general reader will be grateful to the well-known authors for their revival of Greek thinkers who still have a message for our time. Especially Pohlenz' volume is a welcome companion to his great history of Stoicism, and a worthy gift to his eightieth birthday.

The invaluable bibliographies, edited by I. M. Bochenski under the title *Bibliographische Einführungen in das Studium der Philosophie* (Francke, Bern) are continued with volumes 12, *Platon*; 13-14 *Thomas von Aquin*; 15-16 *Der Thomismus*; 17 *Philosophie des Mittelalters*; 18 *Patristische Philosophie*; 19 *Jüdische Philosophie*; and 20-21 *Buddhistische Philosophie*.—Gottfried Martin's *Immanuel Kant, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie* (Kölner Universitätsverlag) gives an interesting new interpretation of Kant. It arises out of a synthesis of the epistemological interpretation of the Marburg school and Heidegger's ontological interpretation. Both are, however, transcended to such a degree that Kant is now interpreted, first on the basis of the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition, and secondly from the point of view of the modern theory of science. Whether these two points of view can be harmonized, and whether the ontological character of Kant's thought is not overstressed, is a different matter. The introduction contains some interesting remarks about Leibniz. A commentary on the fundamental parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, based on the thesis of the systematic unity of Kant's thought, is given by F. Grayek in *Deutung und Darstellung der Theoretischen Philosophie Kants, Ein Kommentar* (Richard Meiner, Hamburg). Herbert Kraus' *Von ehrlicher Kriegführung und gerechtem Friedensschluss, Eine Studie über Immanuel Kant* (Mohr, Tübingen) is a pamphlet which stresses the subordination of politics to morals in Kant's thought.—Paul Jurevics, a pupil of Bergson, gives in his book *Henri Bergson* (Karl Alber, Freiburg) a comprehensive introduction to his work. His interpretation is based on the thesis that Bergson wished to defend the primacy, reality, and power of the mind in opposition to everything that is merely material and mechanical. It is a new and friendly interpretation which, however, remains debatable seeing that Bergson in fact stressed the primacy of Life. Joseph Möller, *Der Geist und das Absolute* (Schöningh, Paderborn) is noteworthy because it shows that Hegel still exercises an influence on the German mind. Interested in the problem of the foundations of a philosophy of religion Möller approaches Hegel. He first attempts to clarify how Hegel laid the foundations for such a philosophy, and to explain in what sense Hegel's whole philosophy may be called a philosophy of religion. He then asks whether a Thomist, or rather a thinker with Thomist orientation, is able to reach any agreement with Hegel concerning the foundations of a philosophy of religion and why idealist thought must fail in the last instance.

Veli Valpola's *Über Namen* (Finnish Academy of Science, Helsinki) is a discussion of the name-relation and an attempt to rescue it from the strictures of Carnap and Quine. Linguistic analysis as such is absent from Germany proper. The different climate of thought concerning the question of language may be felt in E. Otto's *Sprachwissenschaft und Philosophie* (de Gruyter, Berlin) which is, following Nicolai Hartmann, centred in the question of the categorical constitution of the world, "seen from the perspective of linguistic studies."

The Journals struggle on courageously, in spite of difficulties. The *Archiv für Philosophie* is now combined with the *Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung*. Its issue IV, 2 contains much material of interest to students of Symbolic Logic and of Mathematics. The *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, VI, 2, publishes an interesting paper by Hugo Dingler on the problems of positivism, of importance for the theory of science. Joseph

## PHILOSOPHY

Fuchs' article "*Situationsethik in theologischer Sicht*" in *Scholastik*, 37, 2, will interest students of intuitionist ethics which is here discussed from a theological standpoint. The *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger* concentrates on detailed book reviews and is therefore very useful. It appeals for more subscribers and it may be recommended to those interested in new Continental philosophical publications.

F. H. HEINEMANN.

*Oxford.*

## NEW BOOKS

*Marcus Aurelius, His Life and His World.* By A. S. L. FARQUHARSON. Edited by D. A. Rees. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951. 8s. 6d.)

These chapters from a larger study of Marcus Aurelius are well worth publishing, and readers of the *Meditations*, learned or unlearned, will be grateful to Mr. Rees for editing and preserving them.

It will be found that the sub-title, "His Life and His World," should be interpreted as follows. The chapters set out the environment into which Marcus was born, in which he grew up to boyhood and manhood, and (to a less degree) upon which he exercised his developed character. "His World" is in fact the greater part of the book, and much of it enthrals with its own intrinsic interest. But much again bears directly on Marcus and serves to explain him as a human being among other human beings. For instance, Chapter V, entitled "Home Life," is nearly all about Antoninus Pius (clearly a great and good man), but Marcus takes shape before our eyes as he is moulded by his adoptive father's example.

The portraits of contemporary personalities are brilliantly sketched: Fronto the friendly pedant; Herodes Atticus the egoistic millionaire rhetorician; Apuleius the fantastic; Lucian the clever cynic; Pausanias the traveller; Galen that giant of medical science; Ptolemy the reverent author of the *Great Syntax of Astronomy*; Gellius the garrulous antiquarian; and others of lesser note.

The author traces the growth of Marcus' mind from childhood with his mother through the dry, verbal studies of the day to contact with Stoicism and beyond. He tends to idealize. For instance, he quotes, apparently with approval, a letter of the boy Marcus to his master, describing with gusto how he rode his horse into a flock of sheep on the roadside for the thrill of scattering the sheep and exasperating the shepherds. Conduct normal, no doubt, in a young prince, but hardly consistent with future sainthood. Again, it is clear from Marcus' own letters that much of his youthful reading was stupid reading for reading's sake, its merit being measured by the length of time taken over it. Farquharson will hardly allow himself to admit a flaw in his hero. At the same time it is doubtful whether anything short of hero-worship can in the end succeed in penetrating the true character of Marcus.

Stoicism is discussed only as the religion which Marcus made of it, that ground-faith which was a pantheistic optimism. "The sublime yet absurd divorce of matter and mind vanishes in a conception which paradoxically declares that all is material"; a doctrine in some ways curiously like that which Bridges expounds in the *Testament of Beauty*.

An appendix shows convincingly how the Stoicism of Marcus—so near to Christianity and yet so far off—could not have accepted Christ.

The style of the book is reminiscent of Gibbon and errs on the side of ponderousness. Allusiveness and periphrasis sometimes confuse the reader. A revision of the punctuation is desirable. But we should remember that Farquharson did not put the *ultima manus* to his work. J. D. CRAIG.

---

*Aspects of Form: A Symposium on Form in Nature and Art.* Edited by L. L. Whyte with a preface by Herbert Read. (Lund Humphries. Pp. 249. Price 21s.)

The most satisfying part of this book is on nature, and an adequate criticism of it would require several specialists. It was an interesting and, I think, novel idea to bring together studies of form in various parts of nature.

## PHILOSOPHY

The short preface says: "All these patterns are effective and ontologically significant by virtue of an organization of their parts which can only be characterized as *aesthetic*." The introductory chapter by the editor states the theme: "The root characteristic of aesthetic creation is not representation, image-forming, or abstraction, but simply the *making of a functional substitute*, an object which can serve in place [of?] an original (or desired) experience in respect of some function or need of the individual." This might seem to exclude tragedy but to include dolls, pornography, castles in Spain and chewing-gum. Croce perhaps put the same idea more precisely as "the sensuous *expression* of movement of attractions or repulsion," or Wordsworth as "emotions recollected in *tranquillity*."

Dr. Arnheim's essay at length passes from the forms previously discussed by the physicist, astronomer, biologist, embryologist, biochemist, zoologist and criminologist to "Gestalt Psychology and Artistic Form." "Beauty is lost when meaning and form are split asunder. This results, on the one hand, in playing with formal relationships or pure 'composition' which carries no message or contradicts meaning. On the other hand, it leads to the misnamed 'literary' approach, which limits meaning to what the observer knows about the subject matter, and therefore offers chaotic, visually incomprehensible form."

As might be expected, the writers do not always succeed in using the word "form" in the same sense. The analogies between mere spatial relations and aesthetic form as identical with beauty sometimes seem dubious though suggestive. The concluding chapter, playfully entitled "Meditations on a Hobby-Horse, or the Roots of Artistic Form," is not the happiest. There is a very full bibliography and some fascinating illustrations. E. F. CARRITT.

---

*The Third Earl of Shaftesbury.* By R. L. BRETT, Lecturer in English in the University of Bristol. (Hutchinson's University Library. Pp. 231. 15s. net.)

This is an instructive and interesting book on the literary and philosophical environment and influence of Shaftesbury, who, if anyone, was the prophet of "the romantic movement" and of "sublimity" in Britain. Its theme is that Shaftesbury reacted against the mainly empirical tendencies of his friend and tutor Locke, Newton and, in some degree Descartes, which he regarded as inimical to art, morality and religion. His method was to popularize the more *a priori* philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists; his influence, conscious or not, is to be found in the poets Akenside, Thomson, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge and even Pope, and among philosophers in Hutcheson. He opposed alike the mechanical materialists, the dualists and the fundamentalist puritans as all debasing or condemning human nature and the natural world. He maintained that evil is only apparent, that "Beauty and Good are still the same," and that "Nature is the Art of God." No wonder if he incurred the charge of Pantheism.

Some readers will regret that the author has, as they may think, hampered his history with a confessedly nebulous philosophical thesis that Shaftesbury not only had a useful influence but adumbrated a sound aesthetic, ethics and theory of knowledge; that beauty and duty are equally "objective"; that neither can attain its highest flight except in an atmosphere of religious belief; and that human minds are in some vague way "creative" of nature other than their own. The last point is supported by some rather questionably idealistic interpretations of Kant. That the highest poetry needs a religious background seems refuted by Lucretius, not to mention moderns. The only truth which poetry need claim may be truth to a human heart.

## NEW BOOKS

The razor-edge of such a position is acutely felt on p. 71. "Shaftesbury is not saying that the experience of evil is itself something illusory, . . . he is saying that ultimately it has no place in the structure of reality."

Professor Whitehead is quoted in support: "In the absence of Truth Beauty is on a lower level, . . . in the absence of Beauty Truth sinks to triviality. Truth matters because of Beauty." But would the writer of these sentences claim that they are beautiful and, if not, that they are important?

It would be a pity if readers should be distracted from the historical merits of this book by its really irrelevant generalizations. E. F. CARRITT.

---

*Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.* By WALTER A. KAUFMANN. (Princeton University Press: London, Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. xi + 409. Price 40s.)

This work seems to me to be a most thoughtful, fair and scholarly treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy. Professor Kaufmann believes that there is a coherent philosophy in Nietzsche's writings; and he shows how that philosophy developed and reached its final form. He insists, moreover, that the primary place where we should look for that philosophy is in Nietzsche's published writings and those which he prepared for publication. One should not, in other words, prefer the notes to the published writings. "It seems wholly preposterous to ignore the works which a philosopher has published, to claim that he did not really mean what he said in them, and to prefer to them the scattered scribbles which he penned on his walks." Serious scholars, as distinct from Nazi exegetes, have not gone so far as this; but many of them have supposed that books and notes were of equal value. The author points out, however, that even this is unjustifiable. Nietzsche left behind him many notes which were not utilized in published material for the very simple reason that he had not thought through and developed the ideas which had occurred to him and which he jotted down for reflection. We are not entitled to attach as much weight to notes of this type as to published matter, though they can certainly be used as evidence of Nietzsche's mind and line of thought.

Professor Kaufmann, then, takes the books as primary and the notes as secondary sources. In their interpretation he does not indulge in that intemperate use of the concept of "poses" or "masks" in which some writers on Nietzsche indulge. He is well aware, of course, that Nietzsche's utterances cannot always be taken according to their *prima facie* meaning and that they must be interpreted in the light not only of their context but also of the general development of the philosopher's thought and of his fundamental intentions. Indeed, his book is an excellent example of such interpretation. But he is also convinced that the main lines of interpretation must be sought in what Nietzsche actually wrote. One is not entitled to substitute for a philosopher's expressed views some esoteric philosophy which for some reason or other one chooses to attribute to him. In other words, Professor Kaufmann's approach is that of a scholar. It may be that he plays down too much certain aspects of Nietzsche's thought and it is possible that he tidies things up too much; but he always argues his interpretations and conclusions with care. His book is free from rancour and prejudice: it is also free from that sickening adulation which one occasionally meets with in literature on Nietzsche. I dare say that some people would find the book "pedestrian"; but scholarship combined with understanding, as it is with Professor Kaufmann, is an atmosphere that one can breathe without fear of suffocation.

The author's treatment of the growth and nature of Nietzsche's concept of

## PHILOSOPHY

the will to power seemed to me particularly interesting. He shows, for example, that the theory of the will to power was not a metaphysical theory derived through revising Schopenhauer's metaphysics: it was fundamentally an hypothesis with, according to Nietzsche, an empirical basis, even if Nietzsche went beyond his brief in extending it by conjecture to the universe at large. He traces, too, the genesis and development of the interpretation of the will to power as self-overcoming. And this brings him to the discussion of the question whether Nietzsche's "monism," that is, his use of the theory of the will to power as a universal hypothesis, concealed a hidden dualism. The dualism of the two types of morality was overcome by the application of the will to power theory; but did the interpretation of the will to power as self-overcoming involve a dualism of spirit and nature or of reason and instinct? The author argues that it did not, making use of the concept of sublimation. I do not feel altogether happy about the contention that Nietzsche successfully overcame dualism; but the author argues his case well. As to the character of the will to power Professor Kaufmann exposes and demolishes in a conclusive manner the Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche.

The comparisons of Nietzsche with other philosophers are often illuminating. What the author has to say on Hegel seems to me particularly good. While rightly rejecting the idea that Hegel was a devout adorer of the State as the highest good, he makes clear the difference between the views of Hegel and Nietzsche concerning the State's relation to the highest forms of cultural life. He also gives special attention to Nietzsche's treatment and estimation of Socrates, showing that he was not the fanatical Socrates-hater which he is sometimes depicted as having been.

In his preface Professor Kauffman says that "the decision to write on Nietzsche was not inspired by any agreement with him." Nietzsche is for him primarily an "educator," standing for the uninhibited passion for truth and for culture considered as an affair of the "single one," who recreates himself and gives style to his character. But it is also possible, it seems to me, to see in Nietzsche primarily the diagnostician and the expression of the end of a culture, a man who put his shoulder to what he regarded as a tottering wall while he declaimed in shrill tones about the better wall which he could not build. I should also attach more weight than Professor Kaufmann perhaps does to Karl Jaspers' conception of Nietzsche as one of the limiting possibilities of *Existenz*. However, as the author says, Jaspers' picture of Nietzsche depends very largely on the acceptance of certain philosophical positions. And in any case what Nietzsche "means" for any individual is certainly not necessarily coincident with what Nietzsche himself meant. It is through his painstaking investigation of the latter theme that Professor Kaufmann has made a real contribution to Nietzsche studies.

FREDERICK C. COPELSTON.

---

*Homo Faber: A Study of Man's Mental Evolution.* By G. N. M. TYRRELL.  
(Methuen, 1951. Pp. 205. Price 15s.)

Mr. Tyrrell, the author of two well-known books on psychical research, sets out in this volume to undermine what he calls "the scientific outlook." According to Mr. Tyrrell, the main tenets of this outlook to be challenged are (i) "that reality does not extend beyond the realm that the senses reveal"; (ii) "that the entire cosmos can be grasped in principle by the human intellect"; (iii) "that this intellect arose from a chance combination of material particles." He argues that the scientific outlook prevents men from discovering in the Universe the meaning and purpose which are everywhere to be found if sought in the appropriate contemplative states of mind.

## NEW BOOKS

The gist of Mr. Tyrrell's central thesis seems to be as follows. He takes up a remark made by Bergson in *L'évolution Créatrice* to the effect that the term *homo faber* is perhaps more appropriate than *homo sapiens*, since the original feature of human intelligence was the capacity to make tools. He also follows Bergson in emphasizing that in the course of evolution men's minds have been adapted to cope with *practical* problems. "If the adapted man (*Homo faber* as we shall call him) is to *act* efficiently in his world, he must be made to feel at home in it" (p. 55). This requires that his environment must be made to appear simple and as being the whole of reality. "Nature achieved this apparent but specious simplicity, partly by limiting the scope of the human senses, but largely by instinctive indoctrination of the mind" (p. 56).

Mr. Tyrrell evidently considers that he has made the important discovery of an instinct hitherto overlooked by both scientists and philosophers. He tells us that his theory first occurred to him as a result of considering the way in which most people reacted to the facts disclosed by psychical research. "I saw, with a flash of illumination, that . . . *I was being supplied with evidence which shows that the human mind is in the grip of an unconscious urge which makes it cling desperately to the world of familiar things . . .*" (p. 45). He might have drawn upon paranormal data to provide more direct arguments against the current scientific outlook, but instead he sets out to show how his newly discovered instinct has unconsciously biased the thinking of the scientists. Mr. Tyrrell has set himself an ambitious and original programme, but his attempt to fulfil it is disappointing. His survey of scientific thought is superficial and his argument is often neither clear nor convincing. In his chapter "The Adapted Mind in Physics," he confines himself to discussing certain passages in Eddington's *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, notably those in which it is claimed that the fundamental laws and constants of physics can be known *a priori*. It sometimes appears that Mr. Tyrrell is attributing such alleged *a priori* knowledge to our minds having been biologically adapted for solving practical problems. Elsewhere, however, he seems to be claiming only that what confirms his own theory is the reluctance of most physicists to accept Eddington's views, this reluctance being what he attributes to the influence of his new instinct. This presupposes, however, that the physicists who disagree with Eddington have no good reasons for doing so.

The feature of biology which Mr. Tyrrell attributes to his new instinct is its preoccupation with mechanistic concepts and quantitative methods. In connection with psychology, he considers only a few quotations from Watson and Freud. The feature of Freud's thought which is attributed to "the adapted mind" is the account in *The Future of an Illusion* of the genesis of religions in terms of wish-fulfilment. One would have expected Mr. Tyrrell to have acknowledged here an obvious objection to his own theory. What he calls the scientific outlook is a modern growth, and in pre-scientific cultures animistic beliefs have prevailed. Are we to suppose that Mr. Tyrrell's new instinct remained dormant before the rise of modern science? Those who think it helpful to invoke instincts in such a context may well consider that there is a stronger case for a "religious instinct" than for one which inhibits a religious outlook by making men ignore non-sensible reality.

C. W. K. MUNDLE.

---

*The Philosophy of Henry James, Sr.* By FREDERIC HAROLD YOUNG (Bookman Associates: New York. Pp. 338 + xiv. Price \$4.50.)

As R. B. Perry has said, this book "deserves a place in the reading of every student of American intellectual history." It is a very well documented

## PHILOSOPHY

study of the father of the two more famous Jameses, William and Henry, junior. Ample quotations illustrate the varied sources from which Henry, senior, drew his inspiration. That his "philosophy" was "inspirational" is clear, especially from his attitude to Swedenborgianism (this word occurs frequently); and some theologians evidently regard him as "a great figure in American religious thought."

Professor Young has certainly made out a case for the serious study of Henry James, senior, both on his own merits and as the father of his brilliant sons. A special point of philosophical interest on which he throws light is the background of William James's interest in and attitude toward "the varieties of religious experience."

D. J. MCCracken.

---

*Time and Mankind.* By S. G. F. BRANDON. (Hutchinson & Co., 1951. Pp. 228. Price 18s.)

Heraclitus, in a familiar fragment, tells us that Time is a child playing draughts; whereas Plato, no less enigmatically, calls it the moving image of eternity. Many other philosophers, from Augustine down to Bergson, have grappled with the problem of man's apprehension of the temporal process; but it would be rash to claim that any of the solutions proposed has gained widespread acceptance. Any attempt, therefore, to throw some new light on this question would be welcome—all the more since "time" is usually ignored by the modern analytical schools. Philosophers, however, will not find that Dr. Brandon's study has any contribution to make to the particular issues with which they are primarily concerned. What he has done—and done very dextrously—is to survey, in the manner of writers on comparative religion, the varying techniques employed by different civilizations to render their religious mythologies able to "defeat Time." Thus, whereas the Jews regarded their own race (despite its changing fortunes) as the chosen of God, and formulated a philosophy of history accordingly, the Egyptians, together with those races which adopted the Christian religion, found that a belief in personal immortality was the best antidote to the tribulations of this temporal life. It is worth remarking, however, that beliefs in the divine destiny of a race, or in a personal immortality, might better be described as attempts to defeat death or human suffering rather than "Time."

So far as one can judge—without being an expert in comparative religion or soteriology—Dr. Brandon has said little or nothing that has not already been said by recognized specialists not explicitly concerned with man's "reaction to the spectacle of temporal change." On the other hand, his summaries of the (for him) relevant parts of the religious mythologies—Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Hebrew, Hellenic, Roman and Christian—are scholarly, lucid and concise. But since the sub-title of his book reads "A Historical and Philosophical Study of Mankind's Attitude to the Phenomena of Change," he might with advantage have said something about the properly philosophical approaches that have been made to this problem. The book is well indexed and contains a copious bibliography as well as explanatory notes at the end of each chapter.

J. HARTLAND-SWANN.

---

*The Explanation of Human Behaviour.* By F. V. SMITH. (Constable. Pp. ix + 276. Price 18s.)

The problem of explanation in Psychology is as interesting as it is difficult, and Professor Smith deserves our gratitude for opening up the question. He would be the first to agree that his book is a preliminary survey, and we may

## NEW BOOKS

hope that he will follow it up by expanding the observations he makes on the last three pages.

What he has done so far is to consider the sorts of answers which allay our curiosity when we seek for an explanation of physical phenomena. These he traces back to certain "characteristic features of the human mind," which make us satisfied with certain sorts of explanation and dissatisfied with others. Under appropriate circumstances we are convinced by observed "spacial and temporal continuity between the states of the properties conjoined," together with "relationships of 'prescription' between some states and some properties of the cause occurrence and some states and some properties of the effect occurrence," and "relationships of functional dependence where the properties conjoined are susceptible of variation." But the phenomena we seek to explain are varied, and Professor Smith has some interesting remarks to make on the way in which processes differ, and the complications which face us when teleological features are present.

This is all a preamble to the critical study of the systems of six Psychologists: McDougall, Lewin, Allport, Watson, Hull and Tolman. The brief outlines he has given of these various theories are of great value and penetration. He points out their weaknesses and their virtues, and considers how they measure up to the criteria laid down in Part I. He tests them all for the adequacy with which they explain behaviour as a sequence of responses here and now at any given time. In the last three pages, however, to which reference has already been made, he asks whether Psychology should be influenced by the pattern of procedure in the physical sciences. He mentions intuitive understanding, and such models as the Freudian conception of the psychological drama played out between the "ego," the "super-ego" and the "id." But here Professor Smith leaves us with a question-mark.

The trouble surely is that the Psychologist is faced with at least two problems, which interlock with one another, but which, so far at any rate, are not amenable to the same treatment. He may want to know why a person is doing precisely what he is doing at this time and place—why these specific nerves are being innervated, why these specific muscles are being contracted. He may, on the other hand, want to know why a person does a lot of different sorts of things from time to time, which all seem to have the same significance, all instances, say, of timorousness, politeness, guiltiness and so forth. The former problems require hypotheses of the "behaviouristic" kind, the latter hypotheses like McDougall's "horme," Allport's "traits" or Freud's "super-ego." Both sorts of question are perfectly respectable and both sorts of hypotheses are acceptable, provided they can, in principle, be falsified. The unfortunate fact is that so many Psychologists mix up the two sorts of question, as McDougall did with his "instincts," defined in one place in terms of innate readiness to respond to specific stimuli, and in another in terms of their ends, which leave the means—i.e. the responses—unidentified. Alternatively the Psychologists who pursue the specific response problem accuse the others of being unscientific, while the latter accuse the former of being trivial.

Of the Psychologists discussed by Professor Smith, Allport is undoubtedly the most distinguished of the "common-sense" Psychologists, while of the "Behaviourists" Hull deserves the palm. Hull's painstaking deductive method is a model to all research into neuro-muscular reactions from a behavioural point of view. As Professor Smith remarks, you really feel you are learning something. But, of course, so meticulous a study must needs make slow progress, and there is room for the broader approach of Tolman. Lewin's "field theory" is of very doubtful value. The trouble is that the forces in the

"field," which are supposed to move us about like iron filings in the presence of a magnet, are themselves constructed from what common sense tells us about the situation; we have no independent cognisance of them, and therefore cannot predict behaviour from our knowledge of them.

It would, as Professor Smith suggests, be possible to lay down criteria for the satisfactory explanation of the here and now behaviour, though whether we can ever satisfy such criteria remains to be seen. It is a merit of Professor Smith's book that he has made us aware of the difficulties. What is more important is to set up criteria for validating hypotheses of the other kind. We do after all employ hypotheses of this more general order—"personality" is one of them—in everyday life with some success. What we want is an analysis of the criteria we are constantly using without knowing it. This is the problem to which we hope Professor Smith will turn his attention. Few people are better equipped to tackle it.

W. J. H. SPROTT.

*Argument of Laughter.* By D. H. MONRO. (Melbourne University Press and Cambridge University Press. Price 21s.)

Cackles of laughter announce the presence of so many different kinds of egg that no single basket will hold them. Mr. Monro in this book has attempted to classify the sorts of occasions when, or objects at which, we laugh, then he discusses a number of theories of laughter, and finally he puts forward a synthetic theory of his own.

First he dismisses the "non-humorous" laughter, which accompanies tickling and the inhaling of nitrous oxide, as not of his concern. His classification of what *is* his concern is as follows: (a) Any breach of the usual order of events; (b) Any forbidden breach of the usual order of events; (c) Indecency; (d) Importing into one situation what belongs to another; (e) Anything masquerading as something it is not; (f) Word-play; (g) Nonsense; (h) Small misfortunes; (i) Want of knowledge or skill; (j) Veiled insults. Now any theory has to fit all these categories, and his complaint is that every theory has tried to get too many eggs into too small a basket. The theories are divided into: (1) "Superiority theories," held by Hobbes, Bain, Leacock, and Ludovici, to which list he adds Bergson, Feibleman and MacDougall on the grounds that they all took the line that we laugh at something which is deleterious—the mechanical intrusion in the vital world, the world of reality contrasted with the ideal world, or the pain of others which we cannot afford to sympathize with; (2) the "Incongruity theories," held by Kant, Schopenhauer, Spencer and Eastman; (3) the "Release from Restraint" theories, held by Freud, Kline and Gregory and (4) the "Ambivalence theories," according to which the prerequisite of laughter is the opposition of sentiments—the view of Grieg and Menon. Each theory has something to be said for it, as will appear if we compare them with the list of laughable topics. One element, however, is missed by them all: word-play, and this Mr. Monro makes the foundation stone of his own attempt.

"Humour," he says, "consists in its initial stages in exploring fresh possibilities." Such exploration, be it noticed, is not humour yet, but only an initial stage. We get nearer to humour proper when we see that this pure word-play also affords us "relief from monotony," and frequently involves the "linking of disparates." We now approach what Mr. Monro believes to be the central feature: what he calls "attitude-mixing" or "universe-changing," the confronting of one attitude with another inappropriate to it. Mr. Monro is at heart an adherent of the "Incongruity" party. His analysis of incongruity

## NEW BOOKS

or the "inappropriate," is more subtle than that of his fore-runners. The incongruities are often between a conventional, high-falutin' attitude and something less reputable, though not necessarily *dis*-reputable. This either has the object of puncturing the balloon, or of preserving it intact, by making the unconventional ludicrous. But then these contrasts give us an opportunity to let off steam, to defy convention with impunity, and this adds to our enjoyment, so that the "Release from Restraint" element is brought in. They also, in cases where the joke lies in the unmasking of hypocrisy, enable us to achieve the pleasure of a "god's-eye view" of the human spectacle, which is a powerful ingredient of comedy.

The weakness of the theory lies when we come to the banana skin, the "small misfortunes." It is these that are the stock-in-trade of the "Superiority" school. Mr. Monro realizes this, but tries to squeeze them into his basket by saying that they are examples of clumsiness which contrast with the dignity of man, or "the casting off of conventional restraints as in the custard-pie orgies of Laurel and Hardy."

It is a lively book, well written and entertaining to read, which is by no means the case with all books on humour. Mr. Monro has done us service in providing so careful an analysis of the occasions of laughter, and such penetrating criticism of the theories he expounds. There is one complaint, and that Mr. Monro disarmingly anticipates: he does not tell us the difference between the smile and the laugh, and he does not tell us why most of us—with the notable exception of Fontenelle (*Moi, je n'ai jamais fait "han-han"*)—sometimes positively *laugh*.

W. J. H. SPROTT.

---

*Psychoanalysis and Religion*, based on the twenty-sixth series of Dwight Harrington Terry Lectures delivered at Yale University. By ERICH FROMM. (Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1951. Pp. 126. Price 10s. 6d.)

Disciples of Freud have mellowed much in their attitude to religion since the time when he himself described religion as an illusion of which it was best on the whole to be rid. Dr. Fromm shows much sympathetic understanding of religion and insight into the course it should take to-day. Very properly, in my view, he lays the main stress on religious experience; but he also believes that what matters in such experience can be described wholly in terms of man himself, the distinctive content of religious experiences being at least less important than the attitudes of the worshipper and the effect of these on his life. A distinction is drawn between two kinds of religion, the one, which the author detests, being an authoritarian one with dogma at its centre, the other a more humanistic one in which the emphasis is placed on man's freedom and the cultivation of his powers. The important common factor in the teachings of Buddha, Isaiah, Christ, Socrates and Spinoza is said to be "the striving for love, truth, and justice," and accordingly the function of psychoanalysis in religion is held to be twofold; on the negative side it helps to rid us of obsessions from which we suffer through our bondage to authoritarian religion, and on the more positive side it helps us to a better understanding of our own powers and a stronger will to cultivate them in harmony with other men. Religion, however, is not mere ethics, it is characterized especially by "the attitude of wonder," an "ultimate concern with the meaning of life" and a mystical "attitude of oneness, not only with one's fellow men, but with all life and beyond that, with the universe." The precise force of these admissions is not, however, very clear, for Dr. Fromm firmly identifies all sense of "the other" in religion with the authoritarian type of religion which it is his main concern to denounce, and he assures us that "the problem of religion is not the problem

## PHILOSOPHY

of God but the problem of man; religious formulations and religious symbols are attempts to give expression to certain kinds of human experiences." The elusiveness of God and the difficulty of defining his essence are conceived in terms of the way our achievements set new goals before us, the ideal thus eluding us "like the horizon." In these ways Dr. Fromm very cleverly baptizes the ideas brought into prominence by the recent emphasis on the transcendence of God into his own more humanistic religion. But this, together with Fromm's appropriation for his purpose of the famous text "I am that I am," seems to me much more misleading than helpful, and I think it a pity that the author has not been able to bring his good judgment and understanding of religious attitudes to bear boldly on the crucial problem of how a transcendent God can make himself known in properly human experiences. Nonetheless we must be grateful to him for much that he has wisely and graciously said, especially about the subtle forms which idolatry takes to-day, culminating as Dr. Fromm strikingly observes in the tendency for God himself to "become an idol for many." The psychological unmasking of false religious attitudes, in spite of too sharp a dichotomy between dogma and experience, and the stress on patient handling of the religious problems of individuals, will repay close consideration by all interested in religion, all the more, to my mind, if they are able to view the suggestions made in this book without the humanistic limitations imposed by the author on himself. H. D. LEWIS.

---

*Morals and Revelation.* By H. D. LEWIS. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1951. Pp. x + 258. Price 16s.)

Those who have read with interest Professor H. D. Lewis's many articles in the philosophical periodicals will be glad to have the opportunity of buying them in book form. The volume contains, first, a number of papers on the relations between theology and ethics, with particular attention to the views of Barth and Brunner; secondly, a group of more narrowly philosophical articles on contemporary ethical controversies, with especial reference to the question of moral freedom; and lastly some papers on mysticism and on the philosophy of art. Since Professor Lewis's views on these subjects will be well known to readers of *PHILOSOPHY*, only a short review is called for. Most philosophers will applaud his defence of the autonomy of ethics against the claims of some theologians; the defence might, however, have been even stronger if he had laid greater stress on the distinction between ethics, considered as the study—philosophical or logical or what you will—of moral thought, and morals, in the sense of the actual propounding of moral judgments and systems. Religion is bound to take a hand in the latter; but about the former it can have nothing to say.

There will be less agreement with the central section of the book. In a paper on "The Present State of Ethics," Professor Lewis takes an altogether too pessimistic view of the present condition of ethical studies. In the period immediately preceding the War it might perhaps have been said, though with more than a touch of hyperbole, that

To leave ethics alone, or to abandon it to those who have more taste for uplift than thought, and not even to trouble about refutations of established beliefs or explanations of their persistence, seems to be the proper course for those who would really be in the fashion.

In the post-war period, on the contrary, such an attitude, and protests against it, are a little *démodés*; much fruitful ethical discussion has been taking place,

## NEW BOOKS

though it is fair to say that little of it has been in a style of which Professor Lewis would approve, and that not much of it had reached the stage of publication in 1949, when this paper was written. But it must be recorded that in one term in 1950 all three papers to the Oxford Philosophical Society were on ethical subjects, and that one of the speakers came from Bangor.

In general, it may be said that not much further progress is likely to be made in ethics by those who regard it as, to use Professor Lewis's word, a "battle" between objectivists and sceptics (p. 1). In the course of such a battle, what might have been fruitful lines of enquiry are apt to be explored only in the search for ammunition. For example, on p. 93 the suggestion is made that a command might be shown to be "an affirmation of some kind"—a suggestion which is not distinguished as it should be from the stronger one that "a translation of commands into assertions" is possible. But, though such an investigation might possibly "lead the way out of notorious logical difficulties," it is unlikely to do so if it is conducted with the subsidiary purpose of "enabling the defender of traditional ethics to turn the tables on his opponents." And Professor Lewis is more fortunate than most of us if he can say, as he does at the beginning of the book, that "we know better to-day than at any other time just what we must hold if the objectivity of ethics is to be maintained"—unless indeed the knowledge referred to is of the Socratic sort. But nevertheless, those who have not already read the papers of which it is composed will find much to profit and interest them in this book.

R. M. HARE.

---

*Principles of Mathematical Logic.* By D. HILBERT and W. ACKERMANN.  
Translated from the German, and edited with notes by Robert E. Luce.  
(New York: Chelsea Publishing Company. 1950. Price \$3.50.)

This well-known book is described by its American editor as "a classic text in the field of mathematical logic," and most justly so. It was first published, in German, in 1928, and reissued in a second edition in 1938. We are now offered an English version, well translated and printed, and worthy of the original.

Hilbert and Ackermann's *Principles* has a very special place in the literature of mathematical logic because it treats, with unsurpassed excellence of presentation, of just those parts of symbolic logic which are clear of the realm of controversy and which are therefore of permanent value to mathematicians and philosophers. Mathematical logic was, of course, largely the creation of mathematicians who were interested in the foundations of their subject and at the same time disturbed by the insecurity of much of the edifice of pure mathematics. The logical calculus may already be found, worked out in full detail, in *Principia Mathematica*, and most of the constructive part of Hilbert and Ackermann's exposition is covered by that great work. But whereas in *Principia* the relatively secure propositional calculus seems to shade off into the much more questionable theory of types, so that the reader tends to feel uncertain of the whole system, everything in the *Principles* is simple and clear. This is due in large measure to the fact that Hilbert and Ackermann set themselves a comparatively limited task—namely to expound the formalization by a calculus of the most elementary logical inferences—whereas Russell and Whitehead sought to produce a formalization of logic that would be adequate for the whole of mathematics. The propositional (or sentential) calculus and the calculus of predicates, as these are presented in the *Principles*, are now almost indispensable to mathematicians and logicians alike, and they constitute a particularly valuable discovery of modern mathematics. It is therefore most welcome that this little book, in which these logical systems are made so easy to understand, should now be available in English.

## PHILOSOPHY

Besides introducing the reader to logical symbolism and showing in detail, by deriving numerous standard formulae from the axioms, how to handle the calculus, the authors also discuss a number of questions of a more general character, relating to the consistency and completeness of various sets of axioms. It was once the hope of Hilbert that it would ultimately be possible to put mathematics on a firm foundation by formalizing it and then proving that no derivation within the formal system could ever lead to a contradiction. Although this project, like that of Russell and Whitehead in *Principia*, eventually had to be abandoned as over-ambitious, the researches of Hilbert and the Formalist school led to many valuable discoveries in connection with the properties of formal systems and the possibility of proving metamathematical theorems. Some of the results are essentially mathematical, and these are discussed at length in Hilbert and Bernays' *Grundlagen der Mathematik*. In the more metamathematical sections of the *Principles* we are given an admirable account of those portions of this research which are of interest to the more general reader. The discussions of consistency and decidability are particularly illuminating, and the emphasis that is laid on the use of normal forms for logical expressions is also worthy of note.

To sum up, *Principles of Mathematical Logic* is unmistakably a mathematicians' book, but it goes far beyond the limits of mathematics and makes available to everyone interested in logic one of the most permanent results of the study of the foundations of mathematics, the satisfactory symbolic treatment of the basic relations that play a part in deductive reasoning.

G. T. KNEEBONE.

---

*The Dhammapada, with Introductory Essays, Pali Text, English Translation and Notes.* By SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (London, New York, Toronto: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. viii + 194. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Professor Radhakrishnan's object in producing this volume is well stated in his Preface: "This translation of the *Dhammapada*, the most popular and influential book of the Buddhist canonical literature, is offered as a small contribution to world understanding. The central thesis of the book, that human conduct, righteous behaviour, reflection, and meditation are more important than vain speculations about the transcendent—has an appeal to the modern mind."

The Introductory Essay on *Gautama the Buddha* is not new, being a reprint of a lecture delivered in 1938 and published in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. XXIV.

The meaning of the title, *Dhammapada*, is "word of righteousness," originally attributed to one word or sentence and then to the whole collection of sayings. In the Pali version this consists of 423 verses, divided into 26 chapters and forming a vade-mecum of Buddhist devotion and practice. The verses are generally linked with incidents in the Buddha's life and illustrate his method of teaching by aphorism and precept.

The Buddha, whilst outlining a way of life for his followers, consistently discouraged speculation on metaphysical problems and, as Professor Radhakrishnan points out, this proved to be an inadequacy in his teaching, for "in the absence of definite guidance from the teacher, different metaphysical systems were fastened on him early in the career of Buddhism." Moreover, the Buddha's conception of *dharma* (Pali *dhamma*) as the absolute reality was not sufficiently concrete for those seeking an object of worship: hence the gradual deification of the Master himself.

## NEW BOOKS

Text and translation are nicely printed and easy to read, the translation following the Pali verse in each case and frequently being supplemented by explanations taken from the early commentator Buddhaghosa and by comparative passages selected from philosophical and theological texts of East and West. Although perhaps too numerous, these extraneous references give evidence of the translator's wide learning. On the whole, the translation is clear and accurate, though it contains some questionable renderings and a few definite errors. For the reader who is concerned only with the English version, a glossary of terms which have been left untranslated (e.g. *samāna* and *pabbajita* in v. 388) might usefully have been provided.

DOROTHY STEDE.

---

*Thinking and Valuing.* By D. J. McCracken. (London: Macmillan and Co. 1950. Pp. ix + 238. Price 15s.)

Mr. McCracken believes that in contemporary British thought two conspicuous extremes may be detected in regard to value judgments—there is on the one hand a group which seeks a basis for all valid value judgments in authoritarian Christianity, and on the other there is the Russell-Ayer school which regards value judgments as “merely emotive.” He himself proposes to follow neither of these paths, but aims “to reinstate the value judgment in the intellectual life,” an aim which he believes to be of the greatest importance since “the denial of intellectual status to the value judgment . . . is perhaps the chief theoretical weapon of contemporary irrationalism and anti-humanism.” The book falls into two main parts, first a general introduction containing an outline of the sort of view the author himself recommends, and secondly a study of the writings of Descartes, Geulincx, and Spinoza, so far as they illustrate this view.

The general introduction is fairly short, but it is not easy going. This is unfortunate, since because of its difficulty it may leave the reader uncertain precisely what he has to look for in the authors who are used in the second main part to illustrate its thesis. On p. 11 we are told that “in the pages that follow . . . the suggestion is made that ‘value’ may be regarded as an intellectual category on the analogy of the Kantian category of ‘cause’ and that the use of such a category is what distinguishes the value judgment from other judgments.” On p. 24 the difficulty of defining the “Idea of Value” is discussed. It is described as a category of “intelligibility,” and the author argues that it is so difficult to define partly because it is applicable to “the most diverse types of content of experience,” and partly because, since it is a category which “the mind *must* apply in its search for intelligibility in experience, it is really incapable of explanation in terms which do not presuppose it.” He does, however, offer “a type of definition” which runs as follows: “value is that aspect of a fact or experience in virtue of which it is seen to contain in its nature or essence the *sufficient reason* for its existence as such a determinate fact or experience, or the sufficient reason for its being regarded as *an end* for practice or contemplation,” and he adds that “in other words, the concept involved in the category of value is that of a self-justifying reality.”

This may be enough to indicate the general line of approach. There is much that would require detailed examination, but here two comments must suffice. First, it is pointed out on p. 29 that Kant not merely distinguished between the problems of existence and value, but committed the error of also separating these problems, whereas the Cartesians “distinguished and combined,” while at the same time avoiding any confusion between “estimation and explanation.” On the other hand on p. 28 we have just been told that “the general

## PHILOSOPHY

Cartesian solution is to identify value with reality," and similarly later, on p. 204, in the discussion of Spinoza we read "the identification of reality and perfection we have already found in Descartes, and the arguments which we then produced to show that it involves the view that the real is as such valuable will apply equally here." But if reality and value are "identified," "the real is as such valuable" appears to become a tautology. Clearly, however, the author intends the "identification" to be a "distinguishing and combining"; but I do not think we are helped either in the general introduction or in the later chapters to understand just where he envisages the distinction between reality and value to lie. It will not do simply to say that the distinction lies in the employment of different "categories"; for this, in itself, explains nothing. Secondly and generally, Mr. McCracken talks primarily of "valuing," "the value judgment," "the value-category," and so on; but I suggest we cannot make progress with these abstractions. For profitable study we need instances, we need to substitute actual "value" judgments for "the value-category," and so on with the others. In the Preface, in explaining that he does not aspire to a rigid terminology, Mr. McCracken quotes "words are wise men's counters: they are the money of fools." I suspect he has interesting things to say, but throughout it seems to me he requires to do more cashing of his counters.

R. C. CROSS.

---

*An Introduction to Philosophy of History.* By W. H. Walsh. (Hutchinson's University Library. London. 1951. Pp. 168. Price 7s. 6d.)

This book deals with two different and, at first sight, independent subjects. Its scope is clearly stated by the author in the introduction. "Philosophy of History" can naturally designate either (i) a critical analysis of the processes of historical thinking or (ii) a speculative attempt to discern a meaning and purpose in the course of historical events. The difference between these is analogous to that between "philosophy of science" and "philosophy of nature"; but the English language does not permit a similar differentiation in this case, because "history" means both the course of events and the study of it. Mr. Walsh adopts the terms "critical" and "speculative philosophy of history" respectively to distinguish the two studies (an alternative possibility might have been to call the former "epistemology," or "logic," of history).

Neither study has won much attention hitherto from British philosophers. This is a surprising fact, as Mr. Walsh aptly points out in his Preface. It is odd "that teachers of philosophy should with such unanimity expect their pupils to discourse on the logic of the natural sciences and mathematics, with which subjects few of them have much close acquaintance, and scarcely ever ask them questions about the procedures and statements of historians, though in many cases they are students of history as well as of philosophy." He finds an explanation (pp. 10 ff.) of the fact in the "predominant characteristics of the British mind and temper," which has shown itself more prone to criticism and analysis in philosophy than to metaphysics; but these surely explain only the British aversion to philosophy of history in the speculative sense. It might have been thought that "critical" philosophy of history would have been especially congenial to the bent of English philosophy, and it remains a puzzle why there has been so little systematic work in this field.

For this reason it seems to me that Mr. Walsh has performed a valuable service in producing a formal study of this subject (following the lead given by Collingwood's *Idea of History*). The first and larger portion of his book (chs. II-V), discusses the relation of history to the sciences, the nature of historical explanation, truth and fact in history, and objectivity. The remaining chapters

## NEW BOOKS

(VI-VIII) are principally occupied with a critical exposition of the speculative philosophies of history of Kant, Herder and Hegel.

The work is clearly and concisely written, and seems to me to show throughout a level and balanced judgment. Mr. Walsh has a sure touch in detecting the weaknesses of extreme views in either direction, and his own view, while inclining towards idealism, runs fairly near the middle of the road. His most valuable single contribution seems to me to lie in his theory of historical explanation in Chapter III. He points out that the historian (though he uses generalizations as the basis of his inferences) is not primarily interested, as the natural scientist is, in explaining particular events as cases of general laws. His procedure is rather one for which Mr. Walsh adopts the title of "colligation" ("the procedure of explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it in its historical context," p. 59). This is surely so sound that it may well serve as a starting-point for other enquirers. Chapter IV gives a clear presentation of the problem of objectivity in history.

In the second part of the book, the sketches of Kant, Herder and Hegel are useful and clear, and the author illuminates the understanding of them by what seems to me the true suggestion that the motive which has given rise to speculative philosophies of history has been theological or moral rather than theoretical. ("The main factor which gives rise to them . . . is the feeling that there is something morally outrageous in the notion that history has no rhyme or reason in it," p. 21.)

The book is slight, indeed the second of its two parts is only a fragment. But it would be out of place to criticize what purports to be an Introduction for not being more (especially with an author who is himself so modest as Mr. Walsh is). I hope I have sufficiently indicated what seems to me to be its value. Its defect seems to me to lie in a certain dryness. It is rather too much of a textbook, and tries to relate its subject-matter too much to the concepts of the philosophical class-room. Chapter III for example considers whether history fits better the "Correspondence Theory" or the "Coherence Theory" of truth. This is surely to apply a rather cumbrous piece of logical apparatus. When Chapter II professes to inquire "whether and in what sense history can claim to be a scientific study" (p. 29), this seems to arrogate to philosophy a judicial function which hardly belongs to it.

The brief description of Hegel's moral theory on pages 145-6 seems to me to need supplementation or correction in two respects, if it is not to be misleading. (1) Hegel, as Mr. Walsh says, allowed to the heroic figures of world-history a right to over-ride moral restrictions; it should perhaps be added that he did not extend a similar right to citizens of a modern state with an established moral order. (2) Mr. Walsh adopts what has become almost an orthodox line of criticism in recent books of political theory, when he accuses Hegel of sacrificing the individual to the "moral organism" which is the state ("That the individual should perish for the good of the 'whole' does not strike him as morally outrageous," p. 146). But this is surely a distortion. No doubt Hegel believed that there were occasions on which the individual should be (not indeed sacrificed, but called upon to sacrifice himself), for the sake of the state. I suppose these would arise most obviously in time of war. No doubt also his normal submission to the discipline of life in the state involved him in a daily sacrifice (*sc.* of his private inclinations, etc.). But surely it is important to add that he derived from this sacrifice (according to Hegel's belief) a moral freedom which was his own highest good. It was not simply a case of being sacrificed to Moloch. But Hegel's moral theory is only peripheral to Mr. Walsh's subject, and his reference to it is brief and by the way. My criticism would perhaps be more properly addressed to other writers (e.g. to Mr. Weldon).

## PHILOSOPHY

In the remaining paragraphs of this article I venture a few comments on some wider problems about history which are suggested by the book under review.

Mr. Walsh offers a definition of the field of history. "The past" is too wide, for history is not concerned with past phases in the development of the material universe. Therefore we must say "human actions in the past" (p. 107; cf. p. 30). But is not this itself too wide? Is not history confined to the story of human *civilization*? This is what Toynbee says, and it is surely confirmed by the practice of working historians. The study of the human past in that period (300,000 years or so), which elapsed between man's appearance on the planet and the beginning of civilization belongs to the geologist, biologist, anthropologist, but not in the strict sense to the historian.

Mr. Walsh recognizes, what Collingwood forcibly insisted on, that the kind of historical study with which we are familiar is a comparatively recent phenomenon. "History, as we know it to-day, as a developed branch of learning with its own methods and standards, is a comparatively new thing; indeed, it scarcely existed before the nineteenth century" (p. 10). But he seems to me not to draw the consequences of this recognition. If he had examined the methods and assumptions actually used by the actual historians of *this period*, he would have given flesh and blood to his study, whereas in fact, what he gives us is an analysis of the methods of a timeless abstraction called "the historian."

The picture of "the historian" is nevertheless in fact drawn from the models provided by the practice of the historians of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries; rather in the same way as Kant's picture of the operation of "the" scientific understanding was drawn, semi-consciously, from the model of Newtonian science. Kant's attitude was the product of eighteenth-century optimism. He believed in his bones that Science as such had been realized in Newtonian physics; previous physical theories in the ancient and medieval words had been either aberrations or stages towards the development of this. I do not know whether Mr. Walsh would confess to a similar optimism about modern historical studies. Collingwood certainly proclaims it, and Mr. Walsh's Kantian approach seems to imply it. But if we dissociate ourselves from this optimism, shall we not be compelled to adopt a different attitude towards the modern school of historical studies? We shall find ourselves regarding them rather in the way in which we (in the twentieth century, after Einstein) regard Newtonian physics than in the way in which Kant regarded Newtonian physics.

This need not involve a sceptical relativism. Even when we have come to regard Newtonian physics as an historical phenomenon, we are not therefore bound to place it on the same level with regard to truth or truthlessness as Greek physics or scholastic physics or the magical beliefs of unscientific peoples, but can recognize it as presenting a high concentration of truth. Similarly modern historical study could still be recognized as a great achievement in the way of truth, even though it were seen as being itself historically conditioned. But its features would not then be identified with those of history in the absolute. For example, the critic discerning the particular humanist frame of reference which seems characteristic of modern historical writing, would not therefore suppose (as Collingwood does in the *Idea of History*, pp. 10-20), that this is essential to scientific history as such; and he will be readier to look with a different eye at traditions of historical thought and writing which diverge from the modern (e.g. the Biblical) when he has unlearned to identify the modern with the absolute.

In his Second Part Mr. Walsh presents his specimens of speculative philosophy of history from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather abruptly,

## NEW BOOKS

as though there had been nothing before them. Perhaps it helps to show them in their true perspective if one sees what they displaced. Up till about that time the conceptual framework of men's views of history in Western Europe had been supplied by the Christian "Plan of Salvation," according to which history begins with the Creation, is centred in its early period in the story of the people of Israel and after the Incarnation in the history of the Christian Church, and is directed towards the Second Coming, which will end it. Surely what we see in Kant and Herder is partly the beginnings, partly the reflection, of the movement which replaced this view by the humanist myth, which finds the meaning of history in the progressive achievements of man, and which has come to provide since then much of the accepted background of popular imagination and thought?

Working historians of the modern period have always been suspicious of speculative philosophies of history. Mr. Walsh puts it truly when he says (pp. 147-8), "For professional historians . . . speculative philosophies of history of all kinds are of little or no interest. They look on such works, when they notice them at all, as imprudent attempts to impose a preconceived pattern on the actual course of events. The intelligibility which they themselves hope to find in history is not the sort of intelligibility these theories profess to offer." It has been suggested that in this attitude the working historian, whether he is conscious of it or not, is remaining true to an essentially Christian insight. For the Christian also it is a form of arrogance to try to impose a preconceived pattern on the course of events. God's purposes (as Prof. Harbison has written recently) are partly revealed and partly concealed in the historical process. Perhaps an historical process of this kind is really the sort which working historians presuppose when they assume on the one hand (in Mr. Walsh's words) that "if they try long and hard enough and are lucky enough to find the appropriate evidence they will in the end make sense of any historical situation," but on the other hand will not entertain the supposition that "if we look back at the facts of history we shall see that they conform to a pattern which pure reason can work out independently of all experience" (p. 152).

Perhaps, nevertheless, it would be misleading to see too absolute a gulf between the practice of the modern working historian and the modern speculative philosophies of history. It can hardly be an accident that they developed at about the same time, namely from the Eighteenth Century onwards. Probably both are in different ways products of humanism, and bear traces of their origin. This is not necessarily inconsistent with what was said of the Christian elements in the modern historical attitude, for humanism and Christianity have been much mixed in modern culture. M. B. FOSTER.

---

Books also received:

- W. B. GALLIE. *Peirce and Pragmatism*. Pelican Books. 1952. Pp. 247. 2s. 6d.  
 AUSTIN DUNCAN-JONES. *Butler's Moral Philosophy*. Pelican Books. 1952. Pp. 192. 2s. 6d.  
 ERIK GÖTLIND. *Bertrand Russell's Theories of Causation*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksels Boktryckeri A. B. 1952. Pp. 164. No price stated.  
 T. M. P. MAHADEVAN. *Gaudapada: A Study in Early Advaita*. University of Madras. 1952. Pp. viii + 281. Rs. 9.  
 FREDERICK C. COPLESTON. *Mediaeval Philosophy*. Methuen: Home Study Books. 1952. Pp. 194. 7s. 6d.  
 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE. *Methods of Logic*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1952. Pp. xv + 264. 16s.

## PHILOSOPHY

- GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO. *Justice*. (Ed. A. H. Campbell.) Edinburgh University Press. 1952. Pp. xv + 236. 30s.
- A. MACBEATH. *Experiments in Living* (The Gifford Lectures for 1948-49). London: Macmillan & Co. 1952. Pp. ix + 462. 30s.
- MELVILLE CHANING-PEARCE. *The Deep Church*. Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1952. Pp. 222. 12s. 6d.
- P. W. BRIDGMAN. *The Nature of Some of our Physical Concepts*. New York Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. 64. \$2.75.
- D. S. MACKAY, G. P. ADAMS, W. R. DENNES (Editors). *Meaning and Interpretation*. University of California Publications in Philosophy. 1952. Pp. 332. \$4.50.
- D. E. HARDING. *The Hierarchy of Heaven and Earth*. Faber & Faber. 1952. Pp. 268. 21s.
- T. HENSHAW. *New Testament Literature*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1952. Pp. 453. 25s.
- S. I. HAYAKAWA. *Language in Thought and Action*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1952. Pp. 307 + xxxiv. 18s.
- PETER GEACH and MAX BLACK. *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1952. Pp. x + 224. 25s.
- G. E. FASNACHT. *Acton's Political Philosophy: An Analysis* (Foreword by Sir Harold Butler). London: Hollis & Carter. 1952. Pp. xiv + 265. 21s.
- J. HETTINGER. *Telepathy and Spiritualism*. Rider & Co. 1952. Pp. xi + 150. 16s.
- RUDOLF CARNAP. *The Continuum of Inductive Methods*. University of Chicago Press. Pp. v + 92. 26s. (London agents: Cambridge U.P.)
- MAX WEBER. *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*. Translated and edited with an introduction by Hans H. Gerth. Illinois: The Free Press. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.) 1952. Pp. xi + 308. 32s.
- K. SATCHIDANANANDA MURTY. *Thought and the Divine*. Guntar (India): St. Michael's Industrial School Press. Pp. iv + 104. No price stated.
- K. SATCHIDANANANDA MURTY. *The Rhythm of the Real*. Andhra University. Pp. 151. No price stated.
- ALFRED B. GORDON. *The Idea of a Minimum Philosophy*. Dexter, Maine. Pp. 20. No price stated.
- P. V. PISTORIUS. *Plotinus and Neoplatonism: An Introductory Study*. 1952. Pp. 175. 21s.
- FRED S. SPIER. *The Golden Gate: A New Experiment in Philosophy*. Pp. 264. \$3.00.
- LEWIS MUMFORD. *The Conduct of Life*. Secker & Warburg. 1952. Pp. 342. 21s.
- JACQUES DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN. *The Hymns of Zarathustra*. (Trans. Mrs. M. Henning.) John Murray: Wisdom of the East Series. 1952. Pp. 162. 7s.
- NATHANIEL PEARSON. *Sri Aurobindo and the Soul Quest of Man*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1952. Pp. 127. 10s. 6d.
- ALFRED STILL. *Borderlands of Science*. Rider & Co. 1952. Pp. 276. 20s.
- PAUL BRUNTON. *The Wisdom of the Overself*. Rider & Co. 1952. Pp. 276. 21s.
- E. JORDAN. *Essays in Criticism*. Chicago University Press (agents in England: Cambridge University Press). 1952. Pp. 384. 52s. 6d.
- MARTIN BUBER. *Israel and Palestine: The History of an Idea*. London: East and West Library. 1952. Pp. 165. 18s.
- DAGOBERT D. RUNES. *Of God, the Devil and the Jews*. New York Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. 186. \$3.00.
- SIR ARTHUR TANSLEY. *Mind and Life*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1952. Pp. ix + 171. 15s.

## NEW BOOKS

- GABRIEL MARCEL. *Metaphysical Journal*. (Trans. Bernard Wall.) 1952. Pp. xiii + 344. 30s.
- LORD ACTON. *Essays on Church and State*. (Introduction by Douglas Woodruff.) London: Hollis and Carter. 1952. Pp. vi + 518. 30s.
- WERNER HEISENBERG. *Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science*. (Trans. F. C. Hayes.) Faber & Faber. 1952. Pp. 126. 16s.
- STEWART EASTON. *Roger Bacon, and his Search for a Universal Science*. Basil Blackwell. 1952. Pp. vii + 255. 25s.
- ISAAC HUSIK. *Philosophical Essays*. (Ed. Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss.) Basil Blackwell. 1952. Pp. xli + 358. 35s.
- D. J. ALLAN. *The Philosophy of Aristotle*. Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 220. 6s.
- KURT F. REINHARDT. *The Existentialist Revolt: the Main Themes and Phases of Existentialism*. Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee. 1952. Pp. vii + 245. \$3.50.
- OLAN R. HYNDMAN. *The Origin of Life and the Evolution of Living Things: An Environmental Theory*. New York Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xxi + 648. \$8.75.
- BEN F. KIMPEL. *Religious Faith, Language and Knowledge (A Philosophical preface to Theology)*. New York Philosophical Library. Pp. 162. \$2.75.
- F. R. COWELL. *History, Civilisation and Culture: An Introduction to the Historical and Social Philosophy of Pitirim A. Sorokin*. A. & C. Black. 1952. Pp. xii + 259. 21s.
- PATRICK GARDINER. *The Nature of Historical Explanation*. Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xii + 142. 10s. 6d.
- CHARLES A. FRITZ, JR. *Betrand Russell's Construction of the External World*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1952. Pp. 243. 23s.
- H. S. MILLIGAN. *The Undiscovered Country*. London: Robert Hale Ltd. 1952. Pp. x + 179. 9s. 6d.
- ALBERT G. A. BALZ. *Descartes and the Modern Mind*. Yale University Press. (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege.) 1952. Pp. xiv + 492. 63s.
- A. A. ROBACK. *History of American Psychology*. New York: Library Publishers. 1952. Pp. xiv + 426. \$ 6.00.
- F. RAHMAN. *Avicenna's Psychology*. Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xii + 137. 12s. 6d.
- RUDOLF VON URBAN. (Foreword by Kenneth Walker.) *Sex Perfection*. Rider & Co. 1952. Pp. 207. 18s.
- LOUIS COGNET. *Le Père Teilhard de Cardin, et la Pensée Contemporaine*. Paris: Au Portulan, chez Flammarion. 1952. Pp. 199. Fr. fr. 425.
- PIERRE-MAXIME SCHUHL. *Platon et L'Art de son Temps (Arts Plastiques)*. Presses Universitaires de France. 1952. Pp. 139. Fr. fr. 600.
- DR. MAURICE VERNET. *Le Vie et la Mort*. Paris: Editions Flammarion. 1952. Pp. 298. Fr. fr. 650.
- HUGO DINGLER. *Das Physikalische Weltbild*. Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim/Glan. 1951. Pp. 56. D.M. 4.10.
- GERHARDT DRANSFELD. *Die Schöpfung: Ein Versuch über Immanenz und Transzendenz*. Westkulturverlag Anton Hain. 1952. Pp. 51. D.M. 4.30.
- JOSEF MEINERTZ. *Existenz, Psychologie, Ontologie*. Westkulturverlag Anton Hain. 1952. Pp. 40. D.M. 3.60.
- THEODOR BALLAUFF. *Die Idee der Paidea*. Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim/Glan. 1952. Pp. 80. D.M. 8.

# INSTITUTE NOTES

The following lectures have been arranged for the Michaelmas Term, 1952, at 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, at 5.30 p.m. instead of at 5.15 p.m., as announced on the Lecture Card.

## A Course of Six Lectures on "Mind and Its Place in Nature"

|          |    |                                                                                    |
|----------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| October  | 17 | Professor J. Z. YOUNG, F.R.S. (Department of Anatomy, University College, London). |
| October  | 24 | Dr. C. G. PHILLIPS (University of Oxford).                                         |
| October  | 31 | Dr. MACDONALD CRITCHLEY (National Hospital, Queen Square, W.C.1).                  |
| November | 7  | Dr. O. L. ZANGWILL (University of Oxford).                                         |
| November | 14 | A. W. P. WOLTERS, M.A. (Emeritus Professor, University of Reading).                |
| November | 21 | Dr. A. C. EWING (University of Cambridge).                                         |

*Please Note* that in the Lecture Card sent out to all members with the July issue of PHILOSOPHY, the name of the lecturer on October 24th was mistakenly given out to be "Dr. C. G. Young." This should read "Dr. C. G. Phillips."

## OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

- (1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

- (2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
- (3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
- (4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
- (5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Students of philosophy are reminded that they may become Associates of the Institute at a reduced fee of 8s. 6d. per annum, provided they are full-time students studying for a degree or diploma at a university or university college and are not engaged in a gainful occupation. Present or past Members of the Institute are not eligible to become Associates.

**Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.**

---

(Suggested)

## FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.



UNIVERSITY OF LONDON LIBRARY  
DO NOT REMOVE

# PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE  
OF PHILOSOPHY

*Edited by*  
**SYDNEY E. HOOPER**

with the assistance of

|                   |                    |                  |
|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| SIR ERNEST BARKER | C. D. BROAD        | WILLIAM BROWN    |
| A. C. EWING       | M. GINSBERG        | JULIAN S. HUXLEY |
| LORD LINDSAY      | JOHN MACMURRAY     | H. H. PRICE      |
| SIR W. DAVID ROSS | BERTRAND RUSSELL   | L. J. RUSSELL    |
| N. KEMP SMITH     | CLEMENT C. J. WEBB |                  |

## CONTENTS

I. SOME ELEMENTARY REFLEXIONS ON SENSE-PERCEPTION  
*Professor C. D. Broad*

II. THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE  
*The Earl of Listowel, P.C., Ph.D.*

III. THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT OF ST. ANSELM  
*S. A. Grave, M.A.*

IV. PSYCHIATRIC PROLEGOMENA: A PLEA FOR THE HELP  
OF PHILOSOPHY (PART II)  
*Harold Palmer, M.D.*

V. A CRITICISM OF PRESENT-DAY PHYSICS  
*Viscount Samuel*

VI. A REALISM FOR RECONCILIATION  
*Kenneth Henderson, M.A., B.Litt.*

VII. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

VIII. DISCUSSION:

(1) ACTION AT A DISTANCE

(2) ON THE STATE OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

IX. NEW BOOKS

X. INSTITUTE NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE

*Published Quarterly*

**MACMILLAN & CO. LTD. LONDON**

*Revised Price 5/-*

Subscription 21/- Yearly, Post Free.

# Hutchinson's

## THE THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY

A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY  
LITERARY THEORY

R. L. BRETT

Gives an account of Shaftesbury's aesthetic and literary theory; and his anticipation of later writers such as Burke, Coleridge and Kant. It also considers Shaftesbury's thought as part of the background of ideas in the Augustan period.

*Large Demy 8vo.* 15s.

## DAVID HUME

HIS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND  
MORALITY

D. G. C. MacNABB

"This lucid and well-arranged little book will certainly take its place among the best explanations of Hume."

SPECTATOR  
7s. 6d.

## AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

W. H. WALSH

"Mr. Walsh uses a clear, un-technical style, intelligible to all sorts of philosophers, or to the general reader."

HIBBERT JOURNAL  
7s. 6d.

University  
Library

## HUMANITY AND DEITY

by

Wilbur M. Urban

Author of *Beyond Realism and Idealism*, etc.

This book is an attempt at a restatement of the traditional view of the relation of God to man. An examination of the historic proofs for the existence of God and an axiological interpretation of the entire theistic argument, constitute the heart of the book. A study of the main problems in the forefront of the philosophy of to-day is included.

25s. net.

ALLEN & UNWIN

40 MUSEUM STREET, LONDON, W.C.1

## HEFFER'S\*

*\*The Bookshop  
known the world  
over*

New and secondhand English,  
American, European and  
Oriental Books. Learned, rare  
and standard works bought;  
lists invited.

★

W. HEFFER & SONS, LTD.  
PETTY CURY, CAMBRIDGE

# A Study in Memory

## A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY

E. J. FURLONG. An important contribution to the literature of philosophy by the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. He examines in detail and from many angles the process of remembering, the relation of memory to experience and to common sense, and the question of causation or validity.

10s 6d

NELSON

# Satan

A Symposium with Illustrations

30/- net

"It is a curious paradox that in an age when evil is manifested on an unprecedented scale belief in the Devil was never less prevalent. . . . Most would admit the existence of unseen forces, good and evil, but they hesitate to personify them. This composite volume . . . sets forth many of the forms of splendour and horror with which the mind and imagination of man have clothed this dark mystery. It surveys with much learning the conceptions, metaphysical and theological, of the Devil in Christian, and, to a less extent, non-Christian doctrine, and in art and literature. It describes, too, in detail various cases of possession and diabolism, and is finely illustrated."

*Manchester Guardian*

**SHEED & WARD LTD.,**

**110-111 FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4.**

# MIND

## A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy

Edited by Professor G. Ryle

With the Co-operation of Prof. Sir F. C. Bartlett and Prof. C. D. Broad.

### CONTENTS OF ISSUE FOR JANUARY, 1952

- |                                                                                                        |                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| I. The Analogy of Feeling:                                                                             | STUART HAMPSHIRE           |
| II. On Describing:                                                                                     | S. E. TOULMIN and K. BAIER |
| III. Probability-Sentences:                                                                            | E. H. HUTTEN               |
| IV. Logical Form:                                                                                      | DONALD KALISH              |
| V. DISCUSSIONS:                                                                                        |                            |
| A Note on Truth:                                                                                       | W. H. WALSH                |
| Time Order for Minds:                                                                                  | JOHN C. BEGG               |
| The Incongruity of Counterparts:                                                                       | DAVID PEARSON              |
| On Sinn as a Combination of Physical Properties:                                                       | RICHARD RUDNER             |
| Heterological and Homological:                                                                         | J. C. GREGORY              |
| Locke and the First Earl of Shaftesbury:                                                               | P. LASLETT                 |
| VI. CRITICAL NOTICES:                                                                                  |                            |
| S. E. Toulmin, <i>An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics</i> :                                | C. D. BROAD                |
| Paul Wipert, <i>Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre</i> :                            | J. L. ACKRILL              |
| H. E. Rønner, <i>The Development of Aristotle illustrated from the Earliest Books of the Physics</i> : | W. K. C. GUTHERIE          |
| VII. NEW BOOKS.                                                                                        |                            |
| VIII. NOTES.                                                                                           |                            |
| IX. LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE MIND ASSOCIATION.                                              |                            |

Published for the MIND ASSOCIATION by  
**THOMAS NELSON & SONS LIMITED**  
 PARKSIDE WORKS, EDINBURGH 9

# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

*A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology and Philosophy*

Edited by THE REV. L. A. GARRARD

*Contents for January 1952*

- |                                            |                                |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| The World Religions One in Mysticism       | SIR JOHN STEWART-WALLACE, C.B. |
| Conquering Faiths                          | EMIL MARMORSTEIN               |
| The Archaeological Problem of Jericho      | GURSTON GOLDIN                 |
| Sum Qui Sum                                | DR. PETER MUNZ                 |
| Towards a New Humanism                     | DR. A. E. BELL                 |
| Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind     | P. S. MACLELLAN                |
| The Main Stream of the Christian Tradition | REV. G. RANDALL JONES          |
| The Problem of the Good Profane            | GEOFFREY BOWKER                |
| The Idea of Creation                       | HEYWOOD THOMAS                 |
| Horizons of the Occidental Mind            | BERNHARD MOLLENHAUER           |
| Blind Progress                             | A. VAN EYKEN                   |

*Annual subscription, 12s. 6d. post free. Single copies 3s. 6d. net.*

*A free specimen copy of a back number will be sent on request.*

**GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LIMITED**

40 MUSEUM ST., LONDON, WC1





